Iran nuclear deal hinges on trust. This is missing
The Obama administration focused on the positives of the agreement, but Trump’s spotlight is on the negatives
Recently, United States President Donald Trump kicked the onus of the US backing out of the Iran nuclear deal to the Congress. The question is how we interpret this in terms of domestic politics and of geopolitics.
Those supporting the JCPOA, the technical term for the Iran deal, point to fact that Iran’s immediate ability to weaponise has been taken away. They also claim that an unprecedented set of intrusive inspections aimed at building trust between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iran will ensure enforcement of the deal and verify Iran’s intent. They also claim that this sets a very good carrot/stick pathway for other errant states to re-enter the NPT fold.
Those who oppose the deal say that these inspections are subject to a sunset clause, that is when the IAEA certifies continued good behaviour, these intrusive inspections will end, subsequent to which Iran may start cheating . They argue that intent can be gauged in other ways, such as Iran’s resurgent ballistic missile programme. What is to prevent Iran, when it has perfected its missiles, to simply buy an off-the-shelf bomb from an increasingly desperate and isolated North Korea, as the Syrians bought an off- the-shelf reactor from the same vendor?
There are short to medium term benefits of the JCPOA. But there are equally good, long term arguments against it. Ultimately whether you choose for or against depends on what remains unsaid by both sides is that this deal, like any other, hinges on trust.
Trust of course is one of the most difficult things to achieve when your political goals are so diametrically opposed to each other. Under Barack Obama, the JCPOA was seen as merely one chip, in a larger goal towards normalising relations with Iran. This accepted that Iran was indispensable towards stabilising Central Asia, specifically Afghanistan where its interests were more aligned with the West than Pakistan.
After all, if Iran were to provide alternate access to the US to supply its forces there, the salience of Pakistan ends for good. On the other hand, Iran’s positions in West Asia are frequently in conflict with the West.
While the Obama administration preferred to focus on the areas of agreement, Trump focuses on the areas of disagreement. He understands the consequences of his actions on US’ Afghanistan policy as well as on non-proliferation goals in the short term, and this may explain some of his reluctance. What we can be sure about is that he is determined to pass the consequences of his actions onto Congress, in the same way as Congress chose to pass on the consequences to Obama.