Demography politics misses the big picture
Population growth and fertility rates have been falling among both Hindus and Muslims in India since 1991
At an international conference in the early 1980s, Bagicha Singh Minhas, the newly appointed chair of the National Sample Survey Organisation, claimed that several global institutions often produce data on income of countries without knowing their population. The Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Council’s (EAC-PM) analysis of the changing pattern of the religious demography of 197 countries over the period from 1950 to 2015, without considering the changes in religious denominations and geographical boundaries, is reminiscent of this. EAC-PM uses dataset Version 2.0 RCS dm, supported by the Association of Religion Data Archives, which provides yearly data on 97 religious denominations for over two centuries, tapping information from a large number of sources that have diverse scopes, different timeframes and overlapping coverage, but whose statistical robustness has not been established in the domain of research.
The dataset used in the study, “Share of Religious Minorities: A Cross-Country Analysis (1950-2015)”, unfortunately, does not belong to an archive, maintained by any country or the UN system. The purpose of the study is a research paper, produced by the creators of the dataset, which through multiple statistical analyses shows that “religious characteristics are significant factors in explaining the socio-political developments in the contemporary world”. A few of the issues of comparability and authenticity of the data are noted by the authors. Interestingly, this dataset gives yearly figures for countries that have had no population census in the recent past. For example, the set has yearly data by religion for Afghanistan although the last census there was conducted in the seventies. Researchers must be encouraged to probe issues in unchartered territories when these have high socio-political significance.
One can agree with the authors that “religious characteristics influence political processes and outcomes far more importantly than conventionally understood”. There is a need to probe these even when the wherewithal is inadequate.
The EAC-PM report would not have become a matter of political debate but for the strong inferences it has drawn, which does not clearly emerge from the global data. The authors make a purposive departure from the original premise of “abstracting away from the causes” in the analysis of change. In 2020, a
Technical Group constituted by the government gave macro projections of the rural and urban population up to 2036 — but without disaggregation by religion. It was generally accepted that there are significant dips in total fertility rate (TFR) for minority groups in recent years. The use of global databases and unverifiable assumptions would be acceptable for academic research for answering limited research questions. However, an Advisory Council presenting such readings to the PM is a matter of concern.
The key hypothesis of the EAC report is that the rising share of minorities in the total population “is a good proxy for the status of minorities in a country over time. … a society which creates a hostile environment for minorities and/or denies them access to public goods and services is more likely to witness a decrease in their share of the overall total population”. The authors clearly ignore the differential impact of economic well-being and access to public goods and services on population growth at different levels of deprivation. One does not have to be an expert demographer to see that communities in most countries grow at a sluggish pace due to their higher levels of income, education, modern values and access to technology.
Statements on the growth in percentage shares over time can easily be misleading if these shares are highly unequal across communities, or have arbitrary base years. The media has reported a decline of 7.82% in the share of Hindus in the population, while Muslims have recorded an increase of 43% during 1950-2015. If this sounds really alarming, it is because of the low percentage of the Muslim population in the base year. A similar calculation would show that the share of Buddhists has grown by over 1,500%. While the Hindu population as per the 1951 Census was 304 million, which went up by 661 million during 19512011, the Muslim population increased by only 114 million during this period.
Furthermore, the change in the share of minorities at two points in time with a gap of 65 years is likely to give erroneous signals since it may be attributed to contemporary developments. The increase in the Muslim population has taken place largely because of their poverty and illiteracy. resulting in high fertility. The growth rate of the Muslim population during 1951-61 was as high as 33%. In the subsequent two decades, it fell to 31% but went up again to 33% during 1981-91.
The rate, thereafter, has fallen continuously, reaching 25% in 2001-11. In contrast, the population growth for the Hindus was 22% during 1951-61 and rose to 24% in the following two decades. The rate, here, too, has gone down sharply — as low as 18% in 2001-11.
The EAC study’s findings have been amplified by the media and political entities. However, the findings are not new. The census data itself has shown that the growth rates of the Muslim population have been higher than that of the Hindu population. Correspondingly, the TFR for Muslims continues to be higher than that of Hindus as also the SC/ST population. These, understandably, lead to an increase in the share of Muslims in the population. But, there has been a sharp decline since 1991. There is a clear trend of convergence, both in terms of population growth rate and TFR, now over the past three decades.