Soft targets: The myth and reality
Why do terrorists choose to strike soft targets? The answer would be because they feel hitting hard targets is becoming difficult. So what constitutes a “soft target”?
Security experts are trying to understand the issue of soft targets. There are still many unanswered questions. For instance, do terrorists really consider it a soft target? And, most importantly, how do terrorists define their enemies or attack targets?
These are genuine queries for both practitioners and academics. But it appears as if the state and its security institutions are deliberately manoeuvring the “myth” of soft targets to cover up their weak responses. As they have done before, after the recent attack on lawyers in Quetta, the government and security establishment came up with the excuse that terrorists are on the run and therefore are now choosing soft targets. The fact of the matter is that, even after the Army Public School, Peshawar, attack in 2014, terrorists have been successful in carrying out large scale attacks across the country.
Usually, civilians and unarmed individuals are considered “soft targets”. The recent spate of terrorist attacks across the world indicates a disturbing trend of a visible increase in attacks targeting non-combatants. Many experts link this increase to the emergence of the Islamic State group, and its inspired groups. The terrorist attack on crowds celebrating Bastille Day in Nice, the suicide attack on a Kurdish wedding and the suicide attack in Madina, are just some examples of this.
Militants are exploiting security gaps to execute tested strategies. Taking hostages and mass shootings were used in many operations, including the attacks in Dhaka and Kabul.
Many security experts assume that terrorists target non-combatants to divert the attention of security institutions. Then, an attack on civilians increases the impact of terrorism and puts states on the defensive. However, if we look at the patterns of attacks, terrorists continuously target specific non-combatant individuals and groups. With little variations in different regions, terrorists mainly target religious minorities, intellectuals, elites and other groups that hold divergent views.
Terrorists consider these segments their enemies. But in most cases, security institutions prioritise securing state infrastructure and elites. Militants take the same amount of time in planning and executing their operations to hit both “soft” and “hard” targets. The state and its security institutions may have an excuse that they lack resources, logistics, and even capabilities, but terrorists exploit these same weaknesses.
Collateral damage is another myth directly linked to a soft target. While counterterrorism operations might cause collateral damage, terrorists are also least concerned about the casualties of “neutrals” and even their sympathisers. A recent report by Action on Armed Violence revealed that during the last five years, 77 per cent of the total number of deaths and injuries (145,565) recorded in armed conflicts were ordinary people. However, terrorists always prioritise important strategic targets that have national and international significance. Although they continuously focus on their noncombatant enemies, their prime objective remains to hit hard and cause maximum casualties.
Similar patterns can be witnessed in Pakistan. According to open-source databases, the TTP, other Al Qaeda groups, and Balochistan insurgents have managed to carry out 7,311 terrorist attacks in Pakistan from January 2011 to mid-August 2016. These attacks claimed 9,689 lives and left 18,812 others injured. Fatalities among security personnel were 2,672.
In many cases, the perception of state and society about militants — that they are not rational actors — complicates the situation. People get confused when terrorists target segments of a society holding views different from that of a country’s establishment. This happened recently when ISIS attacked a Kurdish wedding in Turkey.
The recent terrorist attack in Quetta — and other attacks in the past that target political leaders, nationalist political workers and religious scholars, who hold views contrary to the terrorists’ — triggered anger against the government. The security institutions’ weaknesses are the strength of the terrorists. The government and establishment should not expect that the mantra of “soft targets” will absolve them of their responsibility to protect the people.