To salvage itself, aaP needs a big win in Gujarat

This was meant to be the AAP’s break-out moment, but it was more a breakdown of its hopes. The results in Punjab show AAP has been unable to advance from the vital beachhead it had secured in 2014. It has also failed to open its account in the small but promising state of Goa. This matters because AAP’s success requires it to take over the space occupied by Congress. Success in Punjab and Goa would have generated momentum for the upcoming polls in Delhi and Gujarat, but AAP will now have to defend itself in Delhi, and work all the harder to convince Gujaratis that, rather than the INC, it is the best alternative to the BJP.

Even so, it would be premature to write the AAP off. The party is a proven draw for the urban, educated, media-consuming middle classes that have an oversize influence on national political narratives. In 2013, it also secured the support of the urban poor, winning 30% of the vote, which it held on to during the 2014 Modi wave. In 2015, AAP expanded into rural and minority-dominated areas of Delhi, demolishing Congress and winning 54% of the vote. Its 2014 success in Punjab proved that the AAP model of charismatic leadership, fresh candidates and modern campaign methods was scalable to a more rural setting. Only 38% of Punjab’s population is urban, although rural Punjab is considerably “rurban” — educated, prosperous and media consuming. As in Delhi, the AAP attracted young, urban, educated, middle-to-upper-class voters in Punjab, plus a section of Hindu and Dalit voters in the Malwa and Doaba regions along with sizeable numbers of voters of both the radical Left and Khalistani constituencies. With its “alternative” political message cutting across classes and castes (though still with an urban bias), the AAP secured 24% of the vote in 2014, won four of 13 Lok Sabha seats and until a few months ago, seemed set to become the leading Punjab party.

This momentum now stands halted. Although AAP remains a major player in Punjab and won more seats than the ruling SADBJP alliance, the INC proved to be a much more attractive alternative, leaving the AAP where it stood in 2014. Disappointment in Goa must be all the greater for it because 62% of the population is urban, while its vote share stands at less than 7%, up from a meagre 3.3% in 2014.

One lesson for the AAP is that while being a disruptor can be effective, there must be more substance in what you offer to the voter. Another is that your opponent will adapt. Not facing anti-incumbency, the lumbering Congress took to modern campaign methods in Punjab and Goa, and managed to build momentum around its core vote base.

To salvage itself, the AAP needs to win a big state. It has to defend its Delhi citadel in the forthcoming municipal elections, but its real test will now be in Gujarat. The AAP is making a serious effort, with Arvind Kejriwal wooing Patidars, Dalits, OBCs and young and educated voters in a state whose population is 43% urban, more so than even Punjab. AAP may also have better luck with the Gujarati diaspora than it did with Punjab, but it still has to convince Gujaratis that it offers a feasible alternative.

Even though Gujarat has some of the ingredients that the AAP has worked magic with in the past, it will be a more arduous path for the party. The AAP’s strength is that it has demonstrated the ability to scale up its support across traditional political lines. But it will need more than a symbolic broom to sweep out the old.