Strategy in Israel-iran escalatory ladder
The latest escalation between Israel and Iran marks a significant change in the adversarial relationship between the two antagonists. Not since the first Persian Gulf War of 1990-91, when the Iraqi military under Saddam Hussein struck Israel with SCUD missiles, have the Israelis been subjected to a missile attack on the scale the Iranians executed. Tehran’s most recent salvo involved a combination of drones and missiles. The missile barrage consisted of a mixture of cruise and ballistic missiles. Israel’s missile defences intercepted an estimated 331 missiles launched by the Iranians. To be sure, the Israelis benefitted from American and British assistance in intercepting the volley of Iranian missiles and drones. What compelled the Iranians to launch such a large attack? The immediate and proximate cause was the Israeli air strike against the Iranian consulate in Damascus that killed two top Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) generals. This event triggered the latest round of escalation between Tel Aviv and Tehran, with the latter launching the Kheibar Shekan and Emad ballistic missiles and Paveh cruise missiles. The drones used by Iran included the Shahed 131 and 136. The Shahed 136 UAVS have been employed in Ukraine by the Russians.
From Iran’s perspective, Israel breached a critical threshold by attacking its diplomatic mission, which Tehran deemed its sovereign territory. Iran’s retaliatory action against the Israeli attack was not perfectly symmetrical in that the means employed by Israelis was likely manned airpower, whereas the Iranians used Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVS) and missiles to strike Israel. Both the non-availability of manned airpower and easy availability of UAVS, ballistic and cruise missiles induced the Iranians to launch them. The volume of projectiles and drones launched by Iran was also disproportionate to Israel’s initial attack, but from Tehran’s point of view this was par for the course for striking the sovereign territory of Iran.
Regardless of the lack of success accruing from Iran’s missile-cum-drone shower, with at most five missiles penetrating Israeli defences, this is likely sufficient from an Iranian standpoint, because in all probability Tehran’s purpose was strategic, conveying to the Israelis they ought not to repeat attacks against high-value Iranian targets. Indeed, five ballistic missiles were successful in penetrating Israeli defences by striking Nevatim Airbase in the Negev desert, causing minor damage. Influencing the risk calculus of the Israelis and inducing greater Israeli restraint was the real aim. Yet, what do we make of the ‘failure’ of Iran’s combined missile-drone attack? It might be the case that a key reason why the Iranian missile-plusdrone attack was generally unsuccessful is because it was a deliberately performative act. The Iranians relayed in advance that they would retaliate by publicly revealing how they would do it or dropped sufficient hints that Israeli and American intelligence picked up.
A direct consequence of this was that it allowed both the Israelis and their allies — the Americans and the British — ample preparatory time to defend against Iran’s missile and drone assault. By telegraphing the scale of the attack in advance, Iran was giving its primary adversary time to ready its defences to effectively neutralise the attack in a bid to insulate itself from a punitive reprisal by Israel and its allies. Yet, the scale of the attack does not square with the notion that it was a performative act and to conclude that it was based more on hindsight than foresight. After all, what if some of the Iranian missiles actually ended up inflicting significant casualties and destruction compelling the Israelis to escalate precipitously in retaliation. The extent of the attack does reveal that Iran has shown a greater proclivity to take risks and the confidence to do so it had hitherto not displayed. But Tehran has also indicated that it wants to de-escalate, stating that it has achieved its objectives.
Even so, Israeli missile and air defences performed commendably with Israel intercepting and destroying 99 per cent of missiles and drones launched from Iranian soil. The multilayered Israeli air-defence system consists of the Arrow Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system developed jointly with the Americans geared for exo-atmospheric interception against longrange ballistic missiles. David’s Sling is another capability to intercept medium-range missiles, which is supplemented with the American-built Patriot battery system. In addition, the Israelis deploy the Iron Dome that is specialised to intercept short-range rockets. Finally, the Iron Beam system is a directed energy or laser capability which may have been involved in the interception of Iran’s missile volley and considered cheaper than the other interception capabilities Israelis possess, but there is conflicting evidence about it actually being operational.
Iran’s massive missile assault foreshadows ominous trends for strategic stability in West Asia, representing a clear transformation in the conflict dynamics between Tehran and Tel Aviv. Proxies and other domains such as cyberspace are likely to be the means through which Iran and Israel are likely to battle each other and their intensely adversarial relationship is likely to affect several countries in the region. Nuclear weapons too are just waiting in the shadows.