Business Standard

Reform, do not rationalis­e

It is time we shed India's complex foreign debt policy framework in favour of a coherent one that addresses the potential market failures arising from unhedged foreign currency debt

- RADHIKA PANDEY & BHARGAVI ZAVERI Radhika Pandey is with National Institute of Public Finance and Policy; Bhargavi Zaveri is with Indira Gandhi Institute of Developmen­t Research

On April 27, 2018, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) published two circulars purporting to rationalis­e and liberalise the regulatory framework governing foreign borrowings by Indian residents. Briefly summarised, these circulars make four important changes. First, they re-allow foreign investors to invest in Indian debt with a maturity period of less than three years. Second, they impose a uniform all-in-cost ceiling (cap) on the return that Indian entities may promise to foreign lenders. Third, they expand the list of ‘eligible’ borrowers permitted to raise foreign currency debt. Fourth, they prescribe a uniform list of enduses that foreign debt must not be deployed towards.

In this article, we argue that while these circulars incrementa­lly rationalis­e a complex regulatory framework, they yet again miss an opportunit­y for fundamenta­lly reforming the manner in which Indian businesses may avail of foreign debt. Currently, India’s regulatory framework governing foreign debt flows follows a prescripti­ve approach that dictates who can raise foreign capital, who can lend such capital, the purposes for which it can be used, the security that can be offered and the return that can be offered. The result is a fragmented and complex regulatory architectu­re that is difficult to administer. These circulars continue this approach, and in some instances, exacerbate its complexity. We highlight three specific problems with these circulars.

First, they reverse a significan­tly progressiv­e step taken by the RBI with respect to rupee-denominate­d corporate debt by capping the return on such debt to 450 basis points over G-sec yield of correspond­ing maturity. The reason for such reversal is unclear, given that foreign capital flows in local currency debt are not associated with systemic risk. Systemic risk is associated from borrowings denominate­d in foreign currency. Where an Indian borrower borrows in foreign currency, she bears the exchange risk. If the rupee excessivel­y depreciate­s, she will have to pay much more than what she borrowed. Unless the Indian borrower hedges such risk or has natural hedges in the form of foreign currency earnings, it may result in disproport­ionate balance sheet exposures. Where an entire sector relies on unhedged foreign currency borrowings, it can lead to a systemic collapse of the sector as well as financial institutio­ns which are exposed to the sector.

In line with this rationale, the RBI had hitherto refrained from imposing interest rate caps on rupee-loans raised from non-residents. However, these circulars reverse this logic in the garb of ‘harmonisin­g the extant provisions of foreign currency and rupee ECBs and RDBs’. The introducti­on of an interest rate cap on rupee borrowings must be supported by a first principles-based sound economic rationale.

Second, the circulars create differenti­al standards for allowing foreign debt in the short-term debt market by allowing foreign investors to invest in G-secs with a residual maturity of less than one year, but disallowin­g such investment in corporate debt of similar maturity. In 2015, RBI had, disallowed foreign investors from investing in corporate bonds with less than three-year maturity. This step was seemingly taken to harmonise the conditions of allowing foreign debt in government bonds and corporate bonds, as at that time, foreign capital was not allowed in G-secs of less than three-year maturity. Now that foreign investment in Gsecs of less than one-year maturity is permitted, it is unclear why the liberalise­d policy change was not extended to corporate bonds. Doing so would have ensured true harmonisat­ion of the framework governing foreign debt in government securities and corporate bonds.

Finally, these circulars exacerbate the complexity of the regulatory framework. While these circulars have capped the return on offshore rupee-debt (bonds issued outside India), the return on foreign portfolio investment (FPI) in onshore rupee-debt (bonds issued in India) is not capped. Foreign investment in rupee-denominate­d onshore bonds is governed differentl­y from that in offshore rupee-denominate­d bonds and loans, although the nature of these transactio­ns is substantia­lly the same, namely raising foreign capital in local currency. While onshore rupee debt is not subject to end-use restrictio­ns, offshore rupee debt is subject to restrictio­ns on end-use, eligible borrowers and eligible lenders etc.

Similarly, even for debt raised in foreign currency, different conditions on hedging and caps apply, depending on who is availing the loan. Such sector-wise caps and dispensati­ons illustrate a centrally planned approach and undue discretion.

The recent circulars that purport to “rationalis­e and liberalise” the framework, in fact, complicate the framework further. For instance, they prefer long term FPIs over other FPIs for investment in Indian debt. Classifyin­g portfolio investors into ‘long-term’ and ‘others’ again tantamount­s to central planning, without addressing the primary issue of systemic risk that unhedged foreign currency loans may pose. Similarly, they limit the participat­ion by a foreign investor in a single company’s bonds to 20 per cent of the investor’s aggregate bond portfolio. Such prudential measures are generally applied towards funds that retail consumers invest in, such as mutual funds, to avoid risk concentrat­ion. The rationale for imposing such requiremen­ts on FPIs has not been explained. Moreover, such requiremen­ts raise the compliance burden and hinder the developmen­t of a liquid and deep bond market.

It is time that we shed India’s overprescr­iptive and complex foreign debt policy framework in favour of a coherent single framework that addresses the potential market failures arising from unhedged foreign currency debt. These issues assume greater significan­ce in times when credit uptake from banks is weak, and the importance of a deep bond market is being felt more than ever before.

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 ??  ?? CHALLENGIN­G The recent circulars that purport to “rationalis­e and liberalise” the framework, in fact, complicate it further
CHALLENGIN­G The recent circulars that purport to “rationalis­e and liberalise” the framework, in fact, complicate it further

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