Why a religious nation-state fails
Covering the period from 2007 to 2019, Shuja Nawaz’s book tells the story of Pakistan’s meaning as a religious nation-state, its civil-military politics, its misalliance with the US and its quarrels with India.
The military has dominated Pakistani politics and society. He blames the US for shoring up its military. Instead, the US should work “with the people” — a vague phrase. If those who vote for Pakistan’s political parties are the people, the US may have felt it had no choice but to support the military, given the frequency with which many of Pakistan’s civilian governments have collapsed. The religious nation-state of Pakistan has failed to unite the country or create a good life for its people. (India could learn from these aspects of the Pakistani experience).
Apparently, Mr Nawaz doesn’t think Pakistan can solve its problems on its own. That is why the US plays a significant but unsatisfactory role in that country. But if the US views Pakistan as a “frenemy” rather than a friend, it could be because Washington cannot define its Pakistani tie in the same way as Beijing. The reason? America’s attempts to befriend both India and Pakistan annoy both.
Pakistan is also an extremist trainer and exporter; it is the main reason Us-led Nato forces have yet to defeat the Afghan Taliban. Isn’t it unrealistic for the US — and Mr Nawaz — to expect extremist-training generals to be peacemongers who will suddenly give up their Taliban clients instead of trying to steer them to the helm in Kabul? Several Pakistani-backed peace parleys have taken place but none has delivered the peace that the US wants in Afghanistan.
Mr Nawaz thinks that the US could help Pakistan to play a larger role in the Near East and Central Asia. But how? What does Pakistan have to offer countries in those regions? Muslim-majority United Arab Emirates buys around 4 per cent and Saudi Arabia just over 1 per cent of its exports. No Central Asian country ranks among its top 20 customers. Neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE are among its top buyers. The US, its largest customer, buys 16 per cent of its exports. China is the next largest buyer — nearly 8 per cent. The largest source of its imports — 25 per cent — is China.
In fact, Mr Nawaz could have made more of Pakistan’s long friendship with China. He thinks that the China-pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) — which is actually a vital milestone on China’s Belt and Road Initiative — could help Pakistan to connect with its neighbours, who, apart from India, have also joined China’s BRI. CPEC could, therefore, be the game changer that Pakistani leaders talk about. But he doesn’t draw out the regional significance of that development.
China, he argues, should bring more investment into Pakistan rather than burdensome debts. But he admits that CPEC has created jobs in the infrastructure sector and reduced the energy shortages that have held back Pakistan’s economy. Of the $46 billion that China has invested in CPEC, $38 billion has gone to the infrastructure and energy sectors.
Actually, China has done more than that. The latest news is that with Chinese help, Pakistan has become an arms exporter to India’s neighbour, Myanmar, and Nigeria. The impact of China helping Pakistan to develop a commercially oriented defence industry will have implications for India’s strategy and status in Myanmar and in African countries.
More investment should be made in the rebellious province of Baluchistan. Mr Nawaz points out that much of the investment in CPEC — including the development of Gwadar port in Balochistan —is tilted towards Punjab.
What China has not done, the US should do, by connecting Khyber Pakhtunwala and Balochistan, “including a tributary linked to Afghanistan”.
At the political level, the US should help make Pakistan’s government more open, inclusive and pluralistic. But the international experience across continents shows that domestic actors are the primary players in democracy-building and that democracy assistance does not go all that far.
Mr Nawaz has used a wide range of sources, including interviews with military men in Pakistan — and to a lesser extent in the US and India. Wittingly or unwittingly, his discussion revolves around the problems created by Pakistan’s identity as a religious nation-state. He could have underlined that, in 1947 and for a long time after, that identity was in conflict with that of a secular democratic India. He could also have discussed whether that identity problem could affect regional security in South Asia if India comes to be defined by Hindu nationalism. Or whether two nation-state nationalisms — instead of one — could drag their countries into war — because they seek to align religion or culture with territory. That has been the history of many nation-states across the world.
Mr Nawaz’s depressingly familiar story is about incompetent politicians, military ascendancy, fractious Indo-pakistani ties and “blaming America”. More than seven decades after the partition of British India, that story reveals why Pakistan remains stuck in an ideological rut, which prevents it from making much progress. But his account of Pakistan’s experiences as a religious nation-state offers lessons to India’s domestic and foreign policy-makers.
THE BATTLE FOR PAKISTAN: The Bitter US Friendship And a Tough Neighbourhood Shuja Nawaz Penguin Random House, 374 pages, ~799