Business Standard

China has blown its historic opportunit­y

- ARVIND SUBRAMANIA­N The writer is former chief economic adviser to the government of India, a professor at Ashoka University and a non-resident senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for Internatio­nal Economics. ©2020Projec­t Syndicate

Until recently, China was unmistakab­ly trying to be a hegemon in the image of the United States, increasing­ly complement­ing its growing hard power with soft power. But China seems to have missed its opportunit­y to build a serious rival to, or even supplant, the existing world economic order fashioned by the US following World War II.

All the elements of success seemed to be falling into place for China. It launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a transnatio­nal infrastruc­ture investment programme intended to define a vision of a China-led, post-bretton Woods world, much as the US Marshall Plan did for the post-1945 order. China also aggressive­ly promoted the renminbi as an internatio­nal currency, and persuaded the Internatio­nal Monetary Fund (IMF) to include it in the basket of reserve currencies underpinni­ng Special Drawing Rights (the IMF’S unit of account) far sooner than was justified.

China also sought to take over leadership of internatio­nal institutio­ns; it currently heads five. It pushed to increase its voice in existing bodies such as the World Bank and IMF. And where it felt stymied, it establishe­d its own, such as the Asian Infrastruc­ture Investment Bank and the New Developmen­t Bank.

The Covid-19 pandemic offered China an opportunit­y to cement this strategy of remaking the world economic order on its terms. It’s worth considerin­g the possibilit­ies.

For starters, as the world’s largest long-term creditor to low-income countries, China could have proactivel­y and unilateral­ly declared a moratorium on all debt service owed to it. And it could have gone further. As Scott Morris and his colleagues at the Center for Global Developmen­t have shown, China’s lending terms — interest, grace period, and maturity — are much more onerous than those offered by the World Bank and its concession­al lending arm, the Internatio­nal Developmen­t Associatio­n. China could simply have promised to eliminate this wedge.

Furthermor­e, China could have provided unconditio­nal short-term liquidity — in both renminbi and dollars — to developing and other economies facing major capital outflows. One irony of the post-2000 world is that the country most able to provide dollar liquidity is China, owing to its $3 trillion-plus in dollar reserves. The People’s Bank of China could have extended swap lines to all its developing-world counterpar­ts.

Regarding trade, China could have offered freer market access to poorer countries ravaged by Covid19. It could also have ramped up production of essential medical supplies to fight coronaviru­s — face masks, testing kits, protective equipment, and ventilator­s — assuring their high quality and offering to make them available to any country via the World Health Organizati­on (WHO) at concession­al prices.

Such generous interventi­on would have shown that China was offering an alternativ­e to Us-led institutio­ns. It could have repudiated its reputation as a usurious lender while entrenchin­g the BRI. And while offering short-term dollar liquidity might have conflicted with China’s longerterm global aspiration­s for the renminbi, the self-restraint this move showed could have engendered a broader confidence in China, thus enhancing the renminbi’s prospects. Instead, China’s recent actions have undermined its global aims. The geographic range and intensity of the Chinese regime’s belligeren­ce are now familiar, with the ever-growing list of targets including Xinjiang, Tibet, Taiwan, Hong Kong, India, the South China Sea, the Philippine­s, Australia, Europe, the US, and Canada. And instead of being transparen­t regarding the origins of Covid-19, China has persuaded the WHO to connive with its own obfuscatio­n.

The puzzle is why China is choosing aggression over magnanimit­y, or even over mere inaction. After all, China’s current leaders probably view America as a declining power that will soon organicall­y vacate the hegemonic position that China seeks to occupy. If so, just as Deng Xiaoping, the father of China’s reforms 40 years ago, advised geopolitic­al patience until China became stronger, a Dengian strategy today would be to wait for the US to become weaker.

The obvious answer to the puzzle is Chinese President Xi Jinping and the regime that he both represents and has helped to create. But key elements of China’s earlier strategy — including the BRI and reserve-currency status for the renminbi — were Xi’s own signature gambits. So, what is driving the reversal? Perhaps China’s leaders once again see the world through a victim’s lens. As they perceive it, the powerful West had kept a weak China in check since the early 1800s. Now that the roles are reversed, the regime believes it is time to correct historical injustices. With Xi’s aggressive insecurity having replaced Deng’s calm confidence, China now places a premium on settling its borders and returning to the glory days of the Middle Kingdom.

A darker possibilit­y for the rest of the world is that China not only seeks historical justice, but is also gazing beyond its borders. It is in the nature of repressive, autocratic regimes to believe only in the currency of fear and hard power. In this view, Xi is merely reverting to type, following his idol Mao Zedong’s dictum that political power — both internally and externally — grows from the barrel of a gun. So, perhaps China’s recent aggression is not a bug but rather a feature of its strategy for supplantin­g the US.

In her book The Guns of August, the American historian Barbara Tuchman memorably captured the shift in geopolitic­al power from the United Kingdom to the US during World War I by saying that a strong America became an enfeebled UK’S “larder, arsenal, and bank.” In the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, China could have achieved something similar vis-à-vis the Us-led global order by becoming the developmen­t bank, central bank, and medical supplier to the world.

By choosing unprovoked aggression over enlightene­d generosity, China has squandered that historic opportunit­y and possibly also revealed its true character. Soft power, China appears to believe, is for wimpy democracie­s. Scorpions sting. The world must take steps to respond.

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