Will India and China fight a war again?
Another October 20 is at hand. It’s the day on which the 1962 Sino-Indian border war began. Most Indians still rightly see the 1962 border war between India and China as a relatively small military defeat but a major national panic, as a cathartic event and one that is never forgotten. While 1962 will still be the seminal year for Sino-Indian relations, it is in 1967 when Indian and Chinese troops last clashed with each other at Nathu La that now defines it. Since then, not a shot has been fired across the border by either side.
On September 11 that year, jostling over the laying a barbed wire fence by Indian troops to demarcate the border at Nathu La escalated when the People’s Liberation Army suddenly opened withering machine gunfire, killing many officers and jawans. The Indian Army retaliated with a blistering artillery fire that obliterated PLA positions. On October 1, 1967, this event repeated itself at Cho La when 7/11 Gurkha Rifles and 10 JAK Rifles were tested by the PLA and similarly not found wanting. The lesson had been driven home and the ceasefire that followed still holds.
The lesson of 1967 has been well learnt by China, just as the lesson of 1962 has been absorbed by India. Not a single shot has been fired across the border since then and even today the Indian Army and the PLA stand eyeball to eyeball, but the atmosphere now is far more relaxed.
In 1971, as the Pakistani armies in the east as well as the west were crumbling, Henry Kissinger, then US national security adviser, met China’s ambassador at the UN, Huang Hua, in Manhattan reportedly said “the President wants you to know that it’s of course up to the People’s Republic to decide its own course of action in this situation, but if the People’s Republic were to consider the situation in the Indian subcontinent a threat to its security, and it took measures to protect its security, the US would oppose efforts of others (Soviet Union) to interfere with the People’s Republic”. The Chinese declined the invitation.
After the incidents at Depsang and Doklam, we come to the question that still bothers many Indians. Will China provoke a conflict with India, or even viceversa? I don’t think so. Both countries are now well settled on the Line of Actual Control (LAC). In Ladakh, China is pretty much on what it desired pre-1962, which is along the old McCartney-MacDonald Line. In 1942, spooked by reports of a Russian presence in Xinjiang. British India hastily abandoned it in favour of the Johnson Line, which encompassed all of Aksai Chin. In the eastern sector, India pretty much holds on to the alignment along the McMahon Line.
Thrice in the past, the Chinese offered to settle this vexatious issue on an “as is where is” basis, but India baulked because the compulsions of domestic politics did not allow it, as they still do. In his last conversation on this with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Chairman Deng Xiaoping had suggested freezing it as it is and leaving it to history to resolve. Good and sagacious advice!
In recent years, China has built as many as 18 forward airbases in Xinjiang, Tibet and Yunnan that put most cities in northern and eastern India within striking range of its new-generation fighterbombers. By contrast, most Chinese cities and industrial centres are deep within and not easily reached by Indian aircraft. It’s somewhat ironical that Tibet, which India used to see as a buffer against China or Russia, has now become a buffer for China.
Yet China has built a huge military infrastructure. India has taken note of this, and has sought to suitably counter it with a buildup of its own. But buildups also lead to more buildups and put you on an ascending spiral of mistrust.
But of one thing we can be sure. If there is a conflict again, it will not be the limited war of the kind seen in 1962. The early use of airpower is implicit. China had threatened it in 1967 when it got bloodied at Nathu La. Both countries now maintain large and powerful air forces. There is also every possibility that the conflict could extend into the Indian Ocean region soon after, where India has a strategic advantage.
Conflicts are generally the result of a serious military asymmetry or by misjudging intentions or by local conflicts spiralling out of control or when domestic failures require a diversion of attention or when domestic dynamics make rational discourse impossible. In 1962, we saw the last two at play. After the colossal failure of the Great Leap Forward and after over 30 million died of starvation between 1959 and 1962, Chairman Mao needed a diversion to assert his control of the Chinese Communist Party and the PLA.
On the Indian side the unthinking escalation of attacks on Jawaharlal Nehru by the Opposition, and from within the Congress Party, forced the government to adopt a strident note and embark on the illfated Forward Policy. This was despite written advice by its Northern Army commander, Lt. Gen. Daulat Singh, that a policy without the military means to support it would have grave consequences.
The serious asymmetry of 1962 does not occur now. India’s arms buildup makes it apparent that a conflict will not be confined to the the Himalayas but will swirl into the skies above and the Indian Ocean region. Both countries have sufficient arsenals of nuclear weapons to deter each other. But above all, both countries have evolved into stable political systems, far less naïve and inclined to be far more cautious in their dealings with each other.
This leaves a local conflict rapidly spiralling out of control highly improbable. After 51 years of not shooting at each other the two armies have evolved a pattern of ritualistic behaviour and local bonhomie that is very different from rigid formalities of international politics. Both sides have invested enough to have a vested interest in keeping the peace and tranquility of the frontier. The writer, a policy analyst studying economic and security issues, held senior positions in government and industry. He also specialises in the Chinese economy. Former journalist M.J. Akbar’s decision to quit the Council of Ministers is no doubt the first victory for the #MeToo movement in the country (Durga Shakti prevails, Akbar forced to resign, Oct. 18). It is really a proud moment for the Indian women. In fact, he should have resigned the moment allegations were levelled against him. The #MeToo movement should not stop here but continue to support women of all categories. Ram P. Secunderabad The #MeToo movement has to be understood as a voice against harassment, rather than a tug of war between genders. The platform has given women the courage to speak out against their harassers. There is a need to pay close attention and take action by investigating both sides. Ahmad Hasan Hyderabad
If there is a conflict again, it will not be the limited war of the kind seen in 1962. The early use of airpower is implicit. China had threatened it in 1967 when it got bloodied at Nathu La.