The making of Kashmir’s tragedy

his son Karan Singh, Sheikh Abdullah and Pakistani politicians and army officers. She also sources information from unpublished documents and personal interviews in both India and Pakistan.

Hari Singh, as Karan Singh wrote in his 1982 autobiography, Heir Apparent, dreamed of independence. Between August 15 and October 26, 1947 (the day he signed the Instrument of Accession), J&K was, in fact, independent, but when critical decisions had to be made, Hari Singh played for time and did nothing. As a result, he lost over one-third of his state, and India ended up with a truncated J&K.

Hari Singh’s refusal to cooperate with Abdullah (prime minister of the state) in 1948-49 saw the administration deteriorate alarmingly, and Patel nudged him to abdicate in May 1949. The 18-year-old Karan, who then became regent, suggested in his autobiography that in retrospect, the only rational solution would have been to have initiated a peaceful partition of the state between India and Pakistan. “But that would have needed clear political vision and careful planning over many years,” he concluded.

The consequences of Hari Singh’s indecision all those years ago are visible in J&K’s unending conflict today. Ms Schofield points out that for sections of Kashmiri youth militancy has become a way of life, with young fighters showing off their weapons and using them to resolve personal disputes. The state’s under-30 generation, comprising 60 per cent of the population, has never known normalcy. However, older Kashmiris, “who have known the valley at peace, regret the insurgency because they believe that it has ruined the lives of so many without bringing about any practical gains”.

The human cost has been huge: Medical facilities are insufficient, hospitals are unhygienic, doctors are overworked and many have fled, immunisation programmes for children are behind schedule, the number of psychiatric cases has soared, the standard of school education has declined and jobs are scarce. For many, the ill-effects of living under siege have been incalculable.

Ms Schofield also observes that azadi, a rallying cry in the valley, means different things to different people — for some, independence of the entire state; for inhabitants of the valley, preservation of their inclusive culture known as Kashmiriyat; and to others, “the creation of a theocratic state”. But both Ladakhi Buddhists and Jammu Hindus are discontented with the way their interests have become subservient to those of the valley. Kashmiris, she says, may be numerically superior in the valley, but their objectives cannot determine the future of the entire state. In fact, even the Muslims of Jammu, who do not speak Kashmiri, “do not necessarily support the demands of the valley Kashmiri Muslims”.

Ms Schofield quotes the late Ashok Jaitley, chief secretary of J&K from 1996 to 2002, as telling her in an interview that azadi “is not a geographical concept but an emotional one, the freedom to be themselves, with dignity and self-respect”. She is at pains to prove that the people of J&K have not been allowed to live with dignity and self-respect. The state is militarised, there are travel curbs in force and frequent curfews, the courts and the media do not function freely, and “encounter deaths” are common. Implicit is the view that India’s politicians have messed up, and sent in the security forces to clean up — a task they are ill-equipped for.

Kashmir in Conflict has a highly inadequate discussion on J&K’s special status, protected by Article 370 of the Indian Constitution — a serious deficiency of the book. Ms Schofield quotes from a statement of N Gopaswami Ayyangar, made while moving the proposal for Article 370 in the Indian Constituent Assembly in October 1949, to show that the state’s special status — a direct result of the restrictive terms Hari Singh inserted into the Instrument of Accession, specifying that the Union government would have responsibility for only defence, foreign affairs and communications — was intended to be temporary.

Explaining that the need for special status — not enjoyed by any other state in the Indian Union — arose from Kashmir’s special circumstances, Gopaswami Ayyangar said that J&K “is not in a position to merge with India. We all hope that in future the State of Jammu and Kashmir will get over the hurdles and completely merge with the Union, like the rest of the states”.

Given how contentious Article 370 has been, it would have added to the book’s value if Ms Schofield had explained why J&K’s Constituent Assembly dissolved itself in January 1957 without recommending that the article be abrogated or amended, ensuring that a temporary provision, originally meant to last only until the state adopted its own constitution, continues to this day. India, Pakistan and the Unending War Victoria Schofield Viva Books 318 pages; ~695