Border Security Force at the crossroads, needs reforms

The Border Security Force, the largest border guarding force in the world, finds itself at the crossroads on its 54th Raising Day today.

Raised on December 1, 1965, policy-makers conceived it as a force capable of guarding borders during peace and assisting the army during hostilities. Operational philosophy, organisation and training of the BSF were, therefore, militaristic.

After 53 years, the BSF is facing a myriad of challenges, ranging from reassessment of operational philosophy, personnel management and acute disconnect of leadership with ground realities.

Scenarios on the border with Pakistan and Bangladesh differ vastly from the one prevailing in 1965. Pakistan is a hostile neighbour, while Bangladesh is a friendly one.

Proxy war by Pakistan has kept the western border alive, necessitating militaristic guarding structures and management practices. Troops face life-threatening situations daily because of militant threat and high-stakes drug smuggling. Shoot to kill and ek goli ek dushman (a bullet for an enemy) is the philosophy on these borders, particularly at night. The fencing, built in the ’90s, however, has created a defensive mindset among troops and the 150 yards across the fence remains generally unpatrolled, especially at night. This needs to change and sovereignty has to be asserted through physical domination.

SMART MANAGEMENT

The population density, lack of development and job opportunities make the Bangladesh border crime-prone. The BSF faces a policy dilemma of averting the use of force in conformity with the national objective of maintaining good relations with Bangladesh and ensuring safety and security of soldiers while preventing crime. The BSF is expected to stop cattle that strays unintercepted through the breadth of North India from going across to Bangladesh and operates with hands tied as a ban has been imposed on use of firearms by troops. This has emboldened criminals as reflected in increased attacks on troops. Such impractical orders emanate from a leadership disconnected from ground and must be reviewed and functional autonomy restored to troops.

Technology must be introduced to ease the burden on troops who put in long hours, sometimes stretching to 16 hours a day. It must be userfriendly unlike the ones in use at present. It should not be vendor-driven and should suit the terrain. The comprehensive integrated border management system (CIBMS) being tested in Jammu and Kashmir and Assam should be put to extended trial to ascertain suitability of such costly technology.

Only a smart border man will be capable of adopting smart border management practices and should be encouraged to come up with innovative ideas besides adopting dynamic training policies. In view of increased interaction with civilians both at borders and in counter-insurgency areas, soft skills attain importance besides conventional training.

BARRIERS TO BRIDGES

Over the years, different weapon systems have been inducted. Most of the induction has occurred because of lack of adequate exposure of Indian Police Service (IPS) leadership to the mechanics of war and anti-insurgency operations. The organisation needs to take a fresh look at the arming policy to suit its role. Heavier weapon systems should be authorised only on need basis.

Border guarding is rapidly transforming into integrated border management where several agencies are equal stakeholders. Borders in the near future are expected to transform from barriers to bridges between nations. A smart border man has to be aware of the developing scenario and understand the functioning of agencies involved with integrated check posts and land custom stations to facilitate hassle-free movement of personnel and goods.

Inculcating a sense of security is one of the important tasks. The BSF should have a larger role in the border area development plan (BADP). As the sole face of the government in a remote area, the government could tap the BSF’S reach to plan developmental programmes and infrastructure in border areas.

STAFF STRENGTH

The strength of the force has grown from a mere 25,000 in 1965 to about 2.5 lakh now. This 10-fold growth has not been uniform. The expansion has caused stagnation. It takes a jawan 20 to 24 years to earn the first promotion. A lot of the blame lies with faulty policy decisions such as the abolition of ranks like lance naik and naik and the introduction of ineffectual ranks such as assistant sub inspector.

Stagnation among cadre officers is acute. Most officers retire much before their experience can be harnessed for policy-making. Cadre review undertaken after three decades has helped to postpone stagnation by a few years without a long-term solution. Senior posts created due to the cadre review have all gone to IPS officers because of the rule position.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

BSF personnel face double jeopardy in terms of pay and allowances. Treated as civilian employees, their salary, allowances and post-retirement benefits are regulated by civil rules. However, unlike civil employees, they lose on three years of service and pension benefits as they retire at 57. They encounter life-threatening situations but are not entitled to pension unlike their counterparts in the defence forces.

A large number of BSF units are deployed on the Line of Control to perform the same duties as army personnel yet they get 25% less than their army counterparts despite being deployed on the same post. Further, in case of an unfortunate death in the line of duty, the family of a BSF soldier is deprived of many benefits available to the family of an army jawan because there is no provision for a BSF soldier to be declared a martyr.

Adverse service conditions coupled with the inability to meet urgent family obligations cause stress, which is reflected in the high rate of attrition. As many as 12,096 BSF personnel have either resigned or proceeded on voluntary retirement from 2015-18, while 121 committed suicide during the period.

OUT OF SYNC

An important measure for efficient functioning of the force relates to leadership. It’s high time the reins of the force are handed over to cadre officers connected with the ground and well versed with the force’s ethos. The IPS leadership is completely out of depth in comprehending complexities of managing a specialised force such as the BSF. Trained in policing and law and order, they have no comprehension of dynamics of border management. Being temporary, they don’t connect with the psyche of troops and are unable to comprehend their requirements and are content with marking their time.

The BSF is an important player in the security matrix of the country and is in need of urgent reforms failing which there is imminent threat of the force losing its edge.

RAISED ON DECEMBER 1, 1965, BSF FACES CHALLENGES RANGING FROM REASSESSMENT OF OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY, PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AND DISCONNECT OF LEADERSHIP WITH GROUND REALITIES