ISSUE
A key shift in South Asia over the last decade has been China’s increasing engagement with each country in the region. While Beijing was a close partner of Pakistan and almost its security guarantor, the other countries — in the imagination of Delhi’s mandarins — were within India’s sphere of influence. This has slowly changed.
A resurgence of nationalist sentiment in smaller neighbours; a desire to diversify relations and play the ‘China card’ to offset the Indian influence; China’s own enhanced capabilities and willingness to step up its economic and political engagement with local elites in South Asian states; and India’s weaknesses in terms of delivering on commitments as well as either reduced leverage or inability to effectively use its levers has all come together in changing the complexion of South Asia.
Today, Beijing is a player in Kathmandu’s domestic politics; it is the reason the regime in Male can diplomatically snub India; it has trapped Sri Lanka in a relationship of economic dependence; it has become even more hegemonic in Pakistan’s polity; and it has even compelled a section of Bhutan’s elite to consider establishing diplomatic ties.