BRITAIN’S GILGIT GRAB: INDIA LEFT BARKING UP THE WRONG TREE

Declassified British archives establish the Partition of the Indian sub-continent was scripted by the British for their geo-strategic interests during its 'Great Game' (the precursor to the Cold War) with then Soviet Russia, to prevent Russian influence from travelling southwards towards oil-rich Middle East. 'Pakistan' was a necessity as it formed part of the Islamic crescent from Turkey to China that would serve as an ideological boundary to check Russia's influence.

The political agreement of Partition, driven by the British and the Muslim League, and eventually accepted by the Congress, was crystallized in British statutes - the Indian Independence Act of 1947, and the modified Government of India Act of 1935. The British provinces of Punjab and Bengal were partitioned according to the two-nation theory, conceived by the British and mouthed by M.A. Jinnah to justify the creation of Islamic Pakistan, with the 560 odd princely states given the choice to accede to either India or Pakistan or remain independent.

While planning Partition, the British assumed — wrongly — that the strategically-located state of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) would accede to Islamic Pakistan. Instead, J&K acceded to India on October 26, 1947, defeating the very rationale of creating ‘Pakistan’. But, the British did not need the whole of J&K, merely strategically placed Gilgit and the slice of today’s ‘Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir’ to protect Pakistan from liquidation should India go to war.

Britain, in violation of every conceivable principle of international law, effected a takeover of Gilgit on October 30, 1947. ‘Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir’ was captured by Pakistan-led tribals with the collusion of the British, whose officers headed both Indian and Pakistani armies.

India remained a British dominion till 1950, with the King as its formal head. Right up to 1948, New Delhi let Governor General Lord Louis Mountbatten formulate India’s Kashmir policy. Mountbatten disclosed in an interview that, at the time of accession of J&K, he told Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that he (as GG) would sign the acceptance of the accession instrument only if New Delhi agreed to hold a plebiscite in J&K to determine the wishes of the people. New Delhi agreed to such plebiscite, having formulated the policy of ascertaining the wishes of the people in the case of disputed accessions, as in Junagadh and Hyderabad. New Delhi accordingly ‘pledged’ that it would regard the accession of J&K to be ‘purely provisional’ and subject to the wishes of the people who would ‘settle’ the question of accession.

Mountbatten persuaded New Delhi to involve the UNSC. The real purpose was to take Kashmir issue out of India’s domestic jurisdiction and have the UNSC call for a ceasefire without requiring Pakistan to first vacate the areas of J&K that it had occupied through aggression and to have the UNSC look the other way when Pakistan consolidated its control over such occupied territory. New Delhi was compelled by the UNSC to respect the ceasefire line and to helplessly watch as Pakistan consolidated its control over the occupied territory. Thus, under the guise of an UNSC directed cease-fire, Pakistan (and the British) retained precisely those areas of J&K that the British needed for the Great Game.

Mountbatten also succeeded in persuading New Delhi to commit to hold a plebiscite in J&K under international auspices. The UNSC would then bypass India's complaint of aggression and hold India to its offer of plebiscite in J&K, as it does even today. It was a trap laid at the UNSC by the British for New Delhi to confer ‘disputed territory’ status on J&K. New Delhi fell for it. India is the only country that has gone to the UN complaining of aggression against its territory and returned by committing to a plebiscite to first decide whether that territory even forms part of the country.

New Delhi, realised, too late, that the UNSC was being subverted by the political expediency of its members, and that it had tied India's hands and pre-empted it from recovering a substantial portion of the state. New Delhi took the easy way out-it simply disowned the occupied territory of the state and its unfortunate people, who remain citizens of India under the Indian Constitution but live under foreign rule. New Delhi, following the policy of territorial status quo, even indicated its inclination to partition J&K along the lines recorded in the UN Yearbooks. It told the UNSC on February 15, 1957, that it considered that it had ’a duty not to re-agitate matters’ and had decided to ‘let sleeping dogs lie so far as the actual state of affairs is concerned’.

When Indian forces reclaimed part of the territory of J&K during the Indo-Pakistan wars, New Delhi handed back territory. When Pakistan audaciously gifted a part of the occupied territory to China in 1963, New Delhi confined itself to making formal, impotent, protests.

New Delhi then decided that the UNSC could not call the shots on J&K, forgetting that it was Delhi that had taken the Kashmir issue to the UN. It adopted the position that Kashmir must be resolved bilaterally under the Simla Agreement of 1972 and the Lahore Declaration of 1999.

Delhi sees a major diplomatic victory if any country endorses the Kashmir issue as ‘bilateral‘! All of Delhi’s energies are frittered away in checking the internationalisation of the issue, little realising that each time it terms the Kashmir issue a bilateral dispute, it reaffirms Pakistan’s standing in the matter, other than as an aggressor.

Delhi emphasises the ‘inviolability’ of the LoC at every conceivable occasion and strives, unofficially, for the conversion of the LoC into the international border. It is content to lodge protests at the proposed formal annexation by Pakistan of the Gilgit region or at the use of such Indian territory for the China Pakistan Economic Corridor. Implicit in this policy is that New Delhi is willing to cede national territory, overlooking that it lacks competence under the Indian Constitution to do so.

The Supreme Court had held at one point of time that Parliament could cede national territory. However, in 1973, the Court took the view that Parliament lacked power to tinker with the basic structure of the Constitution, which includes the unity and territorial integrity of the country. As a result, Parliament cannot give away Indian territory. In following this policy of territorial status quo. New Delhi has, therefore, been barking up the wrong tree.

INDIA IS THE ONLY COUNTRY IN HISTORY THAT HAS GONE TO THE UN COMPLAINING OF AGGRESSION AGAINST ITS TERRITORY AND RETURNED BY COMMITTING TO A PLEBISCITE TO FIRST DECIDE WHETHER THAT TERRITORY EVEN FORMS PART OF THE COUNTRY.