As New Delhi, Washington meet for 2+2 talks, where do ties stand?
WASHINGTON: When Prime Minister Narendra Modi has a virtual conversation with US President Joe Biden; and defence minister Rajnath Singh and external affairs minister S Jaishankar meet their American counterparts, secretary of defence Lloyd J Austin and secretary of state Antony J Blinken for the 2+2 dialogue on Monday, they will do so in the backdrop of a paradox.
On the one hand, the India-us relationship is marked by an unprecedented degree of political and diplomatic engagement, growing strategic convergence with a similar assessment of the Chinese challenge, the deepening of economic ties, increased collaboration in the Indo-pacific in general and South Asia in particular, and a growing partnership on thematic issues such as health, education and climate.
On the other hand, there is — particularly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine — arguably the most serious difference of opinion between the two capitals in recent years on a geopolitical issue that affects the wider global order. The differences in position haven’t undermined governmentto-government ties yet. In fact, the striking feature of this diplomatic episode has been how much effort both governments have invested in underplaying the differences, and highlight the commonalities in position, a sign of the value they place on the partnership. But the differences, nonetheless, exist; they have emboldened political constituencies in both capitals which are not comfortable with the growing partnership and reinforced older stereotypes about each other; they may become a bigger irritant if the war continues with Delhi being expected to make harder choices; and these differences, whether governments like it or not, have become a major part of the public discourse.
Both Modi and Biden — and then Singh, Jaishankar, Austin and Blinken — will attempt to cut through this fog in their meetings, send out a message that the relationship is on track and that divergences are being navigated with tact, and use the current moment to open up newer opportunities of cooperation, especially in the realm of defence.
To understand if this is possible, a useful window is to track the evolution of bilateral ties in the past year and how both sides have built up a degree of trust.
First, India and the US have been talking, every day, every week, every month in different formats, at different levels. PM Modi, of course, attended the Quad leaders summit in person last year in Washington DC — besides attending two other virtual Quad summits with Biden, as well as summits on climate, democracy, Covid-19, and supply chains. Both Austin and Blinken have travelled to India, while Jaishankar has visited the US as has finance minister Nirmala
Sitharaman. Blinken and Jaishankar speak on the phone so regularly that it is hard for the media to keep up. US Trade Representative Katherine Tai, Central Intelligence Agency chief Bill Burns, US climate envoy John Kerry, State Department officials Wendy Sherman and Victoria Nuland, key national security officials Daleep Singh (on G20 and sanctions) and Anne Neuberger (on cyber) have all visited Delhi. And the Indian ambassador in Washington Taranjit Singh Sandhu has access to the US administration and the Hill that is the envy of other ambassadors inside the Beltway.
In itself, a meeting or a visit doesn’t mean anything, but the frequency of meetings and visits — in a year marked by the pandemic, and despite the absence of US ambassador in Delhi — between interlocutors responsible for different domains points to a relationship of which engagement is a central feature.
It is this engagement that has allowed both Washington and Delhi to keep the bigger picture in mind — and that is the challenge posed by China. This is articulated at times, it is unsaid at times. But no official in either country is under any illusions that the US and India need to work together to contain Beijing’s belligerence.
The engagement has also opened other windows. Take health. Covid-19, officials acknowledge, has actually brought India and the US closer — allowing the two countries to explore more meaningful and ambitious health partnerships in vaccine production than have ever been attempted. This, in turn, has allowed India to build constituencies of support on the Hill, including in the Black and Hispanic caucus and among progressives. The fact that Jaishankar, along with Blinken, will speak at Howard University — the iconic historically black university in Washington DC — speaks to India’s engagement with segments of American polity which Delhi hasn’t paid enough attention to in the past, but which will continue to shape American politics in fundamental ways.
Take climate. Gone are the days when India was merely seen as the spoiler; there is a conscious recognition that India has set ambitious targets, it may not be all that Washington wanted, but now DC must help Delhi achieve those targets. Take supply chains. There is a realisation that the world cannot be hostage of specific geographies run by autocrats with revisionist ambitions and diversification is key. Take critical and emerging technologies. Both capitals know that collaboration — by bringing together American capital and technological edge and Indian talent and markets to design new architecture — is the only way to beat back Chinese designs in the domain. Or take trade. Even in the absence of an overarching trade deal — which undoubtedly has inhibited the relationship from reaching its potential — the bilateral goods trade in 2021 crossed $100 billion. Or take investments, where the US has been the key source of huge investments in the start-up and tech sectors in the past year. Or take education, where India recognises that the US will continue to be the critical leader in knowledge production and Indian higher education institutions desperately need partnerships, and US institutions recognise that the pool of Indian students represents among their most lucrative as well as potentially among the most talented catchment area.
Or take South Asia. From Nepal to Sri Lanka, both Delhi and Washington have increasingly converted shared interests into shared approaches to achieve shared outcomes. Even on Afghanistan, arguably the biggest rupture in the region for which Washington cannot but escape blame, there is today an understanding in both capitals that Taliban must not be legitimised. Pakistan — that old third party irritant in the bilateral relationship — is today a side show, with marginal presence, in Washington, made worse by Imran Khan’s antics before his exit. Or take west Asia, where India and the US are now collaborating with Israel and the UAE in a grouping which would have been impossible to conceive just a few years ago.
This context is important because it gives a glimpse into how a process of engagement — with multiple actors, in multiple domains — has allowed both countries to manage differences.
When Russia invaded Ukraine, top policymakers in both countries already knew each other well, valued each other, and had established mechanisms to lay out expectations and concerns. They were also acutely aware of the history of the Cold War — with Washington recognising that a black and white approach to
India’s ties with Soviet Union had set the relationship back by decades, and Delhi recognising that if a Soviet tilt was needed in those decades, a Western tilt is essential to preserve national interests at this juncture. To be sure, it hasn’t been smooth and there are raging debates in both capitals (is Washington asking for too much, is it being hypocritical, why should we listen to them — ask some in Delhi; what good is the strategic partnership with India if it doesn’t stand up against Russia, can we trust New Delhi — ask the sceptics in DC). And at the 2+2, there is bound to be a difference in the emphasis and the vocabulary both sides employ to address the Ukraine issue.
But the crisis has actually shown that two decades of engagement and ties built both at an institutional and individual level have created mechanisms for India and the US to deal with differences without becoming unfriendly, angry and hostile. Public recriminations are rare. And both capitals recognise that the crisis can be converted into an opportunity — especially in the one area where there is a strategic logic but which is lacking. And that is defence, which is what makes Rajnath Singh’s presence in Washington and then his visit to Indo-pacific command in Hawai so significant.
There are four features of the American assessment of India’s defence constraints at the moment. One, Delhi has locked itself in a possibly toxic relationship with Moscow from which it cannot and will not retreat immediately. Two, Moscow will be unable to provide to Delhi all of India’s needs because of its own diminished strength and the crippling sanctions regime. Three, this opens up a window to help wean India off some of its requirements from Russia. And four, this can take two forms — immediate help with substitution in terms of spares and parts, servicing and maintenance of existing equipment and medium-term help with newer systems and technology sharing. Unsaid is the bit that this will also help the US military industrial complex.
There are, similarly, three features of Delhi’s overall thinking on the issue. One, India will continue to remain dependent on Russia — but the crisis has shown an urgent need for both indigenisation and further diversification. Two, Russia’s ability to deliver on its commitments is not fully certain. And three, and most importantly, this opens up a new window to seek from the US a commitment on technology sharing and co-manufacturing. Unsaid is the recognition that India, in a resource constrained environment with a security threat at its borders, needs all the support it can.
As the leaders meet on Monday, the focus will be on differences on Ukraine. But the real story may lie elsewhere — on the management of these differences and whether the two sides have been able to convert these differences into an opportunity.