ON DISMISSAL OF PETITIONS
“The judgment in Kedar Nath Singh has been the law of the land for more than six decades. It balances constitutional rights and principles viz. needs of the
State, to provide a reasonable interpretation.” mental freedom of speech and expression and the countervailing interest of the State to regulate.
“It is submitted that the said delicate balancing would pass the constitutional muster even today, despite efflux of time and despite change in the understanding of fundamental rights as compartments to conjoint rights... It must be treated as binding precedent requiring no reference,” stated written submissions, settled by solicitor general Tushar Mehta.
The government said that the five-judge bench in 1962 considered the validity of Section 124A from the perspective of all constitutional principles including the test of Articles 14 (right to equality), 19 (freedom of speech), 21 (right to life and liberty) and “no reference, therefore, would be necessary nor can the three Judge
Bench once again examine the constitutional validity of the very same provision.”
The Centre’s views follow the submissions of attorney general (A-G) KK Venugopal before the court on Thursday that the sedition law in India must be retained to ascertain the security of the nation and its citizens, adding that some guidelines may be laid down by the court to control the misuse of the statutory provision.
Venugopal, during the hearing on Thursday, threw his weight behind the Kedar Nath judgment to argue that contours of the provision have already been delineated by a constitution bench in 1962 and, therefore, there is no need for a relook at the provision.
In the Kedar Nath case, a constitution bench upheld the validity of the sedition law under IPC,
holding that the purpose of the crime of sedition was to prevent the government established by law from being subverted because “the continued existence of the Government established by law is an essential condition of the stability of the State”. Section 124A is punishable with jail term ranging from three years to life.
At the same time, the fivejudge bench defined the scope of Section 124A. It held that Section 124A only penalised words that reveal an intent to disturb law and order or that seem to incite violence.
The Supreme Court underlined that the presence of a pernicious tendency to incite violence is a precondition to invoke the sedition clause and that the penal provision cannot be used to stifle free speech.