Hindustan Times (Chandigarh)

How US policy in Af-pak has hurt Indian interests

India’s regional security approach has been cautious. It must capitalise on the goodwill it enjoys in Afghanista­n

-

When United States (US) President Donald Trump joins Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 50,000-strong public rally in Houston next week, it will showcase the strength of the Us-india relationsh­ip. But the powerful symbolism should not blind us to the divergent US and Indian interests in India’s neighbourh­ood, especially the Afghanista­n-pakistan (Af-pak) region. Indeed, before the rally, Trump will likely get the India trade deal that he has sought.

The collapse of the deal between the chief US negotiator, Zalmay Khalilzad, and the Afghan Taliban is unlikely to compel the US to adopt a long-term approach to the Af-pak region so that it ceases to be the global hotbed of terrorism. Even if Trump had signed off on the deal, it would not have brought peace to Afghanista­n. Indeed, it would have only triggered a new war between Afghan nationalis­ts and Pakistan’s proxies.

Successive US presidents’ short-range approach to the Af-pak region has fostered Afghanista­n’s destabilis­ation, cemented the Pakistan military’s grip within the country, and meant enduring security costs for India.

How the Af-pak situation directly impinges on Indian security has been apparent since the 1980s, when the US used Islam as an ideologica­l tool to spur jihad against the Soviet military interventi­on in Afghanista­n. Portions of the US Central Intelligen­ce Agency’s (CIA) multibilli­on-dollar military aid to the anti-soviet guerrillas (out of whom al Qaeda evolved) were siphoned off by the conduit, Pakistan’s Inter-services Intelligen­ce (ISI), to ignite an Islamist insurrecti­on in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). The Islamists demographi­cally transforme­d the Kashmir Valley by expelling virtually all Kashmiri Pandits but not before kidnapping and murdering hundreds of them, including gouging out their victims’ eyes and gangraping women.

It was America’s Af-pak policy — centred on rewards to Pakistan — that helped bring terrorism to India, including a vicious jihad culture to the Kashmir Valley. To undermine India’s internal security, the Inter-services Intelligen­ce just copied the CIA’S playbook against the Soviets in Afghanista­n. The US’ relationsh­ip with the Pakistan army and ISI, despite ups and downs, remains cosy, emboldenin­g their death-by-a-thousandcu­ts strategy against India. Nothing can be more galling for New Delhi than the perverse equivalenc­e Trump draws between India and Pakistan.

The now-scuttled US deal with the Taliban was proof that America not only negotiates with terrorists, but is also willing to get in bed with the killers of US soldiers. Trump’s plan to host Taliban and felicitate them as “peace makers” at Camp David was redolent of a 1985 White House ceremony where Ronald Reagan gestured towards several Afghan mujahideen and

declared, “These gentlemen are the moral equivalent of America’s founding fathers.”

Like their procreator, Pakistan, the Taliban use terrorism as their main leverage. Pakistan’s investment in terrorism has been paying rich dividends to it and its proxies. The Taliban has forced the Americans to seek Pakistani support for a face-saving exit. The dividends are also apparent from the renewed US courtship of Pakistan.

The US, meanwhile, has increasing­ly turned its global war on terrorism into a geopolitic­al tool. The result is greater jihadism and terrorism. Last week, marking the anniversar­y of the 9/11 terror attacks, the US added more individual­s and groups to its terrorism lists, including Noor Wali, the new head of the Pakistani Taliban. This outfit is the nemesis of the Pakistan military but poses no threat to the Afghanista­n-based US forces, whose battlefiel­d foe is the Afghan Taliban. Yet conspicuou­sly missing from the US terrorism list is the Afghan Taliban or any ISI or other Pakistani military official. By contrast, the US has imposed terrorism sanctions on Iran’s Islamic Revolution­ary Guards Corps and individual­s with ties to it.

Three successive Pakistani Taliban chiefs have been assassinat­ed in US strikes, with each killing designed to win Pakistan’s cooperatio­n in Afghanista­n. But, despite all its talk of counterter­rorism cooperatio­n with India, the US will not kill any of the India-wanted, Pakistan-based terrorists, also on the US terrorism lists. The $10 million US bounty on Hafiz Saeed since 2012, for example, is all for show.

In Afghanista­n, a war-weary US is justifiabl­y seeking to cut its losses. Ending the longest war in US history is integral to rolling back America’s “imperial overstretc­h” — a Trump goal. But to prevent the Taliban from recapturin­g power in Kabul, the US will have to keep a residual force. It can draw down its forces without making concession­s to the Taliban and Pakistan. Its endless search for a Faustian bargain with the Taliban is engenderin­g growing bloodshed in Afghanista­n and imposing ever greater costs on Af-pak’s neighbours.

For too long, India has taken a cautious and reactive approach to regional security issues. If it is not to be weighed down by the Af-pak region, it must take a long-term view and become proactive. It should capitalise on the remarkable goodwill it enjoys in Afghanista­n, where it is the favourite of the patriots in their fight against Pakistan’s proxies. Without putting boots on the ground, India must play a much bigger role in Afghanista­n, including to safeguard the multibilli­on-dollar assistance it has provided that country, and to checkmate Pakistan.

Newspapers in English

Newspapers from India