The shortcomings in Riyadh’s terror alliance

The Islamic Military Alliance has its merits, but its flaws could be debilitating

The attack at the Al Rawda mosque, in Bir al-Abed, 200 km from Cairo, Egypt, last week, in which at least 305 people died and more than 190 were injured, reminds us of the danger terror poses to West Asia and North Africa region. Given that the target was the minority Sufi Muslim community, Islamic State (IS) is suspected to have carried out the attack. IS has lost the majority of the territory it held in Iraq and Syria, but it’s premature to write off the group.

It is in this context that the Islamic Military Alliance (IMA), headed by Saudi Arabia, gains importance. Conceived in 2015 by Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud, the IMA had its first high-level meeting in Riyadh on Sunday. The prince vowed to “pursue terrorists until they are wiped from the face of the earth”. Unlike the United States or Nato, which are perceived as ‘foreign forces’, an anti-terror coalition headed by a nation in the region is bound to be more acceptable. The IMA has its merits, but its structural flaws could debilitate the alliance. That it is a predominantly a club of Sunni-states puts a question mark over its intent and definition of ‘terror’ and ‘terrorists’. How does Saudi Arabia plan to fight terror in the region without Iran, Iraq and Syria? The region is of great interest to India. However, it is cold comfort for New Delhi that the commander-in-chief of the IMA is former Pakistani army chief Raheel Sharif. The duplicity of Pakistan being an IMA member cannot be ignored while highlighting the body’s demerits.

The Riyadh-led alliance is a necessity, but if its shortcomings are not addressed, it may just become yet another attempt to form an anti-Iran axis — a move that has contributed considerably to escalating tension in West Asia. If Saudi Arabia is serious about tackling terror, it should turn the focus within (something it has partially done), and be more inclusive.