From Capitol Hill, a message for India
In itself, the Ro Khanna amendment isn’t a breakthrough. But it symbolises America’s growing political investment in India
Last week, the United States (US) House of Representatives approved an Indiaspecific amendment as a part of the National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA), the annual legislation that funds America’s defence.
It is first important to note what the amendment, proposed by Indian-American Congressman Ro Khanna, does not do.
The amendment does not give India a sanctions waiver for its purchase of the S-400 missile system from Russia, which can be triggered under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). The authority to give the waiver rests with the executive.
The amendment is not yet a part of the law. The Senate is yet to pass its version of NDAA. Once it does, the House and Senate versions will be reconciled in a conference. While all Senators have a voice, Senate foreign relations committee chair, Robert Menendez, will be a key figure in the decision.
The amendment is also not a standalone provision. It was passed in a voice vote along with 100+ amendments to the NDAA in the House.
Contrary to Khanna’s claims, the amendment is also nowhere as significant as the nuclear deal, a pathbreaking pact that required overcoming legislative hurdles. The NDAA provision is useful for India, but not essential.
But, at the same time, the amendment is politically significant. Here is why.
One, at a time when Russia is the big villain in American public discourse and the US is seeking to militarily defeat Russia in Ukraine and cripple Moscow financially, the fact that 330 members of the House were willing to overlook India’s purchase of Russian defence equipment and refusal to condemn Moscow is significant. The fury of February and March, when the Hill was particularly vocal about its unhappiness about India’s ties with Russia, has dissipated.
To the credit of Indian diplomacy, both administration figures as well as legislators on the Hill, are using Indian talking points in explaining India’s ties with Russia — by highlighting history, the refusal of the US to share technology or co-manufacture in India, and the price differentials between American and Russian equipment. The House vote is a political signal of confidence in the US-India relationship, irrespective of India’s current relationship with Russia. And, as Khanna told HT, it gives the White House enough political cover to give the sanctions waiver to India.
Behind that visible signal is a message. The Hill expects India to diversify away from Russia and deepen its defence ties with the US. The role of American defence companies — who have been complaining about the uncertainty caused by CAATSA — in pushing through this line of thinking in American policy circles should not be underestimated. India will, of course, decide on its defence acquisition strategy in accordance with its own national interest. But it should be aware of this expectation. It should also be aware that the Russia story isn’t over yet. The energy imports remain a talking point in American policy circles. And Russia hawks, including Menendez, remain concerned about Delhi-Moscow ties. But the political signal from the Hill, for now, is clear — we know you have a different relationship with Russia, we can live with it for now, but we hope you reduce your ties in the coming years.
Two, China remains the strategic glue between India and the US. In recent weeks, the administration has stepped up its engagement with Beijing and it may well lift select tariffs imposed against Chinese goods. But while these tactical readjustments will be a part of the US-China relationship, there is little doubt that American politicians see China as the single most important threat to US hegemony.
If Republicans and Democrats, in a polity where both parties rarely agree on anything, have come together to bat for ties with India, it is because of Xi Jinping. As long as China’s belligerence in the Indo-Pacific continues, and China- US relations remain fraught, India has a strategic cushion in DC. The fact that the amendment mentions the threat posed by China to India’s security, and highlights cooperation in emerging and critical technology between the two countries, is proof.
Behind that visible signal, too, is a message. America hopes India to be on its side in the global contest against China. And it hopes that India will play a proactive role if Beijing, at any point, steps up its aggression against Taiwan. Once again, India will and must do what is in its national interest. But being aware of American expectations is helpful to be able to strategise accordingly, prepare the system instead of being taken by surprise, and manage potential areas of friction.
And finally, the amendment shows that being a friend of India — and being seen as a friend of India — is politically profitable.
Khanna is a progressive who has taken a critical position against India’s domestic political orientation. This helped burnish his credentials with liberals as well as younger Indian-Americans who are disappointed with India’s current trajectory. At the same time, this made him come across as “anti-India”, and led to criticism and questions about his commitment to India-US ties. Removing this perception was the single most important driver for Khanna.
This does not mean that progressives won’t continue with their criticism of Indian democracy — in fact, there is a concerted lobbying effort underway to designate India as a “country of particular concern”. But the amendment does indicate that politicians who have ambitions for future office, who depend on Indian-Americans for votes and funds, and who want to maintain a working relationship with Government of India will be careful and highlight the strategic convergence even if they distance themselves politically from Hindutva.
India has scored a diplomatic win in the US Capitol. But sustaining the momentum will continue to require careful internal recalibration and proactive diplomacy.
The views expressed are personal