NAWAZ SHARIF DIDN’T KNOW OF PAK ARMY’S INFILTRATION OF KARGIL: BOOK

ISLAMABAD: Former prime minister Nawaz Sharif and several senior officials, including Pakistan Army generals, were unaware of the military operation to occupy strategic heights in the Kargil sector of the Line of Control in 1999, according to a new book by a leading journalist.

Nasim Zehra’s From Kargil To The Coup, launched this week in Islamabad, adds to the longstanding debate on just how much the three-time premier knew about the operation launched by then army chief Pervez Musharraf, who ousted Sharif in a coup months after India repulsed the Pakistani intruders.

The book says Sharif was presented with Kargil as a fait accompli much later when he confronted Musharraf to explain what was happening.

It was on January 16, 1999 that the operation was formally approved in the military operations directorate. By that time, Zehra writes, Pakistani troops had infiltrated almost seven kilometres into Indian territory from seven directions. This meeting of key generals took place less than five weeks before the historic Lahore Declaration on improving relations between Sharif and his then Indian counterpart Atal

BY SEPTEMBER 1999, SHEHBAZ SHARIF WAS IN WASHINGTON, WARNING HIS AMERICAN HOSTS OF A POSSIBLE MILITARY TAKEOVER. BY OCTOBER, THE STAGE WAS SET FOR THE SACKING OF PERVEZ MUSHARRAF.

Behari Vajpayee.

Zehra writes that Musharraf and his colleagues isolated themselves and made some tactical errors. They underestimated the response from India and the international community. After initial successes, there were reverses, and it was only in May 1999 that Musharraf and his generals took the civilian leadership into confidence. By that time, the Indian side had detected signs of the operation.

By the end of June 1999, Pakistani troops occupying ridges in Kargil-Drass sector were at a dead end. The Kargil clique, writes Zehra, had no plans for them when Indian troops struck back ferociously. By July, fully aware of the situation, Sharif started talking of a withdrawal.

By July 4, despite a meeting at the airport with Musharraf who insisted the Pakistani troops were holding their positions, Sharif left for the US for a meeting with then president Clinton to end the conflict.

Ironically, it was Sharif who took the heat for the Kargil misadventure. While Musharraf publicly supported Sharif’s visit to the US, Zehra writes a backlash started in Pakistan on the decision to withdraw at the insistence of the US. Some quarters were keen to use this opportunity to oust Sharif but this didn’t happen as he fought back with an address to the nation on July 12.

Zehra writes Musharraf did not have much smooth sailing as the officer corps was angry and upset. Stories of the treatment of soldiers and officers who went to Kargil had filtered through. Their unpreparedness and the manner in which they reached a dead end with no exit plan angered many.

Others were upset at how Musharraf had let Sharif agree to a withdrawal.

It was this tension that led to a breakdown in relations between Sharif and Musharraf.

By the time Sharif decided to sack Musharraf, it was too late. The scapegoat for the army would be Sharif and not Musharraf.

Sharif was unwilling to decorate the heroes of Kargil and insistent on repairing ties with India.