Minority reports
Former Election Commissioner S Y Quraishi takes a calm, reasonable approach to debunking a core Hindutva thesis: Namely, the Muslim population is growing so fast it will overtake the Hindu population. The trope is buttressed with allusions to polygamy (along with the “love jihad” corollary) and assertions of Muslims driven by religious fervour to have many children.
To put it mildly, this is a politically explosive subject. The author has tackled this squarely and taken the logic apart. Population growth (and decline) is driven by biological and socio-economic imperatives and the trends are subject to mathematical laws.
Many scholars have examined global and national data and teased out correlations of population growth with factors like education, availability and knowledge of contraception, socioeconomic status, age at marriage, etc. These variables account for far more than nominal religion.
Combining Census data with highschool mathematics is enough to reduce the “Muslim majority” myth to absurdity. The book cites an array of statistics, along with a couple of simple mathematical models of population growth, and a brief, coherent explanation of demography 101 to do this.
It provides an overview of policy since Independence. It also examines historical trends in Muslim majority countries such as Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iran, Nigeria and so on. As a bonus, there are two thought-provoking chapters on the attitudes of Islam and other religions to population control.
Historically every nation goes through several phases of demographic transition. Phase one, which can last for centuries, sees high birth rates hand-inhand with low life expectancies. Populations remain more or less stable as people die in wars, pandemics, famines, etc. As life expectancy improves, there’s a population explosion in phase two.
In phase three, birth rates also come down. Eventually a second, more stable population equilibrium is reached in Phase four, or there’s a declining trend (phase five). India is now in late phase three and moving to phase four.
The most important data-point for demographers is the Total Fertility Rate (TFR), which is the number of children an average woman bears. A TFR of 2.1 (just over two children per woman) is enough to maintain stability. TFRS lower than 2 are associated with decline —most west European nations are now below that threshold (sans immigration). So is Kerala (1.56).
Globally, declining TFR is associated with many factors. The important ones include the age at marriage (the later, the better); literacy levels, especially women’s literacy; awareness and access to contraception; higher income; good healthcare; lower infant mortality; etc.
India has enormous regional variations in TFR but these factors hold good. The more educated south, with better healthcare and education and higher income, has hit First World TFRS in many places. The under-educated north, with poor healthcare, higher poverty, earlier marriages, fewer women in the workforce, and so on has a much higher TFR.
Religion doesn’t seem to be a factor. Muslims in Tamil Nadu and Kerala have far lower TFRS than all communities in north India. Muslim-majority nations like Bangladesh, Turkey, Iran have lower TFRS than India, and way lower TFRS compared to Nigeria.
Indian Muslims tend to be less educated than Hindus, who in turn are less educated than Sikhs, Christians, Buddhists and Jains (these smaller minorities are now all below replacement TFR). Muslims also have lower per capita income, and are concentrated in poor states with bad healthcare. Hence they have higher TFRS. The differences between communities disappear if those non-religious variables are controlled (Muslims have lower infant mortality than Hindus of similar socio-economic profiles).
Incidentally, the polygamy “argument” is based on spurious logic. India has a poor gender ratio. Any polygamist “deprives” other men of opportunities at fatherhood. Data also indicates very few Indian Muslims are polygamous. Indeed, the 1961 Census data (polygamy was legal for all nonchristians until 1955) showed Muslims had lower incidences of polygamy than other communities.
TFRS have declined for all Indian communities as literacy and per capita has increased and awareness about contraception has grown. The north is much higher than the south with Bihar (3.4) and UP (2.7) the worst off. India has a young population but overall TFR has dropped to 2.14, which is near-replacement.
The gap between all-india Hindu TFR (2.13) and Muslim TFR (2.61) was 0.48 according to the NFHS-4 Survey of 2015-16. This is much lower than in 2005-6 (NFHS-3) when Muslim TFR (3.4) exceeded Hindu TFR (2.6) by 0.8. Even if this gap remains or increases (unlikely), there is no way a 14.2 per cent minority (the proportion of the Muslim population) can ever overtake the 79.8 per cent Hindu majority.
The ideologues who raise the bogey of minorities becoming majorities will not read this book, or cease their votecatching rants. But if you do get into an argument on the subject, you may want to cite this concise and comprehensive refutation.