Business Standard

Stewardshi­p code: A call for action

The code aims to facilitate greater engagement between institutio­nal investors and India Inc. Will it succeed?

- ASHLEY COUTINHO

In 2014, seven domestic mutual funds (MFS) came together to oppose Maruti Suzuki’s plan to set up a plant in Gujarat. In 2017, a bunch of institutio­nal shareholde­rs wrote to Infosys seeking the return of co-founder Nandan Nilekani on the company’s board after the sudden resignatio­n of chief executive Vishal Sikka.

Instances of shareholde­r activism such as these are rare in India. But, the adoption of the Companies Act, 2013, the introducti­on of e-voting, rise in institutio­nal ownership of Indian equities, emergence of proxy advisory firms and the regulatory nudge to formulate a stewardshi­p code are goading investors to engage with boards of listed companies more closely.

The Securities and Exchange Board of India (Sebi) now wants mutual funds and alternativ­e investment funds to mandatoril­y adopt a stewardshi­p code from April 1. Insurance Regulatory and Developmen­t Authority of

India and Pension Fund Regulatory and Developmen­t Authority have also enunciated principles that their regulated entities need to adopt.

“A mandatory code may nudge mutual funds to take their stewardshi­p role a lot more seriously,” says Navneet Munot, executive director and chief investment officer, SBI Mutual Fund.

Stewardshi­p responsibi­lities include engaging investee companies on matters ranging from corporate governance and financial performanc­e to capital structure and strategy. Such engagement may be through detailed discussion­s with management, interactio­n with investee company boards and voting in board or shareholde­rs’ meetings.

Will it work?

Sebi’s revised stewardshi­p code provides a framework to monitor listed companies and it specifical­ly provides that regulation­s on insider trading should be considered while seeking informatio­n. The inability to access unpublishe­d price-sensitive informatio­n is likely to limit the ability of institutio­ns to monitor listed companies, say experts.

“Monitoring the investee companies may be a challenge. One of the areas of monitoring is strategy and informatio­n relating to strategy is usually both unpublishe­d and price sensitive. Further, fact-finding and interventi­on could be limited due to the restrictio­n on sharing informatio­n with institutio­nal investors from an insider trading perspectiv­e,” says Vaneesa Agrawal, founder of law firm Thinking Legal.

According to her, the requiremen­t that institutio­nal investors should formulate a policy for the identifica­tion of situations that can trigger communicat­ion of insider trading appears impractica­l. “The investee companies' boards should be responsibl­e for such identifica­tion as well as dealing with such situations. Having said that, institutio­nal investors can consider active interventi­on in cases where there is an alleged insider trading breach,” says Agrawal.

One of the principles for stewardshi­p stipulated by Sebi is to identify possible situations where conflict of interest may arise — such as in the case of investee companies being associates of the entity. Avoiding investment in associate companies is not a solution, reckon experts. Rather, the institutio­ns should refer such decisions to an independen­t committee and ensure that those with a potential conflict of interest are not included in decision making.

According to Shriram Subramania­n, founder and managing director of Ingovern Research Services, a proxy advisory firm, institutio­nal investors should take a stand on important corporate matters such as appointmen­t of directors and auditors, rather than confining themselves to matters pertaining to change in capital structure such as issuance of equity or raising debt.

“Institutio­nal shareholde­rs can engage better with companies on the quality of disclosure­s, especially those with regard to related party transactio­ns and other issues that don’t come for voting,” says Munot, adding that the number of issues that global shareholde­rs deal with is far greater.

Matters related to environmen­tal, social and governance (ESG) are among them. In India, the concept is yet to gain ground and most ESG decisions are taken by company boards without consulting minority shareholde­rs.

“With increasing pressure from their own investors, asset managers will soon start engaging with companies on issues such as plastic usage, water stewardshi­p, decarbonis­ation initiative­s, emissions reduction and delivering a positive environmen­tal impact,” says Abhay Laijawala, managing director, Avendus Capital Public Markets Alternate Strategies and fund manager of Avendus India ESG Fund, a category III AIF.

Chris Hodge, advisor to the Internatio­nal Corporate Governance Network, a leading authority on global standards of corporate governance and investor stewardshi­p, cautions that it can be difficult to tell from public reports whether signatorie­s to the code are engaging with companies actively or not. The stewardshi­p code in the UK was revised last year to address this issue and gather evidence on how the investors have implemente­d their stewardshi­p policies in practice.

Does size matter?

Historical­ly, promoter holding in Indian companies has been in excess of 50 per cent, making it difficult for minority shareholde­rs to intervene in matters of corporate governance. Another common refrain is that the domestic institutio­nal investors do not have the kind of heft that their global peers have in influencin­g company decisions. The tenth largest asset manager in the world, PIMCO, for instance, is about five times the Rs 28 trillion MF industry in India.

Joydeep Roy, partner at PWC India believes that the insurance industry — barring a few players such as LIC — is still a small investor in direct equities, which is why the stewardshi­p of private sector insurance companies may have insignific­ant influence over governance in companies they want to invest in.

Hodge says that size is not necessaril­y a barrier to engagement, but it may influence the way an institutio­n can engage with companies.

“Resources are clearly a constraint for smaller asset managers, but they are for the big global managers as well. The likes of Blackrock hold shares in thousands of companies worldwide, and even they do not have the resources to engage regularly with all those companies. So they have to prioritise,” he says.

According to Hodge, global investors tend to prioritise engagement with those companies where they have an ability to achieve a good outcome, where they have a significan­t shareholdi­ng and are therefore able to exercise some influence. In these cases, it is the size of the holding, not the size of the manager that matters, he says.

Institutio­nal ownership of Indian equities, however, has been rising rapidly in the past few years (see table).

“There is far greater institutio­nal awareness today about shareholde­r minority rights. Indian corporates understand that collective­ly, institutio­nal investors can engage with controllin­g promoter shareholde­rs almost as equals,” says Laijawala.

According to Munot, the "against" votes can matter even in companies where institutio­ns have a small stake and where shareholde­r resolution­s are likely to go overwhelmi­ngly in the company’s favour. “Such votes can pose a reputation­al risk, which is why companies are now more willing to engage with institutio­ns before and after putting forth a proposal,” he says.

Agrawal concurs and adds that several important decisions require a special majority under the Companies Act and the role of institutio­nal investors in such decisions can be significan­t.

Roy, for his part, feels that smaller insurance players will have to introduce technologi­cal solutions to facilitate informatio­n flow and take investment and divestment decisions accordingl­y. Another solution could be to take the help of industry bodies, Life Insurance Council and General Insurance Council to facilitate stewardshi­p activity.

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