Chinamaldives bond gives India the jitters Up north: In 10 yrs, a new Nepal with a new neighbour
DOWN SOUTH New Delhi struggles to gets its concerns addressed by Maldives that is reluctant to follow its promised ‘Indiafirst policy’ even as the rapid expansion in Malebeijing ties becomes a worry
NEWDELHI: Relative to India, China is a late entrant in the Maldives, a key Indian Ocean nation and the only SAARC member-state Prime Minister Narendra Modi is yet to visit.
But China may well have stolen a march over India, which hasn’t quite managed to have its concerns over happenings in the island nation addressed by Maldives president Abdulla Yameen, who extended the emergency in his country much to New Delhi’s dismay. Maldives’ reluctance to follow its promised “India-first” policy has, in recent times, become an irritant for New Delhi. External affairs minister Sushma Swaraj conveyed this to her Maldivian counterpart, Mohamed Asim, in as many words when they met in New Delhi last month, an official familiar with the development recalled. “The minister conveyed the message that the India-first policy is as important a part of taking bilateral ties forward as India’s neighbourhoodfirst policy,” he said on condition of anonymity.
Although the Chinese footprint in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region is something New Delhi has learnt to live with despite an understandable unease, the rapid expansion in ties between Male and Beijing has become a larger cause of concern.
The Maldives – located around 700 km from Indian shores – has become a showpiece of mega projects-driven Chinese foreign policy as well as an important player in President Xi Jinping’s marquee one-road-one-belt project. Chinese presence in the island nation has been growing steadily ever since Beijing opened an embassy in Male in 2011, about 37 years after India set up its mission there.
The Indian Ocean region has around 40 countries and is home to 40% of the world’s population. It touches Australia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, West Asia and the eastern sea bend of Africa — making the countries that rim the ocean vital cogs in the geopolitical ambitions of both India and China.
Maldives has been a long-time ally of India but relations between that country and China have warmed rapidly in recent years. Maldives is only the country besides Pakistan that has a free-trade agreement with China, and this accord seems to have overshadowed the nation’s trade agreement providing for the export of essential commodities with India in 1981.
“Negotiations for the freetrade agreement (with China) took only three years to complete. And it was rushed through Parliament, making many opposition MPS express their concerns,” a second Indian official said, asking not to be identified. Soon enough, China kicked off a stream of mega projects – including the Friendship Bridge and Laamu Atoll Link Road – in the Maldives. Reciprocal visits by premiers Xi and Yameen to each other’s countries further boosted ties, and Male became an earnest partner in the one-road-one-belt project in the Indian Ocean. Over 97% of India’s international trade (by volume) and 75% (by value) passes through this region.
“China has used inducements and investments on a significant scale to strategically penetrate the Maldives, which is now slipping into a debt trap,” said strategic affairs expert Brahma Chellany.
The growing trade and investment ties between the two countries are increasing China’s political and strategic influence in the region, much to India’s discomfort. For instance, New Delhi’s hackles were raised when three Chinese naval warships docked in Male harbour in August 2016 in the first such “goodwill visit”.
So, what helped China step up its influence in the Maldives? Sachin Chaturvedi, director of New Delhi-based think-tank RIS, believes the answer lies in the approach. “A multisectoral approach has helped China increase its influence in trade, development cooperation and defence. This has given the country greater flexibility in envisioning and implementing its projects,” he said.
Experts believe the growing ties between the two countries hold major political consequences for India. “China’s support has spurred the Maldives’ unbridled lurch toward authoritarianism. Without being able to count on China’s support, Yameen wouldn’t have behaved the way he did recently,” said Chellany. influence and how has it done so?
One, China’s national power has grown tremendously in the past decade. If it is expanding in Latin America and Africa, is it any surprise that it would expand its influence in Nepal, with which it shares a long border? To interpret any engagement between China and Nepal only through an alarmist prism would be a mistake. Both are sovereign nations, both have had historic ties, and in an inter-connected world, both will grow closer.
Two, not only does China share a border with Nepal, it is in Tibet that the two meet. Nepal is a route that Tibetans have used to escape, or return home. Chinese officials have told Nepali interlocutors that they believe the ‘Western bloc’ — US, EU, and human rights groups — may create unrest in Tibet by using Nepal as a hub. Beijing has not only sought a clear commitment by Nepal that Tibetan activities would be cracked down upon but also directly engaged with political parties and security forces to get it done. Three, China sees economic opportunity in Nepal — both as a venue for investment but, more critically, as a potential route to deepen its penetration into the Indian market. It has pushed connectivity projects, proposed trilateral cooperation between the three countries, and played up Nepal’s hopes of acting as a bridge. And this is because it believes this is a good way to swarm the entire market across the Gangetic plains.
Four, as the contradictions of Delhi and Beijing have grown on a range of global and regional issues, China sees Nepal as a place where it can squeeze India. By translating its economic engagement into a political role, backing precisely the actors Delhi is uncomfortable with, and altering Nepal’s strategic alignment, China wants to counter, reduce, and even negate India.
THE NEPALI PULL
The reason this has become possible is because Nepal itself is changing. Its hill-dominated establishment, perennially suspicious of India, sees an opportunity to increase its leverage with Delhi by playing the ‘China card’. But beyond the rulers, the Kathmandu middle class and intellectual elite — all from the hills — believe that Chinese capital can transform Nepal’s fortunes. They reciprocate Beijing’s overtures.
India’s inconsistent policy line, erratic diplomacy veering from neglect to overbearing pressure, and its record of antagonising all sides of the Nepali political spectrum have reduced New Delhi’s power. Back in 2013, the Chinese ambassador to Nepal said to interlocutors he would do everything in Kathmandu that his Indian counterpart did. Beijing is living up to its word.