Selection and strategy hurt India in Perth Test
PERTH: Another away Test match defeat for India. After the euphoria of Adelaide, Australia’s victory in Perth leaves India’s hopes of a historic series win in Australia well and truly back in the balance. Lose in Melbourne, and although the Border-gavaskar Trophy could still be retained in Sydney, India’s epic 12-match odyssey in 2018 will end without the series victory that would define Virat Kohli’s legacy as India captain.
India were outplayed in Perth. Australia’s top and lower order batting was comfortably better than India’s, the former helped by Australia’s superior new ball bowling — particularly on the first morning when India’s lack of pace turned their attacking full lengths into floaty drive balls. Australia’s hundred-run opening partnership on a difficult pitch for run-scoring was a setback from which India, already on the back foot after losing the toss, never really recovered.
MISREADING WICKET
Yet as well as being out-played in Perth, India’s defeat was also the consequence of mis-reading conditions and errors in selection — a recurring theme of India’s Tests in recent times. The pre-match hype surrounding the nature of the Perth pitch — expected to be fast and bouncy — persuaded India to select four quicks and no frontline spinner. It was a fascinating and bold strategy but one that was proven to be wrong — not because India lost the match but because of how they lost.
That Nathan Lyon took 8/106 and finished as Man of the Match suggests India got it wrong by leaving out Ravindra Jadeja. (see Chart 1)
After the match Virat Kohli brushed off suggestions that India had made an error saying that the pitch didn’t take much turn throughout the match. This is right: the average spin of 2.71° is low even by Australian standards (average 3.61°), but closer analysis of Jadeja’s record in Tests suggests he isn’t a spinner who needs significant assistance from the pitch to be successful. Jadeja is a bowler who relies on subtle changes in line and speeds for his threat. (Chart 2)
India may have been dissuaded from picking Jadeja—a left-arm spinner—against Australia’s left-hander-heavy top order (generally left-arm spinners struggle against left-handers) but analysis shows him to be an excellent bowler to left-handers, especially in SENA countries. (Chart 3)
SPIN HAD A ROLE
This was only the third Test in history that India did not select a frontline spinner. On new and unfamiliar pitch it was a huge risk to take such a break from convention. That Hanuma Vihari bowled 28 overs across the match was a tactic acknowledgement of India’s error. In the second innings he retained control (economy rate 2.21) but in the first innings (economy rate 3.78) he released pressure, particularly in the evening session on day one with the match in the balance.
Also, there’s a strong argument that India got the identity of the fourth quick bowler wrong as well. In opting for Umesh Yadav ahead of Bhuvneshwar Kumar, India chose pace and bounce over accuracy and control. That in itself was not a terrible decision but in what proved to be a lowscoring match Umesh’s inaccuracy released pressure. On a pitch which ultimately had more uneven bounce than pace off the surface Bhuvneshwar’s stump to stump lines and controlled lengths would probably have been more appropriate.
Additionally, and perhaps even more significantly, selecting Umesh ahead of Bhuvneshwar or Jadeja meant India had an exceptionally long tail with the collective batting average of their numbers 8 to 11 amounting to 10.97. (Chart 4)
LACK OF BATTING DEPTH
On a pitch that they deemed lively enough for four fast bowlers, India’s shallow batting order placed enormous responsibility on their top seven, two of whom (Murali Vijay and KL Rahul) are woefully out of form, and two of whom had only played six Tests between them (Rishabh Pant and Hanuma Vihari). India’s lack of batting depth proved to be a notable difference between the two teams — something which cost them in England and is now costing them again in Australia. (Chart 5)
In the post-match press conference Kohli explained that Bhuvneshwar wasn’t picked because of a lack of first class cricket— which is true: he hasn’t played a first class match since the third Test against Johannesburg—but if that makes him un-selectable and with no first class matches scheduled during the series, then why is he in the squad at all?
It is unlikely that had India picked one of, or both, Bhuvneshwar and Jadeja, they would have won in Perth. The match was arguably lost on the first morning when Ishant and Bumrah were as culpable as anyone — but a different team may have given them a significantly better chance of getting back into the match.
Even with what appeared to be notable selection errors India pushed Australia hard and this is what is so frustrating about this Indian team. India are clearly a very good side and this year they’ve largely played well in tough conditions but too often they have made elementary strategic errors that have cost them dearly in tight matches. In a year of fine margins India’s failure to read conditions and understand the strengths of their own players has arguably stood between them and greatness.
THE FOLLIES
On three occasions this year India have left their second and third-best batsmen (Cheteshwar Pujara and Ajinkya Rahane) out of matches (Cape Town, Centurion and Edgbaston) despite them clearly being well suited to conditions in South Africa and England. In Johannesburg they selected four frontline bowlers and an all rounder on a pitch that required batting depth (sound familiar?) And at Lord’s they made the utterly inexplicable decision to select two spinners after an entire day of rain had washed out the first day. No match in the Cricviz database has seen more swing or seam than that Test at Lord’s and India played two spinners — nothing better encapsulates their strategic errors.
Admittedly they have made some good calls as well — most notably the selection of Bumrah despite a very short first class career, but that does not excuse the litany of errors that has at least contributed to, if not defined, defeats in Cape Town, Centurion, Edgbaston, Lord’s and now in Perth.
Losing because the other team is better is one thing but losing because—or at least partly because—you’ve made fundamental selection errors is less excusable. India have two Tests to ensure that their shortcomings off the field don’t obscure their obvious brilliance on it.