Aspiring hegemons must not abandon their allies
If India stands down on Doklam against China, Bhutan will be tempted to open up to China by establishing formal ties
As the standoff between Indian and Chinese troops in the India-ChinaBhutan tri-junction continues, it is important to take a step back and look at the problem through the prism of India’s larger grand strategy. Both India and China seem to agree that the geographical locus of the dispute lies in a small sliver of land in the Doklam region, claimed both by China and Bhutan. (The settled Sikkim-Tibet border is a red herring.) Faced with Chinese road construction on territory it considers sovereign, the government of Bhutan allowed Indian troops present in the area in the Sikkim sector to resist this encroachment, triggering the ongoing stand-off.
The road through Doklam could allow the Chinese to further run roughshod over a key precept of India’s foreign policy – of primacy in the South Asian region. Recent Chinese actions have clearly sought to negate any future Indian move to consolidate its position as South-Asia’s pre-eminent power. Whether that be in Nepal, Sri Lanka or Bangladesh, Chinese economic leverage stands to potentially reduce India’s clout among its smaller neighbours and circumscribe their foreignpolicy preferences.
Enter Bhutan. It does not have formal diplomatic ties with China. Its military is close to non-existent. Through long-standing arrangements, India serves as a virtual security guarantor of Bhutan. Bhutan on its part has allowed Indians unfettered access to its territory which is not the case for, say, Americans. Most importantly, unlike Nepal in the recent years, it has avoided playing its two behemoth neighboujrs against each other.
One of the key Chinese objectives in initiating the Doklam standoff seems to be testing India’s resolve to stand by Bhutan. It should be an Indian imperative to not fold in this trilateral poker, for doing so has two far-reaching consequences. One, should India stand down, Bhutan will receive a message that its policy of relying only on India has not borne fruit. In that event, Bhutan will be tempted to open up to China by establishing formal ties.
China – having cornered Bhutan in face of an absentee protector – will invariably seek to change territorial facts on the ground as the ‘cost’ of its détente with that country. This, in turn, will change the subtle balance of forces in the India-Bhutan-China tri-junction. Two, if India was to abdicate its responsibilities towards Bhutan, India’s other neighbours will, in effect, be told that relying on India as a countervailing force to the Chinese juggernaut is foolish. That surely cannot be good for India’s elusive pursuit of regional primacy. Aspiring hegemons do not abandon allies.