Nepal PM’S visit to India signifies fluidity of politics
tion of this intensified diplomacy.
THE RISKS
But three schools of thought have cautioned the government about the current approach.
First, in Kathmandu, Nepali Congress feel let down by India. Five NC leaders have visited Delhi in the last three weeks, with broadly the same message - Oli and Maoists are consolidating; they are taking over state institutions and the democratic space is shrinking. They argue by ‘appeasing’ Oli , India is strengthening him at the cost of its older friends. At least two of the four NC leaders also warned they too would be forced to take an ‘ultra nationalist’ position-- since criticising India helps domestically and has no cost externally. Delhi can be taken for granted as Oli has shown, one NC leader commented.
Indian interlocutors have told the NC that it is overreacting; they fared poorly in elections because of poor leadership, poor governance and factionalism and should get their house in order first; that India has no choice but to work with Kathmandu and that the NC would remain a cherished friend.
Second, Madhesis political figures, and more vocally, the civil society have sounded alarm bells. They believe that Delhi’s patch-up with Oli has come at the cost of Madhesi rights. India has dropped the agenda of a constitutional amendment to address issues of federal re-demarcation, which was at the heart of a prolonged India backed agitation. While Tarai parties have done well in elections and formed the government in the Madhes province of eastern Nepali plains, community leaders and opinion makers have a strong sense of resentment at what they see as Delhi’s betrayal.
India’s response to them is on these lines - there is no way we can drop the agenda of Madhesi people; your divisions have harmed the cause; work together. But a key Indian minister has told Madhesi leaders that the political context did not allow India to raise their issues and it had to protect its interests at the moment.
The third cautionary note comes from within the government of India itself. A section of India’s intelligence agencies, and officials who have served in Nepal, believe Delhi is hurting its long term interests in what is coming across as a rather desperate quest to show that its ties with Kathmandu are fine, and avoid ‘bad headlines’.
They believe while engaging with Oli is a necessity, India is underestimating the inherent dangers. They argue China has brought Oli and Maoists together; Oli’s primary loyalty will be to the ‘north’; Oli will sooner or later cross the strategic ‘redlines’; India needs alternatives; the current approach will leave Oli so strong that it will be difficult to dislodge him; Delhi must engage with Maoist leader Prachanda and wean him away from Oli; it must also work to strengthen the NC and Madhesis and create a coalition which can take on the UML eventually; India is currently appearing weak and Nepali political actors will not take Indian power seriously.
The dominant school of thought -- which is backed by Swaraj, key political interlocutors, and bureaucrats at the external affairs ministry -- however does not buy this ‘alarmist’ version. They believe that India has to respect the democratic mandate of the Nepali people, or would alienate popular opinion; that Oli must be given a chance and it is important to wait and watch how Oli engages with both India and China; that if he wants to indeed develop Nepal, he cannot antagonise India; and that India does not have much of a choice either - Prachanda is unreliable, the NC is weak, and Madhesi parties are geographically limited and backing them publicly invites the wrath of Kathmandu’s political elites and pushes it towards China further.
It is against this backdrop - of deep discord, rapprochement, and internal arguments with friends back in Kathmandu and within the system in Delhi - that the Government of India is laying out red carpet for K P Oli. The visit represents a dramatic tale of fluidity of politics and diplomacy.