‘Until 26/11, our force thought policing meant traffic management and VIP duty’
MUMBAI: Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) leader Jayant Patil took over as Maharashtra home minister after his predecessor and party colleague RR Patil resigned following the 26/11 attacks. Patil was in the chair for 11 months when his department faced public ire for failing to prevent the attacks. In an interview, he says the toughest challenge was to regain the confidence of the people.
What were the challenges before you ?
After serving as finance minister for nine years, my party told me to take over as home minister immediately after the attack. The morale of the police force was low. Fingers were being pointed at the capability and doubts were raised over the bravery of the force. The arms, ammunition and technology they were dealing with were generations old. They had no bulletproof jackets or other safety gear to fight such attacks. I had two tasks on priority, first to boost the morale of the police and build confidence among the people and, two, modernise the force.
I held brainstorming sessions with top police officers and formed a highlevel committee on procurement. The process was fast-tracked and we insisted on transparency. We purchased speedboats, armoured vehicles, modern equipment and adopted stateof-the-art technology. We formed Force One, an elite commando force on the lines of the National Security Guard, to combat terrorist attacks at the state level. We appointed a batch of 165 dedicated officers with special training in the state intelligence department . People wanted changes visible on an urgent basis and this was a way to gain their confidence back.
Protecting Ajmal Kasab, the lone surviving attacker, was another task for the police…
Yes. We had received specific intelligence inputs about a possible aerial attack by Pakistani terror groups on Arthur Road jail where Kasab was lodged. Besides the deployment of the Indo-Tibetan Border Force outside the jail, we constructed a special cell for him inside . It was a specially designed cell to withstand any type of attack, including a strike by rocket launchers.
Kasab’s survival was crucial for us as he was the only proof of the involvement of Pakistani agencies in the attacks. Kasab’s confession, his testimony and the trial helped the country prove Pakistan’s hand. The trial played a crucial role in supporting our argument that Pakistan is a terrorist state. Our investigating officers and public prosecutors played an important role in uncovering Pakistan’s involvement.
What were the other precautions taken?
Kasab had to be treated for various illnesses, including depression during his stay in the jail. It would be very difficult to believe now, but Kasab was admitted for treatment at JJ Hospital for 4-5 days on many occasions and the police could maintain complete secrecy about this. Any leak related to his whereabouts could have proved dangerous. To ensure his protection, we had to set up a special court inside the Arthur Road jail.
You had once met Kasab in Arthur Road jail. What did you say to him?
It would not be appropriate to disclose all the details of our meeting that lasted for about 1.5 hours. I met him in jail to take first-hand information about the attacks and ensure the briefing given by our investigating team, led by (IPS officer) Rakesh Maria, was factual. I had to present a complete picture of the attacks and the plot behind it on the floor of the assembly and hence I wanted to be factually correct.
The year after the attacks was full of the fear of repeats, criticism and lost morale…
The year following the attack was full of intelligence inputs, rumours and the fear of repetition of such an attack in important cities. No agency was ready to take any chances on intelligence inputs they received. The inputs were immediately passed on to the authorities concerned. We would take weekly meetings of top officials for discussion of the inputs related to terrorist activities and intelligence information. The agencies were on their toes and were putting in the effort to give a befitting reply in case of any attack.
What was the brief from your political bosses and the Centre after the attacks?
Then Union home minister P Chidambaram had clear instructions on Naxals, whose activities were on rise at that time and wanted Kasab to be hanged at the earliest. We had a meeting at a hotel near the Mumbai airport with Chidambaramji, who had specially flown down to discuss issues related to terror attacks with us. He wanted Kasab to be hanged immediately by expediting the trial and wanted to know the deadline. We were trying to convince him about the time required to take the case to its logical end. Special public prosecutor Ujjwal Nikam had a subsequent meeting with him in Delhi. We could finally convince him about the time period required to complete the trial. He was very determined about containing the Naxal movement too. In a meeting in Delhi with home ministers of Naxal-infested states, he had given us a specific action plan with 12 names and had told us either you do it, or we will do it.
What went wrong during 26/11 attacks? Why could our force not combat it strongly?
Our police force never thought of this type of attack. The force thought only defence forces are trained for such types of terrorist attacks. Until then, policing was only about patrolling, traffic management and VIP bandobast. It is true that the force was baffled for an hour of the attack, but later faced it courageously.