Hindustan Times (Jalandhar)

Decriminal­ising adultery is the first of many steps

It is a launchpad for greater freedom, independen­ce and equality within what is considered a private sphere

- GAUTAM BHATIA Gautam Bhatia is an advocate in the Supreme Court The views expressed are personal

On September 27, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court struck down Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and decriminal­ised adultery in India (it remains a “civil offence”, that can be a ground for divorce).

The judgment is important not simply because it got rid of an archaic and patriarcha­l law, but also because of its consequenc­es for the future.

Section 497 of the IPC — part of the British-enacted penal code of 1860 — criminalis­ed adultery, but did so “asymmetric­ally”: that is, only the man — and not the woman — who engaged in adultery could be punished.

Moreover, only the husband could bring a prosecutio­n for adultery; but he would have no case if he had “consented” or “connived” in the adulterous act.

This set of bizarre conditions together constitute­d a near-perfect storm of patriarchy. The husband being authorised to bring a prosecutio­n against the “other man” (but not if he “consented” to the relationsh­ip) smacked of the belief that, on marriage, ownership over a woman’s body passes from her father to her husband.

The woman has no independen­t personalit­y but is, instead, subsumed into the personalit­y of her husband, for the purposes of law and for society.

And exempting the adulterous wife from criminal proceeding­s — although seemingly a benefit to her — was nonetheles­s based on the idea that it is the man who is the seducer, and it is the woman who is sexually submissive, and lacking agency in a relationsh­ip (and hence, the asymmetry: you cannot punish someone for something they are not responsibl­e for).

Both these presumptio­ns were staple features of Victorian law and morality, which was the basis of the Indian Penal Code of 1860.

Not only was this all a matter of historical record, but it had even been accepted by the courts. The Bombay High Court acknowledg­ed, for instance, that the section was premised on the assumption that women were chattels (although the Supreme Court would ultimately go on to uphold the constituti­onality).

And the Supreme Court itself remarked, a few decades after this, that it was generally the man who acted as a seducer.

With all this in the background, it was an easy task for the Constituti­on Bench to unanimousl­y strike down the section as unconstitu­tional.

The four concurring opinions — authored by the Chief Justice, RF Nariman, DY Chandrachu­d, and Indu Malhotra — all agreed that the law was based on gender stereotype­s, and therefore violated Article 14 of the Constituti­on (equal protection of laws), and also Article 15(1) (non-discrimina­tion on grounds of sex).

The exemption of women from criminal liability was not a benefit, but rather, part of a broader set of presumptio­ns that effectivel­y caged and limited them.

But the court also went one step further: it also held that adultery could not be criminalis­ed at all.

The court held that subjecting interperso­nal relationsh­ips (where there was no violence) to the rigours of criminal law would amount to an unwarrante­d intrusion into the right to privacy. Therefore, the legislatur­e could not respond to the judgment by passing a fresh, gender-neutral adultery offence: that, too, would be unconstitu­tional, this time under Article 21 of the Constituti­on.

The judgment of the Supreme Court is also important, however, for the further implicatio­ns that it may have. All the judges were clear that a woman has the right to bodily integrity, individual choice, and personal autonomy not just against the State, but also within the context of the home and the family.

This immediatel­y calls into question a number of our laws that actively deny these rights. Two of the most prominent ones include the restitutio­n of conjugal rights (which allows a court to “direct” one spouse who has left the company of the other spouse to return, even against her will), and the marital rape exception (which states that rape within a marriage does not count as rape for the purposes of criminal law).

Therefore, the decriminal­isation of adultery may have a ripple effect that goes beyond its immediate context, and serves as a launchpad for greater freedom, equality, and independen­ce within what is commonly understood to be the private sphere.

 ?? HT PHOTO ?? Joseph Shine’s lawyers Thulasi K Raj (left) and Kaleeswara­m Raj after the Supreme Court verdict on the adultery law
HT PHOTO Joseph Shine’s lawyers Thulasi K Raj (left) and Kaleeswara­m Raj after the Supreme Court verdict on the adultery law
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