India needs a robust EIA process
The government must take into account the criticism and improve the draft
On Monday, former environment minister and senior Congress leader, Jairam Ramesh, reiterated that the draft Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), 2020 notification was not based on research, reduced public participation, and represented an attitude which viewed environmental regulation as an “unnecessary...burden”, not as a means to ensure the welfare of people and sustainable development. Union minister of environment, forest and climate change, Prakash Javadekar, termed Mr Ramesh’s comments “unfounded”. But Mr Ramesh is not the only one with concerns. On July 10, 100 environmental researchers, activists, ecologists, conservationists, and former members of government bodies sent a letter to Mr Javadekar, critiquing the notification.
The critics claim that the draft EIA legitimises environment clearance; excludes major industries from the EIA process; subverts the public hearing process; reduces the scope of citizens to report violations, and fails to address a project’s impact on wildlife, and habitats. This is mostly true. They also claim the draft fails to address the conflict of interest that arises from the fact that a project proponent can choose a consultant to do impact assessment; and the quality of composition of the expert appraisal committee, which is often staffed by those with no technical expertise. These, too, are valid objections.
Mr Javadekar has a critical role in protecting the environment and vulnerable communities. It is imperative that he patiently listens to the objections on the draft EIA, even if they are coming from Opposition party members. India deserves a robust EIA. This will be possible only if the consultative process is intense, rigorous and takes into account legitimate concerns.
When India joins the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a non-permanent member in January 2021, it will confront a range of issues. How can the UN help wind down conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan, while ensuring humanitarian aid for civilians and justice for wrongdoers? How can it protect refugees fleeing these and many other conflicts? How to address the human rights impact, including structural racism and inequality, of the coronavirus pandemic?
Human rights groups have repeatedly criticised UN secretary-general Antonio Guterres for his reluctance to rebuke powerful countries such as China, Russia, or the United States (US) for their human rights violations. In response, he initiated a “Call to Action on Human Rights” aimed at urging the UN and member-states to focus more attention on growing rights challenges.
People facing oppression around the world will have high expectations of India to firmly defend their rights. The Indian government has said that on the Council, it would “act as a voice of reason and moderation and a firm believer in respect for international law.”
Unfortunately, India’s record on promoting respect for rights abroad is poor. At the UN Human Rights Council, India has usually abstained on country-specific resolutions. It has failed to support UN initiatives to address Myanmar’s ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya or Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s “drug war”.
India has, at times, spoken, whether to support a call for accountability for alleged war crimes in Sri Lanka in the past, or recently, when it said that concerns around rights protections in Hong Kong should be considered “properly, seriously and objectively”.
Human rights abuses are typically either a cause or effect of international crises on the Security Council’s agenda. India is a significant contributor of UN peacekeepers to missions around the world and has aspirations of becoming a permanent member of an expanded Security Council. UN peacekeeping missions increasingly focus on monitoring, investigating, and reporting human rights abuses in post-conflict situations. India should demonstrate leadership and support, expanding such efforts.
To stand for rights abroad, India should also address its record at home. While it has long contrasted its more open society with China’s one-party authoritarian State, the government has recently emulated some of China’s restrictions.
India’s large number of capricious Internet shutdowns puts it in league with Myanmar, Iran, and Zimbabwe. Despite a Supreme Court ruling that Internet communication is a fundamental freedom, access remains restricted in Jammu and Kashmir. Even during a lockdown to contain the spread of Covid-19, when the Internet has become the primary means of information, communication, entertainment, education, and business, the authorities have not relented.
Nor did the spread of the Black Lives Matter movement around the world, after police in the US killed George Floyd, have a noticeable impact in India. The Indian police continued their longstanding practice of torturing suspects, resulting recently in the deaths of a father and son for keeping their electronics shop open longer than Covid-19 lockdown rules allowed. The authorities remain silent on the need to protect marginalised groups at home.
While on international platforms, leaders like to speak of India’s feisty civil society, its independent media, and other democratic institutions, these, too, have suffered severe setbacks. Numerous activists are in jail or facing politically-motivated charges for expressing critical views of the government. The authorities recently opposed 80-yearold activist Varavara Rao’s bail, saying that he was seeking “undue benefit,” on account of “Covid-19 and his old age”.
India’s constitutional protections are in decline, including in its commitment to secularism. Members of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party and their followers have repeatedly stigmatised Muslims.
When Indians protested the government’s discriminatory citizenship policies, the authorities hit back hard. Like US President Donald Trump, who has described antiracism protesters as “thugs” or Chinese authorities who said that the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong were the first signs of “terrorism”, some ruling party politicians have described peaceful protesters as “traitors”. The police not only used excessive force and failed to protect protesters but, in some cases, joined in the attacks. But far from holding the police to account, the authorities have instead arrested peaceful protesters.
India appears to be at a crossroads. When it joins the UNSC, it will have a choice: Align with rights-respecting countries or make common cause with countries such as China, Russia and Brazil that are trying to tear down the global rules-based legal system that has human rights at its core. With a pivotal US election in November, an increasingly belligerent China, and a world in twin health and economic crises, early 2021 will be a key moment for India to align itself with those who support rights, not those who undermine them.
The Ladakh stand-off with China has catalysed India’s efforts to strengthen its military presence at the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI). New Delhi recently moved to expedite plans for basing additional military forces, including facilities for additional warships, aircraft, missile batteries and infantry soldiers at the strategically-located Andaman Islands. Naval air stations INS Kohassa in Shibpur and INS Baaz in Campbell Bay are reportedly having their runways extended to support operations by large aircraft, even as a 10-year infrastructure development “roll-on” plan — pegged at ~5,000 crores — is on the fast-track. Indian strategic commentators are even urging New Delhi to permit friendly foreign navies access to the ANI’S military bases.
The idea of militarising the Andaman Islands isn’t new. Since the 1980s, Indian commentators have advocated building strategic muscle at the ANI. What has often seemed like a straightforward choice for Indian policymakers, however, has never been an easy decision to make. On the matter of the strategic development of the Andamans, India’s defence and foreign policy establishments have not always been on the same page. A section of India’s diplomatic community has opposed militarising the ANI, arguing that turning the islands into a strategic-military garrison would militarise the littorals — an outcome that would not sit well with countries in South and Southeast Asia.
When India first began developing the ANI in the mid-1980s, observers say Malaysia and Indonesia had been wary. Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur feared that India would use its military facilities in the ANI to dominate its region, and project power east of Malacca. In time, New Delhi’s willingness to keep its security presence at the strategic islands to a minimum assured many in Asia that its motives were benign. Today, amid growing threats from China, New Delhi seems open to the idea of militarising the islands. But, many say opening up the ANI’S military facilities to foreign navies could still spook regional states.
There is also an ecological aspect to militarising the ANI. Since 2015, when the government had first announced its intention to transform the islands into a maritime hub — allocating ~10,000 crores for the purpose — efforts to promote tourism and port development have hugely expanded. To improve tourism and trade potential, Niti Aayog has a plan to construct hotels, resorts and a trans-shipment hub at Campbell Bay. The flurry of recent infrastructure projects, environmentalists warn, could devastate the fragile ecology of the Andaman. Already many islands are facing significant damage from the climate crisis.
The proponents of the Andaman’s militarisation point to a different kind of asymmetry: The apparent lack of reciprocity in India’s bilateral logistics agreements. The Indian navy’s plans to offer logistical support to partner navies does not, ostensibly, include its ANI facilities. Four years after signing a logistics pact with the United States (US), its navy ships still have no access the ANI. France, Singapore and Australia — India’s other logistics partners — too haven’t had their warships repaired or replenished at Indian island facilities. With New Delhi unwilling to open up its island bases to foreign warships, observers say India’s logistics arrangements haven’t performed to potential. To counter China’s expanding footprint in India’s sphere of maritime interest, militarisation advocates aver New Delhi must permit Japan, Australia and France and the US to build strategic capabilities at the ANI.
In the past, Indian policymakers have considered cooperative avenues with Indopacific partners. In 2016, New Delhi and Tokyo discussed a joint project to upgrade infrastructure in the ANI, including a proposal to install a sound surveillance sensors (SOSUS) chain to improve India’s underwater domain awareness. The plan was to integrate India’s undersea sensor chain with the existing Us-japan “Fish Hook” SOSUS network meant specifically to monitor People’s Liberation Army-navy(plan) submarine activity in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean Rim.
But, notwithstanding its utility in detecting Chinese submarines, a region-wide undersea chain of sensors has implications that call for a degree of caution. In particular, Delhi needs to consider the possibility that operating sensitive equipment with foreign partners might involve sharing of critical undersea’ data with foreign collaborators. The Japan-us SOSUS provides some useful pointers. While the Japanese Maritime Self -Defence Force (JMSDF) and US Navy personnel jointly manage the JMSDF Oceanographic Observation Centre in Okinawa, the information is available to the US Pacific Command, and the facility is controlled by the US Navy. Needless to say, an Indo-japanese-us project in the Andaman Sea might require a level of informational access that the Indian Navy may not be comfortable with.
While China’s presence in the Indian Ocean is growing, Beijing hasn’t so far militarised key Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) outposts in the Bay of Bengal (Hambantota, Chittagong and Kyaukpyu). If New Delhi pushes for greater military presence in the ANI, Beijing could well seek military access in friendly Bay countries.
This isn’t to suggest that inviting foreign navies to the ANI or joint military projects in the Andaman sea is a bad idea. Strengthening collaboration with Indo-pacific partners at the ANI is very much an option for Indian decision-makers to consider. But New Delhi must also take into account the downsides of offering foreign navies access to its island facilities. The final decision should be based on a dispassionate weighing of costs and benefits.
WITH A PIVOTAL US ELECTION, AN INCREASINGLY BELLIGERENT CHINA, AND A WORLD IN CRISIS, EARLY 2021 WILL BE A KEY MOMENT FOR INDIA TO ALIGN ITSELF WITH THOSE WHO SUPPORT RIGHTS