Business Standard

Muddling along in Afghanista­n

US President Donald Trump is desperate to pull American troops out of the war-torn country, even if it means clearing the way for the Taliban’s ascent to power in Kabul

- HARSH V PANT & VINAY KAURA Harsh V Pant is professor of Internatio­nal Relations, Department of Defence Studies, King’s College London. Vinay Kaura is assistant professor, Sardar Patel University of Police, Security and Criminal Justice, Jaipur

US President Donald Trump’s unannounce­d visit to Afghanista­n for the ostensible purpose of celebratin­g Thanksgivi­ng Day and his surprise invitation to Afghan President Ashraf Ghani for an official visit to Washington needs to be assessed in the context of his desperatio­n to restart negotiatio­ns with the Afghan Taliban, which were abruptly terminated by him when the peace deal had seemed very close to being signed. This was Mr Trump’s first visit to Afghanista­n since becoming president.

The US president’s willingnes­s, or rather desperatio­n, to withdraw from Afghanista­n has never been in question. He wants a substantia­l number of American soldiers brought back from the war-torn country with or without an exit strategy, before the 2020 presidenti­al election. India has always feared this expedient haste, as it only undermines the Afghan government by signalling a lack of American resolve. New Delhi would like the Trump administra­tion to work towards an agreement that supports the democratic forces in Afghanista­n, rather than endangerin­g them. Since he has had no real alternativ­es to reviving talks, Mr Trump has chosen to pick up where he left off in September.

In Afghanista­n, Mr Trump has demanded a “ceasefire” as a preconditi­on for talks with the Taliban. Demanding a ceasefire can be termed a historic shift in Washington's position, which would also require a huge concession from the Taliban. This is the second time in a week that Mr Trump has talked about a ceasefire. During his telephone talks with his Afghan counterpar­t a few days back, when he thanked Mr Ghani for his cooperatio­n in the release of two foreign professors by the Taliban in exchange for three insurgents, Mr Trump had stressed the need for the ceasefire as a preconditi­on for talks.

This is a very significan­t position taken by the US president, who has hinted at a change in the Taliban’s position: “They [the Taliban] didn’t want to do a ceasefire, but now they do want to do a cease-fire, I believe. And it will probably work out that way. And we’ll see what happens.” However, the Taliban does not seem to have made any change.

India, which has a huge stake in the Afghan peace process, would like Mr Trump to stick to the ceasefire preconditi­on. New Delhi has always cautioned Washington about the peace process with the Taliban in Afghanista­n, advocating the role of the elected Afghan representa­tives in deciding the nation’s future.

In the recent UN General Assembly debate on Afghanista­n, an Indian diplomat in India’s UN Mission had argued that “while the internatio­nal community must be united in supporting these efforts, we do not believe in advancing prescripti­ons. In any country, it is the people of that country and the elected representa­tives of that country who should have the leading voice in deciding their future — this has always been one of India’s guiding principles in its engagement with Afghanista­n.”

Without a ceasefire, intra-afghan negotiatio­ns cannot succeed. Apart from the ceasefire, another sticking point has been the involvemen­t of the Afghan government in the process. The ostensible reason for ending the talks in September was the Taliban’s claim of responsibi­lity for a terror attack that also led to the death of an American soldier. In addition to calling off the peace process, Mr Trump had also cancelled his planned meeting with Taliban leaders and Mr Ghani at Camp David.

There is speculatio­n whether the US president wanted to improve the deal’s terms through his direct involvemen­t, or whether Mr Ghani’s presence at the signing ceremony was a clever ploy by Mr Trump to legitimise the role of the Afghan government. Given the military stalemate in Afghanista­n, the suspension of talks has not improved America’s limited set of options.

The Taliban have not demonstrat­ed any enthusiasm for sharing power with the Afghan government; their fundamenta­l interest lies in overthrowi­ng it. Even as talks with Special US Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad were underway, violence from the Taliban side showed no decline. The belief that the Taliban showed increasing willingnes­s to join the Afghan mainstream, as they remained invested in the process, was actually propagated by those in Pakistan who insist on a peace deal at all costs. If anything, the Taliban’s ultimate aim is not to secure peace, but to finalise a deal that triggers American withdrawal and clears the way for its ascent to power in Kabul.

Had the deal been signed in September, it would have seen thousands of American troops withdrawn in exchange for guarantees by the Taliban that Afghanista­n would not be used as a base for terror attacks on the West. But New Delhi has been sceptical about the Taliban’s ability to prevent Al-qaeda and other terrorist groups supported by Pakistan’s intelligen­ce agencies from plotting attacks against India from Afghan soil.

Since avoiding diplomacy is costly for all sides, it is a matter of time before the Trump administra­tion goes back to the negotiatin­g table. However, the terms of negotiatio­ns are equally important. Even those in India who accept in principle the need for a negotiated settlement have been against Washington's desperatio­n for negotiatin­g exclusivel­y with the Taliban, without securing an early ceasefire. This approach goes against the basic American position that the peace process should be “Afghan-led and Afghan-owned”.

Mr Trump has probably come to realise his previous mistake and so seems to be reinforcin­g the need for a ceasefire if the talks are to begin between Mr Khalilzad and the Taliban representa­tives. Yet, given Mr Trump’s mercurial dispositio­n and the imperative­s of domestic politics, there is no guarantee that Mr Khalilzad would necessaril­y insist on this preconditi­on in his talks with the Taliban, which can begin any time now. And therein lie the dilemmas of Indian policy towards Afghanista­n, which remains dependent on Washington’s policy responses.

Since avoiding diplomacy is costly for all sides, it is a matter of time before the Trump administra­tion goes back to the negotiatin­g table

 ?? PHOTO: REUTERS ?? Donald Trump poses for a photo with American troops during a surprise visit at Bagram Air Base in Afghanista­n on November 28. It was his first visit to the country since becoming president
PHOTO: REUTERS Donald Trump poses for a photo with American troops during a surprise visit at Bagram Air Base in Afghanista­n on November 28. It was his first visit to the country since becoming president

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