India’s options limited after China intrusions
In October last year, a senior Indian security official met the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Indian Army’s 14 Corps. The Corps was raised in the aftermath of the Kargil war between India and Pakistan in 1999 and has its headquarters in Leh.
The Leh-based 14 is primarily tasked with maintaining the sanctity of the Line of Actual Control that divides Aksai Chin and Ladakh between India and China. Aksai Chin came under Chinese occupation after the 1962 war that dealt India a crushing blow. It also allowed the Chinese to hook up with its all-weather ally Pakistan through the illegally ceded territory of Shaksgam Valley in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).
Lieutenant General Harinder Singh is a former director general of military intelligence, who took over as the GOC of 14 Corps late last year. The Indian security official explained to him that the change of the status of Jammu & Kashmir had irked the Chinese. In the coming months they would up the ante and try and capture more land and shift the LAC deeper into Indian-held territory.
Several Indian security officials have confirmed that there was adequate credible intelligence of China’s intentions to up the ante in the Ladakh sector. The heights of the Galwan Valley overlooks a key road that winds its way to Daulat Beg Oldie, an outpost that serves as a key military base for India.
By November/December 2019 the world was waking up to news of a spread of a deadly virus in Wuhan, China, and all talk about the Chinese preparations to take over the Galwan Valley in Ladakh was lost. As winter set in, Indian troops settled in for business as usual. But the events that unfolded on the night of June 15 raise several key questions. Why did India’s top political, strategic and military leadership fail to anticipate and counter Chinese intentions to challenge and occupy Indian claims in Ladakh?
How should India now counter a clear and present danger on its northern borders? Did the newly-appointed Chief of Defence Staff, General Bipin Rawat, mislead the government? How did the plethora of official agencies set up to study China fail to predict a clear change in its India policy?
RISING HOSTILITIES
The brutal killing of Colonel Santosh Babu, the commanding officer of the 18th battalion of the Bihar Regiment, and his men by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has brought home the reality of Chinese intentions in Ladakh. Reliable military and intelligence sources say that the death toll of Indian soldiers is considerably higher and could be more than 40 soldiers. A lieutenant colonel and a major are still missing and could be in Chinese captivity.
What is inexplicable is why Colonel Babu and his men went unarmed to remove a temporary Chinese structure at Patrolling Point 14. The standard procedure is to carry assault rifles slung at the back, pointing downwards, to signal peaceful intent, but to also serve as a deterrent to Chinese troops from taking any sudden hostile moves. Why was Colonel Babu and his men sent in unarmed?
The Chinese plans that the Indian security official had briefed Lieutenant General Harinder Singh late last year continued even as the world turned its attention to an emerging pandemic threat from China. The Chinese build-up was confirmed by other Indian intelligence agencies and reports were sent to Delhi. However, they were either missed or ignored, allowing the Chinese build-up. Why did India fail to read the tea-leaves and anticipate China’s intentions to change status quo?
CRUMBLING DEFENCES
The rising political rhetoric in the aftermath of the “surgical strikes” in 2016 to “avenge” the killing of
19 soldiers in Uri and the air strike on Balakot, Pakistan in February
2019, as a response to the death of 40 Indian policemen in Pulwama, has pushed India into a tight corner. While political rhetoric is good for winning elections, it is not smart strategy.
Soon after the Kargil war, the then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee government instituted a committee to look into lapses and reform India’s security apparatus. A Group of Ministers went through the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee and began an ambitious plan to reform India’s security apparatus. The Kargil Committee recommended the ITBP be chosen as the lead agency. It reports to the Union ministry of home affairs, which also commands the Intelligence Bureau and was the lead on abrogating Article
370 within months of PM Modi winning a historic landslide electoral victory in May 2019.
A 700-km border and Line of Actual Control that stretches from the Karakoram ranges to Himachal Pradesh is now manned jointly by the ITBP and the Indian Army. The local ITBP sector headquarters holds a meeting every month with representatives from the intelligence agencies, Army, Air Force, customs and the state police to review any intelligence on China relevant to their sector. So how did this elaborate Indian security apparatus miss China moving nearly two army divisions (about 9,00012,000 men) into the area? How did they miss a road being built by the Chinese up to the strategic Finger 4? And how did they miss Chinese troops building semipermanent bunkers on the Galwan Valley heights?
COMPOUNDING FAILURES
Every year the defence and home ministries sit and jointly plan the patrolling schedule for the Ladakh sector. Decisions are taken on how many patrols will be sent by the army and ITBP separately and jointly. Each patrol carries GPS units to collect waypoints and record the areas that have been covered. Clearly, this mechanism failed to anticipate China’s moves to consolidate its position in the Galwan Valley. India’s political and strategic leadership also failed to anticipate that the Chinese would violate agreements from
1993, 1996 and 2013 that specifically bars any change in status of the LAC by either side.
India’s military, starved of crucial funds for the last six years, has limited war fighting capabilities. At best, it is in a position to sustain a full-scale war for only
12-15 days after factoring in its current war wastage reserves. India will also have to keep in mind the possibility of a two-front war if Pakistan steps in, if things escalate quickly with China. The failure to anticipate China’s intentions has already proved costly. However, years of bad planning and abysmal defence budgets, rapidly spreading Covid-19 infections and a broken economy severely restrict India’s options.
The writer is a journalist based in New Delhi and a founding partner of CSDR Consulting
Several Indian security officials have confirmed that there was adequate credible intelligence of China’s intentions to up the ante in the Ladakh sector