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finance jihad in these places. The local Islamist groups lower the costs of business!

Let me quote: “...my research also revealed that the business community supported the Islamists over other armed groups as a way to lower overall costs.”

It seems businesses in places where there is some sort of civil war have to pay local gangs anyway, mostly by way of extortion and protection money. The Islamist groups compete by charging less and the businessmen end up financing them.

Let me quote again: “...in the Afghan case this rational, strategic business calculation was instrumental in financing the rise of the Taliban in 1994.”

Apparently, the smugglers and traders along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border were being forced to pay off various extorters during 1992 and 1993. This was lowering their rates of return.

Then along came the Taliban and restored order. They stopped extortion and accepted only voluntary donations. “Rallying behind the new Islamist movement... members of the business class helped turn the Taliban into a surprisingly powerful, new contender which quickly ousted the well-established ethnic warlords...”

As an aside, I might add that this was exactly the deal the East India Company offered the businessmen of Surat in the mid-17th century — security and stability at a lower cost. Indeed, all modern states offer the same pact: You pay your taxes and we will let you get on with your business and profits.

The book has nine chapters and space does not permit a description of all of them. But two deserve special mention — chapter 3 called “Mafia and Mujahideen” and chapter 8 called “The Proto-state goes Global”.

Pakistan’s role

The first is a detailed, 35-page-long description of what went on in Afghanistan and its western border during the Soviet occupation of the country. The involvement of the ISI is fully documented. It shows how fake all Pakistani claims are.

We learn about how a fellow called Sultan Ahmed Tarar, known popularly as Colonel Imam, co-ordinated “ISI operations developing close relations with Afghan commanders.” At one point he was dealing with as many as seven groups with funding, arming and training.

“In the process,” says Ms Ahmad, “the business class made a fortune... the traders quickly learned how to leverage their financial influence... and became a lynchpin between spy agencies and battle-weathered guerrillas.” As a result, smuggling became a $5-billion business.

“As they systematically built their wealth and influence, the smugglers found new political allies in Pakistan... these business elites enjoyed legal immunity and political perks from the Pakistani government...”

By 1991, the whole thing had turned into a criminal-business network with “a decidedly Islamist political character.” Shoot, loot and scoot Chapter 8 is about the new businesses that have sprung up across the South Asia, West Asia and Africa. The author discusses Pakistan, Iraq-Syria and Mali.

Pakistan, she says, started playing a duplicitous game with all involved parties and participants. The overall consequence, as we now know, has been a complete collapse of any semblance of a functioning modern state on the borders of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The short point is that the area is controlled by local gangs and warlords who tax all businesses — narcotics, trucking, construction and what have you. The difference is that whereas earlier payments to Islamist groups brought some order and stability, now it is quite the reverse.

In West Asia, it is now all about smuggling oil – what else – and antiques and fake antiques. Ms Ahmad says that “so profitable is this illegal business that some jihadists have even pretended to destroy these priceless antiques, publically declaring them un-Islamic, while secretly hoarding them for sale.”

The Daesh started with the Islamic zakat rate of 2.5 per cent but with time the rate is now much higher. Basically everyone, not just businesses, paid up.

In Mali, the business model is the same but the goods in question are cigarettes and cocaine. The profit margins are so staggering that religion is quickly forgotten.

To conclude, the author does well not to assign blame. She just tells it like it is. Black Markets and Islamist Power Aisha Ahmad OUP 303 pages; ~595