Xi Jinping’s ‘new option’ is centralised and opaque

China’s model of development is delivering, but it is autocratic and cannot be replicated in other countries

It seems that China’s leaders have now forsaken Deng Xiaoping’s advice to tao guang yang hui (keep a low profile). In declaring a ‘new era’ for China during October’s 19th National Congress in Beijing, President Xi Jinping presented the Chinese system of governance as a model for other countries to emulate. Leaders who “want to speed up their development while preserving their independence,” Xi said, should look to China as “a new option”.

Developing countries, particularly in Southeast Asia and Sub-saharan Africa, seem awestruck by this possibility.

What is the Chinese model of economic and political development, and is it preferable to the alternatives?

China’s model comprises a number of key characteristics, including authoritarian governance buttressed by the perception of stability; State-guided industrial policy; massive infrastructure investments; rural industrialisation backed by small-scale agriculture; and openness to foreign trade and technology. This model has, no doubt, produced rapid economic growth in China.

But the implication that authoritarianism is necessary for rapid development misses the mark. In fact, it is this characteristic of the Chinese system that should give other countries the greatest pause.

Democracy is exasperatingly slow and often contentious. But its deliberative and electoral processes help mitigate conflicts, especially in heterogeneous and conflictridden societies. Even in a more homogeneous country like China, the absence of open public discourse does the opposite, as evidenced by the State’s mishandling of ethnic unrest among Tibetans and Uighurs.

Without a strong civil society or an independent judiciary to check government power, Chinese leaders have, on many occasions, made catastrophic errors in judgment. Look no further than Mao Zedong’s

Going the extra mile, you earn the goodwill of friends, colleagues, relatives, and people in general, as the latter shopkeeper did. Going beyond his normal task of selling merchandise, the shopkeeper created potential customers who would prefer this shop in future. “One of the most important principles of success is developing the habit of going the extra mile,” said Napoleon Hill. No wonder, the second shopkeeper is likely to fare far better professionally than the former because he contributed to Nature’s plan of sharing with others what they Great Leap Forward or the Cultural Revolution. Xi, too, has blundered. For example, his decision to order China’s State-owned enterprises (SOES) to prop up China’s falling stock market in 2015 was an epic miscalculation.

The absence of political checks and institutional mechanisms for public scrutiny has also encouraged abuse of power and high levels of corruption, contributing to high inequality, arbitrary land grabs, unsafe working conditions, food safety scares, and toxic pollution, among other problems.

As China’s economy becomes more complex, the absence of transparent and accountable governance processes, combined with frequent crackdowns on civil society and efforts to enforce conformity and discipline, will ultimately stifle entrepreneurship and innovation. If the SOES remain too-big-to-fail, this will create a further drag on innovation.

The lack of openness and transparency could also test political stability. In the face of crisis, China’s leaders often overreact by repressing dissent. Xi’s consolidation of power, and the cult of personality surrounding him, could exacerbate instability.

Democratic governments, for all their messiness, are less fragile, as they draw their legitimacy from pluralism and political contestation, rather than from high economic growth or nationalist appeals.

Despite the official narrative, most of the features of the Chinese system of governance that Xi has championed have little to do with him. They are vestiges of China’s imperial or early communist governments: A performance-based meritocratic promotion system; an organisational framework that ensures top-down loyalty without compromising the quality of local governance; and a unique system of political centralisation combined with economic and administrative decentralisation.

In other words, for all its allure, the Chinese model is deficient in some basic respects, and not easily reproducible in others. Any country that takes to heart Xi’s invitation to emulate China but does not have a similar organisational history will likely be unsatisfied. Not only is China politically unique, but it also possesses a large and increasingly prosperous domestic market that enables it to lure foreign investment on its own terms.

So, no matter what the Middle Kingdom’s newest emperor might claim, development with Chinese characteristics is really only for China.

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS, FOR ALL THEIR MESSINESS, ARE LESS FRAGILE, BECAUSE THEY DRAW THEIR LEGITIMACY FROM PLURALISM AND POLITICAL CONTESTATION, RATHER THAN FROM HIGH ECONOMIC GROWTH

required. Further, the plateau at extra mile is always less crowded, there is hardly any competition. It offers an inner peace not known to people confined to short-term desires.yet, partaking of the bliss available requires shrugging off the many comforts. As Roy T. Bennett said, “Life always begins with one step outside of your comfort zone