How the Galwan Valley tragedy can transform Himalayan geopolitics
to prevent escalation.
Where does this leave New Delhi?
India must respond to China’s move, not just through military means but through a forward-looking strategic, economic and connectivity vision matching China’s BRI project. It must think about reconnecting and resuming old trade links. Ladakh is a geostrategic axis or a pivot point for India to reach out to central Asia, Europe and Russia. The Dorbo-shayok-dbo road should be called the Ladakh economic corridor. It should be India’s approach to go beyond the Himalayas. Otherwise, India is destined to remain defensive in posture.
This, however, is contingent on India reworking the governance priorities in Ladakh. It is the locals who have the best understanding of the border. The region has already remained neglected for a long time due to Article 370 and 35A.
The way forward must have several components. First, the Ladakh administration should distribute the entire stretch of vacant land in eastern Ladakh (from Chumur to Karakoram) among the population of the Leh district for agriculture, horticulture and other economic activities.
Two, the government must expedite infrastructure airport/road network expansion in eastern Ladakh. The Indian Air Force must reactivate the Fukche/loma airport for both civilian and military use. Attempts should be made to reopen and refurbish the old Chuchul airport base.
Three, authorities must re-populate the area with legal ownership to citizens and not leave the borderland vacant. The government must provide incentives for Changpa nomadic farmers presently settled in Leh (Kharnag-ling settlement) to return to the borderland areas and encourage them to reactivate their nomadic Rebo herding skills. Security forces should be directed not to prevent their movement along the border areas.
Four, large-scale forestation and largescale grass-sowing activities through aerial seeding and use of drip-irrigation technology must be undertaken. Five, NITI Aayog should prepare a defence development plan for area development. And six, the Indian Army should revisit the idea of legalising the existing illegal border trade at specific places such as at Dhumtsele and Demchok.
Galwan has changed geopolitics in the Himalayas. India must step up. decision was taken under Section 8A(1) of the Customs Tariff Act, which gives “emergency power” to the Indian government to increase import duties if the government is satisfied that this is necessary in the given circumstances. But, section 8A(1) does not talk of “national security” as a ground to modify tariff rates; it refers to economic emergencies.
Consequently, it will be difficult to accept under WTO law that India genuinely believed that hiking tariff rates to 200% on all Pakistani imports is necessary to safeguard India’s essential security interests. India got away because Pakistan has not challenged India’s measure before a WTO panel. The reason could be that bilateral trade between the two countries is too small.
But, using Section 8A(1) to impose trade restrictions on China will be tricky. China will, in all probability, challenge this in the WTO, and India will find it difficult to defend its action. If India wants to restrict Chinese imports on national security grounds, it will have to provide a reasonable explanation as to why and how imposing trade restrictions on China are “necessary” to defend India’s essential security interests.
The other constraining factor for India is the high quantum of bilateral trade between the two countries. With bilateral trade at almost $90 billion a year, it is around 45 times more than that with Pakistan. Moreover, numerous Chinese imports are used as intermediary products in Indian industries ranging from pharmaceuticals, automobiles, and electronics. So, curbing imports on these will be tantamount to India losing out too. It is clear from this — when it comes to India’s dealing with Pakistan and China under WTO, what’s sauce for the goose is definitely not sauce for the gander.