WHERE WILL THE OPPOSITION TO THE BJP COME FROM?
When the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) returned to power in May — with a bigger majority — there was a sense of deep pessimism that permeated across India’s Opposition parties. The disappointment at the defeat was natural, but it went beyond that. It suddenly seemed that the BJP, led by the formidable Narendra Modi, was electorally invincible. And India was headed towards a unipolar moment in its polity, where only one dominant party would continue to hold all levers of power.
The BJP’S electoral dominance, geographical spread, organisational depth, and ideological acceptability has, indeed, grown exponentially. The pessimism was, therefore, understandable.
But in a democracy, and in a large and complex democracy like India, the conclusion was also somewhat misplaced. Politics is a competitive process. Politics is a product of faultlines. Politics also manufactures those faultlines. And politics abhors a vacuum. The correct question was, therefore, not whether the BJP would have an opposition — but where would the opposition come from.
Thursday’s assembly polls in Haryana and Maharashtra have provided a glimpse and offer some clues for where the resistance to the BJP may emerge. In both states, the party was single-largest, and in both states, its stint in power will continue. But the failure to win a majority in Haryana, and the increased dependence on the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra, also mean that its unfettered run has got somewhat paused.
The outcome in the two states was a product of the performance of three actors in particular — the Sharad Pawar-led Nationalist Congress Party in Maharashtra; and the Bhupinder Singh Hooda-led Congress, and Dushyant Chautala-led Jannayak Janata Party in Haryana. What is the larger message their performance tells us about the sources of opposition to the BJP?
One, the resistance to the BJP will come from the regions. In the Lok Sabha, even as the party spread across all parts, it was unable to succeed in the south. But India’s unique geographical particularities and distinct evolution of politics in distinct states means that the regional challenge is particularly acute in state polls. Tamil Nadu and Kerala remain perhaps the most challenging states for the BJP — and its efforts to co-opt a regional party in Tamil Nadu (the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) and capitalise on the Sabrimala issue in Kerala have not really succeeded. But it is not just the south. In the east, the BJP has expanded in West Bengal — but Mamata Banerjee remains a formidable rival and the 2021 assembly polls is an open contest. These polls have also indicated that the challenge to the BJP has increased in the north. Punjab is with the Congress; the BJP just about won Haryana; in Delhi, it faces a difficult contest early next year with the Aam Aadmi Party putting up a strong fight to defend its turf. To be sure, the BJP has blended national and regional dynamics in many parts, and it is seeking to expand in areas where it has been weak like the south, but this entire project remains fragile.
The second source of opposition comes from social contradictions. India’s social structure is complex and hierarchical. The caste question in particular often pits groups against each other on the ground. The BJP has, to its political credit, carved out wider multi-caste alliances — but this has often come at the cost of tapping resentments against dominant political castes. In Maharashtra,
the Marathas continued to resist the BJP to a large degree; in Haryana, the Jats did the same. There are a large section of Dalits, particularly assertive Ambedkarite Dalits, who remain sceptical of the party’s Hindutva project. To be sure, the BJP has carved out alliances of upper castes, OBCS, and a segment of Dalits. But this remains fragile. And due to either sharpening contradictions between any of these groups, or smart political mobilisation by any party, these alliances can fray.
The third source of opposition can come from local leaders. It is not a coincidence that Hooda and Pawar put up the strongest fight. Both have a lot in common — political experience, the will to fight, the resources to invest in battles, a loyal social base (Marathas for Pawar, Jats for Hooda), and connect with the ground which allows them to tap local contradictions. This is not unique. In Bihar in 2015, two local leaders — Nitish Kumar and Lalu Prasad — were able to halt the BJP’S juggernaut. In Odisha, it was Naveen Patnaik who managed to prevent a BJP win in the state assembly polls earlier this year.
And finally, a source of the BJP’S opposition could well be local economic concerns. Pockets of discontent are visible — due to unemployment, shutdowns of industrial plants, fall in exports which have a downstream impact, falling consumer demand, dip in rural incomes, and farm distress. In the Lok Sabha polls of 2019, these issues did exist. But voters believed that in the absence of a credible national Opposition, the BJP was best positioned to address these. But continued distress, especially at the local level, could change the mood, as evident to some extent in these polls.
What does this add up to? The BJP remains dominant. It remains the party to beat. But the inherent checks and balances in Indian democracy are playing out. The party can be challenged, but this will come from local leaders, local issues, local geographies, and local caste contradictions. But this also means that the Opposition still does not have a national leader, an overarching national narrative on a national scale that can challenge the BJP. This paradox means that Modi has both reason to be concerned about the local, and reason to smile about the national.