The incomplete Kashmir story
The Centre’s gambit has partially worked, but democracy and statehood are essential
Exactly two years ago, the Centre pushed through a set of radical constitutional changes in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). The state was split into two entities; it was turned into a Union Territory; and Article 370, which guaranteed its special status, was effectively nullified. Domestically, this was followed by additional security deployment, detentions of both mainstream and separatist leaders, and curbs on political activities, civil liberties and communication. Externally, it led to criticism not just from Pakistan (an interested party with a record of sponsoring terror) and China (another interested party which illegally occupies part of Kashmir), but also partners concerned about India’s democratic record.
A lot has changed. The government has eased restrictions and released leaders, including three former chief ministers. It appointed a new lieutenant governor, the politically sharp Manoj Sinha. It held local body elections. This summer, Prime Minister Narendra Modi hosted Kashmir’s leaders and sought their views. For their part, Kashmiri parties formed the Gupkar Alliance to push their demand for restoration of Article 370 and statehood. Externally, the United States reconciled itself with the end of Article 370 fairly soon, seeing it as an internal governing arrangement, but would like to see more political freedom in the Valley. To show its domestic audience that Islamabad hasn’t given up, Pakistan has insisted India take corrective steps. But it is no longer making the restoration of Article 370 a precondition for talks, there is a ceasefire, and its terror networks are weaker. There is a view that China’s aggression in Ladakh was prompted by India’s actions in Kashmir — but it is hard to know, and this may well have been one among a set of multiple variables.
And, so, the Indian State has succeeded in its ambition to exercise full control over J&K. But this is still half the story. It would be a mistake to read silence in the Valley (especially during the pandemic) as consent. There is a psychological distance and radicalisation. Mainstream “proindia” leaders remain weak. The instability in Afghanistan can spill over given the transnational jihadi networks at play. For India to succeed and be true to its own values, even as it keeps up its security preparations, it must restore statehood to J&K, hold elections, and let Kashmiris articulate their aspirations and exercise the same political rights as any other Indian citizen without fear, but within the Constitution.