Penny wise, pound foolish
Policymakers should provide adequate funds to Isro
The loss of the GSAT-6A satellite last week highlights both the strengths and weaknesses of the Indian Space Research Organisation (Isro). The launch went well, indicating that the space agency has stabilised the geosynchronous satellite launch vehicle (GSLV) platform. A new indigenously developed cryogenic engine, Vikas, offering more thrust, was used to launch a payload of over 2,140 kg. Unfortunately, ground control lost communication with the satellite just after it went through the second of the three scheduled orbit-raising manoeuvres, designed to lift it into geosynchronous orbit, 36,000 km above the Earth. This was the second mission failure since August 2017, when the IRNSS-1H navigation satellite failed to launch. The GSAT-6A failure implies that a satellite that cost over $41 million (~27 billion), with a rated life of 10 years, is now unusable. The GSAT-6A would have enabled mobile communication with multi-band coverage, thus improving mobile coverage in remote rural areas as well as enhancing the dedicated military communications network. Its successful launch had showcased Isro’s capacity to launch heavy payloads and had also asserted that Isro's grasp of cryogenic engine technology was now quite reliable since it was the sixth GSLV launch with an Indian engine.
The reason for the loss of link, however, is a power failure and highlights the penny wise, pound foolish policy approach that forces Isro to work within shoestring budgets. Space communications systems and power systems require extensive, reliable backups precisely because a simple blown fuse cannot be replaced in space. Satellites such as the GSAT-6A operate on solar power, using solar panels to store a charge in their batteries. These batteries are fully charged at launch and should be capable of operating for a while even if there’s a problem with the panels. But the whole power system on GSAT-6A appears to have failed, perhaps due to a short circuit. Insiders claim that budget constraints forced Isro to skimp on backups. Indeed, it has suffered power system problems in earlier satellites too. For example, INSAT-2D became operational only four months after its launch because it had a power system glitch, and transponder failures caused by inadequate power systems have occurred in other Isro satellites also.
While it may have been caused due to a minor electric flaw, the cost of this failure is considerable. The delay in the enhancement of the high-priority military communications network may prove expensive in strategic terms, for instance. The defence forces will have to manage until such time as a replacement satellite can be launched and made operational. Quite apart from its strategic role, Isro is responsible for multiple vital tasks, enabling civilian communications and broadcasting, compiling weather data, providing mapping and locational services. Failures such as this one also damage Isro's reputation as a commercial satellite launcher, even though the stability of the GSLV platform makes it more cost-effective. They could also affect a lucrative revenue stream. Rather than forcing the agency to survive on thin resources and jugaad, policymakers should give Isro adequate budgetary resources to ensure that failures such as this don’t occur again.