Breaking the logjam on the northern border

Aclearly defined, accurately depicted and accepted boundary is essential for exercising sovereignty within the nation state, and the process starts with mutually accepted broad contours of where the boundary should lie followed by a political agreement to refine and define it. The boundary is then subjected to delineation, which essentially implies drawing on the map where the boundary runs, and finally demarcation by identifying and marking on the ground with natural features and boundary pillars.

Where such an exercise is not considered critical, politically or economically, and both nation states find it expedient to let the ground reality prevail, the concept of frontiers emerges wherein both states exercise control up to a general line, leaving an opaque zone or buffer ensuring avoidance of confrontation or conflict.

Finally, boundaries can be defined by natural features such as rivers, watersheds and prominent landmarks or artificially by latitude and longitude reference.

Colonial Britain addressed boundaries and frontiers from the perspective of imperial interests and not securing lasting sovereignty for a unified India. Consequently, except where a direct threat from a neighbouring power suggested demarcation so as to draw the inviolable line, the British were content to declare major stretches as frontiers. While the Mcmahon Line came near to defining the generally accepted alignment of the Indo-tibetan boundary in the eastern sector, the western sector remained the major bone of contention.

INHERITED BRITISH LEGACY

Post the First Anglo-sikh War and under Article 4 of the Treaty of Lahore on March 9, 1846, the Lahore Durbar ceded all territories between the Beas and Indus rivers to the British and Article 12 in turn rewarded Gulab Singh with ‘independent sovereignty’ of these territories. The Karakoram in the north and its extension south-east was the extent of the Sikh Empire when these treaties were concluded.

William Johnson, an official of the Survey of India, while at Leh en route to Khotan in 1865, came up with the advanced boundary line of the Kashmir state without any serious physical survey. This extended the ceded territories of the Sikh Empire eastwards to the Kun-lun watershed, encompassing Aksai Chin. It found expression in the Survey of India map of 1868.

In 1893, Hung-ta Chen, the Chinese official at Kashgar, handed a map showing the proposed boundary to George Mccartney, the British consul general atk ash gar. this showed the border along the Karakoram mountains, which was a natural boundary up to the Indus river watershed. the british presented this line, known as the Macartney-macdonald Line, to the Chinese in 1899 through Sir Claude Macdonald, the British representativeat peking. the chinese did not respond and it was taken as accepted. The boundary had more or less reverted to the extent of the ceded territories of 1846. In 1962, the People’s Liberation Army advanced up to the 1899 Macdonald line and is generally now the Chinese claim line as was also articulated in 1959.

Based on imperial British cartographic declarations of shifting boundaries in the western sector, India inherited and chose to persist with the whole of Aksai Chin being part of erstwhile Kashmir state integrated into India. While the analysis, views and theories doing the rounds of academic circles and seminars may suggest the long term strategic purpose of Chinese actions and the threat to India, the fundamental objective is to bring around an agreement on the contours of the boundary, of course as perceived by the Chinese, so as to set the path for delineation and demarcation.

EXPANSIONIST POWER

Diplomacy by its very nature is designed for sugar-coated compromise. It is no substitute for, and is inversely proportional to, hard national power. Under the Sino-indian Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement (BPTA), 1993, the two sides agreed to call the entire disputed border as the Line of Actual Control (LAC), which in fact became a frontier; liable to alteration by force and with the hope of delineation. After 22 rounds of talks by special representatives, nothing appears to have been reconciled. Chinese incursions have been generally glossed over and presented as a peaceful diplomatic solution.

China today is an expansionist power with historical grievances, much like Germany in the 1930s, blatantly disregarding treaties and conventions. Such powers have always been balanced by coalition of alliances or building corresponding power to resist and address the asymmetry. Our neglect, unwillingness and incapacity to invest in creating such corresponding power, and our ideologically and morally driven non-alignment precluding alliances fore-closes these options. With both avenues closed to address this expansionism, the future holds humiliation behind the façade of diplomacy.

COURSE AND CONSEQUENCES

Irrespective of the political dispensation in power, our national security issues are a matter of exaggeration and magnification of minor tactical actions by the ruling party and any setback, actual or perceived, is painted as a sell out by the opposition leaving no scope or ground for serious and pragmatic debate for resolution with national interest in focus. Then there is the Indian Parliament 1962 resolution to recover every inch of Indian territory from China making any seriously negotiated settlement nearly impossible.

For six decades, we have wished away the reality. Emotional hyper nationalism is no substitute for comprehensive national power and sober handling of national security issues. What then is the solution to this logjam? Do we have the will and wherewithal to force the issue? Can we shed the ideological baggage or impractical resolutions? If not, then perhaps a practical and honourable accommodation with China remains a pragmatic option. Zhou Enlai’s proposal of 1960 and Deng Xiaoping’s of 1982 need serious consideration free from and above bindings.

The nation and the political leadership are free to choose what course to follow but would not be free from the consequences of the choice.

DIPLOMACY BY ITS VERY NATURE IS DESIGNED FOR SUGAR-COATED COMPROMISE. IT IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR, AND IS INVERSELY PROPORTIONAL TO, HARD-EARNED NATIONAL POWER