The delay in appointing a new CDS is disappointing

The Union government’s failure to appoint a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) eight months after the death of General Bipin Rawat is baffling. The delay seems to suggest that either the appointment was not as necessary as it was made out to be or that the government, after taking a giant step, is having second thoughts about its decision.

In his 2019 Independence Day speech, Prime Minister Narendra Modi came up with the surprise announcement of a CDS who would be the permanent chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC) and principal adviser to the defence minister. He would administer all triservice organisations, including those of cyber and space, and also be the military adviser to the Nuclear Command Authority.

Then, the government went much further than the strategic community expected by making the new CDS the secretary of a new department of military affairs (DMA) in the defence ministry, fulfilling a long-standing demand of the military that it should be part of the apex structure of the government. Hitherto, the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force were “attached offices” of the MoD, a status equivalent, say, to that the public works department has with its parent ministry of housing and urban affairs.

The CDS’s clout as the first among equals among the chiefs was derived not only from being the permanent chairman of the CoSC, but his concurrent role as the secretary of the DMA, whose job would be to provide bureaucratic direction to the three forces on behalf of the MoD. Among the critical tasks identified was restructuring the armed forces to bring about jointness in operations by creating joint or theatre commands.

The DMA has a huge day-to-day agenda, whether it be on ongoing military operations, procurement, deployment of forces, promotions, postings, training matters, maintenance of platforms like aircraft and ships, or stocking of munitions and supplies. This is besides the burden of dealing with Parliament questions, court-related work, other government departments and ministries, and foreign governments.

That is why it is difficult to understand why the government did not fill General Rawat’s post quickly. And though in the DMA, the secretary is assisted by a team of additional secretaries and five joint secretaries, there are decisions that, as per rules, only he can take.

The passing of General Rawat was shocking. But accidents happen, and military and governmental systems are designed to deal with such difficulties. True, General Rawat had some qualities that led to his appointment first as the Indian Army chief and then as the CDS. But there are, at any given time, at least a dozen senior military personnel who have a similar profile and are capable of taking up the job.

But now we are confronted by this strange lassitude in the system, which has failed to appoint a successor. The decision in early June has lent a shambolic touch to the government’s thinking that all serving or retired three-star officers aged 62 or below from any of the three services would be eligible for the job of the CDS.

The military works along procedures and processes. Every appointment is based on well-laid-out criteria. To become an Army commander, one has to climb the chain, command a battalion, brigade, division, and corps, and complete courses such as the Higher Command in Mhow, Staff College, Wellington, and College of Defence Management. The Union Cabinet makes all these higher appointments.

The pool for selecting the Army chief with a four-star rank comprises the three-star General Officers Commanding-in-Chief of the six geographical commands of the Army, its training command, and the serving vice-chief. But, by this June notification, the government seems to see nothing wrong in opening up an even more important job to maybe 100 serving or retired three-star officers of the three services, many of whom would not have met the criteria for becoming the chief of their service. This could lead to an anomaly where an officer junior to a serving chief becomes the CDS, who is primus inter pares by virtue of his position.

General Rawat’s tenure may have been controversial because of his propensity to speak his mind. Still, as the CDS and the DMA head, he did serve an invaluable function of compelling our conservative services to think hard about the issue of theatre commands and jointness, which was, in a sense, his prime military task. Moreover, reports suggest that he was close to recommending a decision to the government on this vital issue.

But what the travails of his succession suggest is that the government is reverting to the stereotypical views of civilian authority, which has long blocked efforts to modernise and upgrade the higher command of the military. This features an excessive fear of a military figure who wields authority and influence over all three services. General Rawat was acceptable because he was deemed “reliable” by the powers that be. And that is where the problem with locating a successor seems to be.