Xi’s dreams TICKER
The once-in-fiveyears congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), must be a pretty impressive event for those with no memory of the glory days of the Soviet Union. The People’s Republic does its best, but when it comes to vast auditoriums of grey-suited apparatchiks diligently applauding a leader, the USSR retains the crown. When the PRC’s leader, Xi Jinping, took the stage for what turned out to be a truly mammoth speech, it was unclear what we should expect. On those next minutes — well, hours — would turn the PRC’s future. The phrases that Xi raised to the level of dogma would determine how hundreds of thousands of government functionaries on the mainland viewed their duty. In the end, once the applause had died down and a hundred analysts had parsed the speech, there were definite clues. First: As opposed to the impression some got at the last Party congress in 2012, economic liberalisation and a greater scope for the private sector were not at the top of the agenda. Instead of a method, there was an aim — to build a “moderately prosperous society”. Second: The real priority is to establish a Party-run PRC as a global leader. This is the “China Dream” of national “rejuvenation”. Finally, it is likely that Xi will attempt to abandon the post-Deng consensus of once-adecade transfers of power between generations. In the set of half a dozen men elevated to the highest level of power at this Party congress, there appears to be nobody who will be an obvious successor to Xi — indeed, nobody in the appropriate age range.
The ideological ground has changed under Xi and the CPC since 2012, and in their favour. The ideals of modern, liberal democracy and a regulated, decentralised market-driven economy are under rhetorical and actual assault even within the countries that should have been their strongholds — in Europe, America and even India. The CPC can argue that governance and economic management “with Chinese characteristics” no longer have to pay lip service to these ideals.
There are already multiple voices saying that the CPC’s approach is “right for China”, at least. It is important to remember that while this appears to be a limited, restrained defence of CPC-style authoritarianism, it is in fact anything but that. It implies that the principles of democracy, of accountability through elections, of liberal protections for the individual, for identifiable minorities, and for entrepreneurs and companies are culturally contingent. Some cultures can’t aspire to them, or don’t need them. The CPC can point to the PRC’s awesome achievements over the past years, steering one of the greatest economic transformations in history while maintaining political stability, as evidence for this “fact”. Going forward, by claiming its own continued primacy is central to the restoration of pride in being Chinese, and by equating the growth of the PRC on the world stage as endorsement of its organisation of society, it will seek equal global legitimacy for its style of authoritarianism as there is for liberal democracy.
It is important to recognise this thinking, and to contest it where possible. There are several things about it that do not add up. First, economic. While the PRC’s economy may still have a vast presence for state-owned enterprises, the engines of growth lie elsewhere — in private enterprise. Under Xi, the CPC has taken a more adversarial approach towards private capital than was in evidence earlier, and over time the economic consequences of this for PRC economic dynamism will add up.
Second, political. The advantages of single-party or even dictatorial rule have always been clear: It allows for greater long-term planning and more coordination across diverse areas. The disadvantages are also known, and outweigh the advantages: The ability to make big mistakes, to unleash tyranny, to evade accountability. Since the 1990s, the PRC has been fortunate that its leaders have not made any such really big mistakes. Other authoritarian regimes throughout history have also had good decades. But that does not mean they never make them.
Finally, cultural. The Party is not China. Being Chinese is not the same as owing allegiance to the People’s Republic. It is necessary to remember this, however uncomfortable it may be for a CPC laying claim to global glory on the basis of an ethnically-defined “China Dream”. Think of this: Whatever Chinese cultural power exists emanates more from Hong Kong than from the mainland. The most influential ethnically Chinese thinker of the past 100 years is not Mao or anyone from the mainland, but in fact Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore. The most vibrant Chinese-speaking city, most will agree, is not on the mainland — it is Taipei. Multiple different political systems, multiple different ways of thinking and organising society and culture — all with strong “Chinese characteristics”. The CPC may claim a monopoly on the phrase, but that does not mean the rest of the world should not be sceptical about its claim.