A quick sweep of the history of Kashmir
Kashmir’s Untold Story Declassified is an effort by two journalists, one of whom is a former soldier, in which they try to unravel the torturous history of Jammu and Kashmir. Importantly, the book focuses on Jammu and Kashmir around Partition and the independence of India on August 15, 1947.
Writing popular history can be burdensome. Historians who write for students can depend on their readers having some background information. In contrast, popular historians have the task of helping those who may not have the necessary knowledge of geopolitics, history and geography to understand, analyze and comprehend the sequence of complex events, and help them form an opinion. That burden is even heavier when the subject is Jammu and Kashmir, especially in the postarticle 370 era. Much of what is passed off as Jammu Kashmir history today amounts to propaganda and misinformation.
Iqbal Chand and Maroof Raza have tried to do a quick sweep of the history of Kashmir. They have devoted a considerable part of the narrative to exploring how areas like Gilgit and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir were appropriated by Pakistan with British help even after Maharaja Hari Singh acceded to India. In that, they have been able to bring together some interesting pieces in the bigger jigsaw of the Great Game that started with the alleged thrust of Czarists Russia into Central Asia and intensified in the first part of the last century. The book makes no mention of the Great Game. Nor does it try to connect the manoeuvres of the British Raj in 1947 to the shadowboxing with mostly imaginary enemies in Soviet Russia. The result is a lack of clarity.
The book, however, does add to the existing literature on the British plan, in the future interests of the Anglo-saxon world, to frustrate the smooth joining of Jammu and Kashmir to India. The authors insinuate things about George Cunningham, Col Roger Brown and Captain Brown but do not come up with evidence. In The Shadow of the Great Game; The Untold History of India’s Partition, Narendra Singh Sarlia deftly used correspondence, British official records, and US and European sources to show how the British cast their fortunes with Pakistan after Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s assurances that the newly formed Pakistan would ally with the British to dispossess
Iqbal Chand Malhotra, Maroof Raza
Bloomsbury India. Unlike the British, the US supported the Indian position of complete withdrawal of the raiders and the Pakistan Army from POK. With aggressive pushing from India, matters came to a head at the United Nations in October 1948. On 27 October, 1948, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin spilled the beans in a conversation with his US counterpart, George Marshal: “The main issue was who would control the main artery leading into Central Asia. Indian proposal would leave that in their hands,” Sarila writes.
Surprisingly, the authors suggest that if India had signed the Stand Still Agreement with Jammu and Kashmir, a military intervention could have been possible even with the Instrument of Accession. There are perhaps two reasons for this: Their correspondence shows that Nehru and Patel were keen for the Maharaja to hand over power to Sheikh Abdullah before acceding to India. While Maharaja Hari Singh was dithering and continued to harbour plans for an independent Kashmir, Abdullah, a left-leaning politician, and his followers were ready to cast their lot with India. Road connectivity with Kashmir was through Pakistan. Pakistan, which had signed the Stand Still Agreement, first imposed an economic blockade and then sent in raiders backed by the regular Pakistan Army.
Finally, the authors claim Syama Prasad Mookerjee was “originally a Congressman, who held the portfolio of industry and supplies in Nehru’s dominion cabinet from 1947 to 1950”. That Mookerjee was in Nehru’s cabinet is true, but the assertion that he was “originally a Congressman” is callous and perhaps borders on misrepresentation of facts. Mookerjee was indeed the Indian National Congress candidate representing Calcutta University in the Bengal Legislative Council in 1929. In 1937, he was elected as an independent candidate and served a coalition government of the Krishak Praja Party and All India Muslim League as the finance minister of Bengal in 1941-1942. In 1939, he joined the Hindu Mahasabha. Aditya Mukerjee, professor of contemporary history and Director of Centre for Historical Studies, JNU, has said: “Nehru’s first cabinet was a representative government, claiming that Dr Mookerjee was a former Congressman would amount to stretching history.” The authors do not make any addition to the broader geopolitical narrative of that time or today. The book has not broken new ground as its title claims it does. north-east and in Kashmir. The book ends with the author trying to come up with a respectable model for future coalitions.
The work is rich in detail with personal experience woven with inputs from political experts and backed by research. There are interesting back stories on how coalitions were brokered, who helped whom, who outsmarted whom and how, glimpses into friction between parties and politicians, all of which adds to the drama of the narrative. Students of politics will find this an important addition to their reading list, and one that gives them an understanding of Indian governance. A book this information rich deserved better editing and more careful proofing. However, the odd missing articles or preposition don’t affect the reading.
Few politicians are likely to set aside the time to read Ballots and Breakups. This is sad. Reading it might stop them from resorting to shallow tactics to seize power, and would convince them that the electorate is not in the dark about their poll antics.