Checkmate China

Last year, a team of eight eminent persons, including foreign secretary Shyam Saran, Lt. Gen Prakash Menon (Retd) and Nandan Nilekani (all of whom had also interacted with the national security adviser, Shiv Shankar Menon, and his two deputy NSAs), released a document titled “Non Alignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the 21st Century”. To summarise the seven chapters of this document in a few sentences is not difficult because their thesis rests on the assumption that the emerging new world will be bipolar, pirouetting on US and China, while India, it states, must maintain neutrality if it wants to progress economically.

Whether or not India chooses to align with the US, surely it cannot remain “neutral” to its primary threat, China. In fact, it must pursue genuine strategic partnerships with some important nations like Japan, Singapore and Vietnam.

Though most strategic thinkers agree that by 2025 India will have the third largest economy in a multipolar world, the document by Indian experts reiterates the policy of appeasement towards China and Pakistan, an Indian doctrine which has emboldened our adversaries, as evidenced by events in the last few months. Pakistan has been beheading our soldiers, attacking Indian inmates in Pakistani jails, sending counterfeit currency notes and terrorists into India, while China has recently intruded deep into Indian territory in Ladakh, without firing a shot.

A perusal of the new Chinese defence white paper, released in April 2013, shows that China has made no mention of its “no first use” (NFU) nuclear doctrine (mentioned in all previous white papers), thus leaving India as the only nuclear weapons state in the world with a “no first use” nuclear doctrine, a fact which certainly won’t deter our two main adversaries. The same white paper indicates the Chinese Army strength at 850,000, Air Force at 398,000 and Navy at 235,000 men (the manpower of the Second Artillery, which deploys all nuclear and conventional missiles, has not been indicated). If taken at face value, then it’s advantage India.

India has an Army which is 50 per cent larger than China’s, and both sides have deployed about nine divisions (200,000 troops) on the India-China border. China has better infrastructure on its side of the border, thus permitting rapid troop build up. India’s belated attempts to build up its border infrastructure resulted in the latest Chinese incursion that began on April 15, 2013, a task made easy because that part of the border was under the ITBP (a police force that’s no match for the regular Chinese Army).

On April 15, 2013, a Chinese Army platoon of 30 men in three vehicles, drove 19 kilometers into Ladakh, to a place called Depsang Bulge (about 30 kms from Daulat Beg Oldi or DBO airstrip), set up four tents and have since received supplies by helicopters. The DBO airstrip is important to India because of its proximity to Karokaram pass (where the Chinese-built road connects China to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir), and also because DBO guards the eastern ingress route to the Siachen glacier.

On April 29, a fifth tent was erected by the Chinese platoon. All this at a time when China’s military machine is totally pre-occupied in the Asia Pacific Region (APR) — it is trying to enforce China’s territorial claims in the East and South China seas; it’s trying to negotiate on behalf of North Korea with the US, Japan, South Korea and Vietnam; and it faces uprisings in Xinjiang province.

Surely India can take advantage of China’s “over stretched” military machine and convey a tough message — that aggression does not pay — by undertaking a series of tit-fortat incursions into Chinese territory. It could also cut off supply lines to the Chinese intruders and make their position untenable. The Air Force could maintain combat air patrols, and Army could use shoulderfired surface to air missiles to deter intrusions into our airspace by Chinese helicopters. There may, of course, be some Chinese response to our defensive actions. Our response to the unfolding situation would need to be carefully caliberated. In 1987, a massive Chinese incursion into Sumdorong valley (Arunachal Pradesh) was stopped dead in its tracks, without a single shot being fired by the Indian Army, by moving troops to tactically advantageous positions. It took considerable effort by the then Army Chief, Gen. Sundarji, to persuade an indecisive Indian government to allow the Army to act decisively. Today, the “problem” in replicating the “Sumdorong manoeuvre” appears to be the installation of one more “hurdle” — the NSA, presently a post held by a retired diplomat of good standing, has taken over the task of rendering professional military advice to the government on military and nuclear matters. Fortunately, on May 1, some 17 days after the Chinese incursion, the Army Chief was finally given the opportunity to brief the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). A failure to react to the present Ladakh incursion screams of lack of resolve and will result in loss of territory and a repetition of similar Chinese actions elsewhere.

In the medium term, the loopholes in our conventional capability need to be plugged urgently. We must also change our NFU nuclear doctrine and make it similar to those of other nuclear weapon states, induct Tactical Nuclear Weapons to match those held by China and Pakistan, and enhance our nuclear arsenal to a number and range which will cover all Chinese and Pakistani cities with a population of above one million. China has 160 such cities, while Pakistan has 10.

India’s nuclear arsenal, according to unconfirmed media reports, is 90. India has 50 cities with a population of over one million, and these are effectively covered by Pakistan’s rapidly growing nuclear arsenal (presently at about 110 bombs), while China (with an estimated nuclear arsenal of over 240 bombs) has a similar strike capability. No wonder our leadership is terrified at the prospect of taking any action beyond “talking”, whilst our adversaries are exercising overt and covert military options.

Unfortunately, given years of neglect, enhancing our conventional and nuclear deterrence capability will take over a decade. An interim option is to deploy Navy warships and submarines more frequently in the APR, and also diplomatically question Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and Xinjiang. This requires courage. The UPA government may find that taking a firm stand now will put the nation in a better mood when it queues up to vote in 2014.

The writer retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief

of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam