Eliminate further irritants in ties
Washington must address Indian concerns over the effects of its new sanctions on Iran, Russia
The US has emerged as India’s most important partner. The inaugural India-us two-plustwo ministerial dialogue will help highlight the growing convergence of their interests in the Indo-pacific region. However, in India’s neighbourhood, Washington and New Delhi are still not on the same page.
For example, after gratuitously assassinating the third consecutive chief of the Pakistani Taliban this summer to please Pakistan’s military generals, the US held face-to-face talks with the Pakistan-backed Afghan Taliban in Qatar. While the Pakistani Taliban is the Pakistan military’s nemesis, the Afghan Taliban is America’s main battlefield foe in Afghanistan, yet the group is still missing from the US list of foreign terrorist organisations.
More broadly, the US and India have become key partners in seeking to create a free, open and democracy-led Indo-pacific. The critical missing link in this strategy, however, is the South China Sea, which connects the Indian and Pacific oceans. US reluctance to impose tangible costs on China’s continued expansionism in the South China Sea has emboldened Chinese inroads in the Indian Ocean.
One issue likely to figure prominently in the two-plus-two meeting is how India has emerged as a prime victim of two new sets of US economic sanctions — on Iran and on Russia. The new sanctions directly impinge on India, a longstanding significant buyer of Russian weapons and the second-largest importer of Iranian oil after China.
The twin US pressures on the energy and defence fronts have made India acutely aware of the risks of aligning itself closer with Washington. After ensnaring India in its Iran and Russia sanctions, Washington has sought to save the promising Indo-us strategic partnership by throwing in concessions.
In reality, the concessions are intended as tools of leverage. For example, the Pentagon’s top Asia official, characterising Indian media reports as “misleading”, has made it clear that India can expect no waiver from Russia-related sanctions if it signs major new defence deals with Moscow.
The congressional waiver crimps India’s leeway with its stringent conditions, including a six-monthly presidential certification specifying the other side’s active steps to cut its inventory of Russian military hardware.
On the Iran-related sanctions, no waiver for India is still in sight. With global shipping operators already pulling back from business with Iran and oil prices rising, India’s energy-import bill is increasing. US sanctions threaten to affect even India’s Pakistan-bypassing transportation corridor to Afghanistan via Iran, including the Chabahar port project.
The Trump administration is clearly seeking to influence India’s arms-procure- ment and energy-import policies. This is in keeping with its increasing unilateralism, including dictating terms to allies and friends. Canada, for example, has been warned to accept US’S terms or face exclusion from the new NAFTA.
Japan is buying a $2.1 billion US missiledefence system, not because it can effectively protect it from missile attacks, but because of US pressure to buy more American military hardware. Washington is similarly pressuring New Delhi to buy more American weapons, although the US has already emerged as the largest arms seller to India.
But, while the US basically sells defensive military systems, Russia has armed India with offensive weapons, including a nucle- ar-powered submarine and an aircraft carrier. Washington is also seeking to sell more oil and gas to India, besides pressing it to switch imports from Iran to Saudi Arabia and other US allies. However, next-door Iran, offering discounted pricing, will remain critical to India’s energy- diversification strategy.
Meanwhile, the US — after its success in getting India to accept a logistics assistance pact, which includes access to designated Indian military sites — has pushed for India to endorse the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), which the Indian armed forces initially feared could compromise their network. India, instead of leveraging its ties with Washington, appears set to announce at least an in-principle agreement on a modified COMCASA during the two-plus-two meeting, if not sign it.
Why is it that, in the run-up to any important summit or high-level meeting, India agrees to make a key concession to the other side? And why is that the other side doesn’t feel similarly pressured to make a concession to India? Isn’t reciprocity the first principle of diplomacy? Before finalising COMCASA, India should clinch some major defence deals with Russia, including for the S-400 system, so as to test the US response. Instead, it is concluding new defence deals with the US.
The US and India will remain close friends. Washington, however, must fully address Indian concerns over the extraterritorial effects of its new sanctions on Iran and Russia. Make no mistake: Washington has introduced a major irritant in the bilateral relationship that the twice-postponed two-plus-two dialogue cannot purge.