Sweeping conclusions?

Former foreign secretary Shyam Saran’s candid review of my book on May 29 (“Alternative Facts on the Nuclear Deal”) contends that my failure to interview key actors involved in day-to-day negotiations over the nuclear deal resulted in “sweeping conclusions”. Multiple attempts were made to secure personal interviews via email, telephone and a key intermediary but were unsuccessful. Consequently, the author relied on a close reading of Indian media articles, interviews with knowledgeable but indirectly involved Indian elites including former Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) chairmen, key Bush administration personnel and leaked American diplomatic cables.

Saran strongly refutes my thesis of disagreements between the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) over the contours of India’s separation plan and the fast breeder reactor’s (FBR) status. If the MEA and the DAE were indeed on the same page every single time, it does not account for DAE Chairman Dr Anil Kakodkar’s surprise public interview in early February 2006 in which he declared that the FBR’s should not be placed under safeguards for energy security and national security reasons forcing Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to concede.

Saran also avers that Prime Minister Singh always regarded the IPI pipeline as only possible if it demonstrated economic feasibility and lower geopolitical risk. However, then Petroleum Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar’s resolute dismissal of US Ambassador David Mulford’s sanctions threats (as evident in the leaked cables) specifically citing Cabinet support for the IPI pipeline complicates the narrative. The nuclear deal was India’s rhetorical nuclear Mahabharata and multiple interpretations are possible of this comprehensive nuclear debate.

Chaitanya Ravi via email