Confluence of the foreign and the domestic
Rarely has foreign policy been as closely intertwined with domestic politics as in the Narendra Modi years. This was most starkly visible to this writer during the 2019 general elections in the villages of Uttar Pradesh when voters of all hues — young and old, unemployed and working-class — repeatedly referred to how the PM had “improved” India’s position in the world and enhanced India’s “prestige”. Three years later, in the US, Indian-american community leaders in Virginia echoed the same refrain. “There is no doubt that Modiji has made us feel more proud of being Indian,” one of them said.
The fact that Modi has effectively used the international stage — be it Madison Square Garden or Wembley — or foreign policy moves — be it Uri or Balakot — to enhance his credentials as a strong Prime Minister, of a strong and new India, is clear. But stepping back, what have been the overarching principles that have guided Modi’s foreign policy, how is India’s relationship with key actors, and what are its key challenges?
Three principles
Based on PM Modi’s statements, the work of former external affairs minister, the late Sushma Swaraj, the remarks and posture of the current external affairs minister S Jaishankar, and actions taken by the government, three key principles that have guided Indian foreign policy in these years can be gleaned.
The first is national security. The foremost task of Indian foreign policy — and this predates Modi — is to ensure that India’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and the lives of its citizens, are secure.
This means being assertive, even aggressive when needed (for instance, as a response to Pakistan’s terror export). It involves partnerships to add to one’s strength (for instance, signing the foundational defence agreements with the US or becoming an active part of Quad or deepening intelligence collaboration with Israel or the strategic partnership with France). It includes extended periods of patient diplomatic negotiations when a clear military solution isn’t possible (for instance, with China to resolve the two-year long impasse in eastern Ladakh). It means boosting domestic capabilities (through reforms in the military structure and policy initiatives to push indigenisation). It means securing the border (through ramping up investment in border infrastructure, but also creating economic interdependencies through more effective cross border transport and trade mechanisms where possible). And it means prioritising defence and strategic compulsions over values (such as in Ukraine, where India’s overwhelming military dependence on Russia makes a break from Moscow almost impossible even if Delhi isn’t pleased with Russian actions).
The second is India’s domestic economic transformation. Once again, the aim of using Indian foreign policy to win over global support to serve socio-economic objectives predates Modi. But as India has grown, the opportunity to leverage India’s size, geography, market and potential has grown too. It hasn’t always worked but the effort is unmistakable.
This has taken many forms. Make in India was an early initiative of the government, but it is only in the last two years — particularly since the pandemic — that the slogan has actually begun yielding policy dividends. As the world looks to diversify from China, and the importance of reliable supply chains begins resonating globally, India’s insistence that successful economic collaboration rests on a domestic manufacturing element is being heard in international capitals. Or take climate. Modi has been a pioneer in reshaping India’s climate diplomacy, repositioning New Delhi from being seen as a spoiler to being seen as a constructive actor on the international stage. Indeed, despite the developing world having to pay for the collective sins of the developed world, India was among the few countries which met its Paris obligations. But a successful and just transition rests on collaborating with the world on green technologies and harnessing climate finance, a key objective of Modi’s foreign policy.
The third principle that has guided Indian foreign policy in the Modi years has been the security of Indian citizens. Be it Sushma Swaraj reinventing Twitter as a grievance redressal mechanism to address consular related issues, or India embarking on major evacuation operations in times of conflict, most recently in Ukraine, the political direction to all Indian missions is clear — the safety of Indian nationals is of highest priority and there will be political monitoring to ensure lapses don’t occur.
Three relationships
These principles — some in the national interest, others more narrowly political — help explain India’s approach to its key relationships.
By far, India’s most important relationship is with the US. Modi has indeed overcome the “hesitations of history”, as he put it in a speech to the US Congress, by taking forward Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh’s investment in the relationship. The PM appears to recognise that the US national security and defence grid can be an indispensable ally for India as contradictions with China intensify; US private capital is essential to India’s growth story, be it in terms of investing in Indian markets or startups or boosting domestic manufacturing or serving as a client base to India’s service industry; US educational institutions will continue to be a key destination for Indian students and could serve as knowledge partners; US tech industry can be a natural partner for Indian talent, and the Indian-american diaspora in the US makes the people-to-people relationship rich and distinct. This does not mean India will become a vassal of the US — it won’t; it doesn’t mean that differences won’t erupt between the two sides — over Russia or human rights; it doesn’t mean that India will give on its rhetoric of strategic autonomy. But over the past eight years, India has only gotten closer to the US and this trajectory is set to continue.
India’s most challenging relationship is, undoubtedly, with China. When PM Modi first took over, he genuinely believed that the two Asian giants could make a bid for peace and reconciliation — after all, for most of history, India and China had not been at loggerheads as the PM was fond of telling interlocutors. But even as he hosted Xi Jinping in Ahmedabad, Chinese troops intruded into Indian territory. For reasons that have little to do with India, the post-2014 period has coincided with China’s belligerence across the international theatre in every sphere, and India is a victim of both direct military aggression at its borders and geopolitical aggression in its vicinity. The problem is that there is an asymmetry of power, with Indian policymakers keenly aware of the gaps in national capabilities. But as a recent paper by Antara Ghosal Singh for Stimson Center pointed out, India occupies a significant place in Chinese discourse, there is a divide within China on how to deal with India, and New Delhi has tools it can leverage to achieve desired ends provided it sheds its diffidence. In the wider neighbourhood, India’s patience has paid off with countries ranging from Sri Lanka to Nepal recognising the limits of China’s appeal and promises and the costs of Beijing’s political interventionism. But managing Beijing, and securing borders in the wake of Chinese aggression, will remain Delhi’s foremost security nightmare in the years ahead.
India’s most overestimated relationship is with Pakistan. And Modi has done well in ensuring that Islamabad occupies exactly the place it merits in the list of foreign policy priorities. For too long, obsession with Pakistan skewed India’s outlook toward South Asia (new regional mechanisms are a better alternative), towards the West (viewing the US relationship outside the Pakistan prism is far more helpful) and towards West Asia (Modi’s investment in ties with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries, and causing a rupture in their traditional security ties with Pakistan, will rank among his most remarkable achievements). By giving Pakistan a chance (with his surprise invite to Nawaz Sharif for the swearing-in and then during his Lahore visit) and then allowing the world to see the Pakistan establishment blow the prospects of peace in Pathankot, Modi ensured no one could blame him for jeopardising ties. By responding strongly to terror attacks, but not allowing it to climb on the escalatory ladder, Modi sent a signal of unpredictability to Pakistan and imposed costs for terror.
By not allowing Islamabad a veto on Kashmir policy, he created a new political reality for Pakistan to deal with. And by ensuring an active backchannel between the two sides, Modi has kept up mechanisms to lower tensions and keep the peace. But a caveat is key here. The India-pakistan relationship will always be fragile, and an accident can never be ruled out. It is also unhealthy to use Pakistan as a tool in domestic politics as in 2019, for it increases the prospects of a miscalculation.
THE FOREMOST TASK OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY IS TO ENSURE THAT INDIA’S SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE, AND THE LIVES OF ITS CITIZENS ARE SECURE
A word of caution
Narendra Modi took over power when the decades most favourable for India’s rise were over. The world had become more dangerous. The rise of ultra-nationalism and protectionism in the West, coupled with Xi Jinping shedding the myth of China’s peaceful rise, added to his challenges.
Us-china tensions have opened doors for India, but Delhi needs to prepare all its institutions to make the shifts necessary to prepare for the future. Us-russia tensions have brought fore the tensions between Delhi’s past ties and present requirements — the former makes India dependent on Moscow, and the current makes it essential for India not to antagonise the West. India has done well to navigate the tensions so far even as it is wooed by all sides. The neighbourhood will always remain a work in progress, as regimes swing from policies that favour China in a bid to score strategic points only to be replaced by regimes which recognise the imperatives of geography and culture. And India will have to continue deepening ties with a range of other middle powers.
As it does all of this to achieve its goals of national security, economic transformation and security of its citizens, India would do well to remain cautious of the tendency to view foreign policy from a domestic political prism that excessively relies on optics.
To go back to the anecdotes from locales as distant as UP and Virginia, the manner in which the Indian state machinery is mobilised to showcase every diplomatic achievement as Modi’s personal victory, underplaying any challenge or setback for the fear of denting his image, create a climate of adulation in foreign capitals around the PM, and invest in preventing headlines which would cast a negative light on how India is perceived is unhelpful. It also skews policy priorities and incentives within the bureaucratic system. And it undoes the otherwise excellent and creative work of India’s foreign policy machinery in difficult and adversarial circumstances, to achieve national goals and navigate key relationships. A strong India must not need constant validation to make its presence felt.