The future of China’s engagement in Afghanistan
There has been much speculation about China gaining in the aftermath of the withdrawal of the United States (US) from Afghanistan. However, contrary to this perception, events of the past few weeks actually amplify the strategic challenges that Beijing faces. Yet, they also present the Chinese leadership with an opportunity to demonstrate China’s capacity as a great power to shape outcomes in the region.
While China was never entirely comfortable with the US presence in Afghanistan, this did serve Beijing’s strategic interests. There were, of course, trade-offs such as having the US military along China’s western periphery and contending with prolonged instability in West Asia along with the spread of transnational terrorism. But, overall, China has benefited from the US war on terror. It kept the US distracted and embroiled in long-drawn-out anti-insurgency and State-building operations. It provided China with the opportunity to free-ride in a regional security environment underwritten by American military power. And it allowed China and the US to cooperate on tackling threats posed by terrorism, while also creating an enabling narrative for the Communist Party to crack down on minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet.
Foreign minister Wang Yi’s comments to US secretary of state Antony Blinken earlier this week were indicative of Beijing’s discomfort with the US disengagement. Wang warned that a “hasty withdrawal... is likely to offer an opportunity to various terrorist groups in Afghanistan to resurge”. He called on the US to “help Afghanistan combat terrorism and violence, instead of practising double standards or fighting terrorism selectively”. Also, apart from asking for support to “guide” the Taliban, Wang called on the US to “work with the international community to provide Afghanistan with urgently needed economic, livelihood and humanitarian assistance”, and “help the new Afghan political structure maintain normal operation of government institutions, maintain social security and stability, curb currency depreciation and inflation”.
As evident from this, at one level, the US withdrawal amplifies Beijing’s challenges associated with terrorism. This is not only with regard to the threat, however limited, of infiltration into Xinjiang but also in the context of inspiration for and revitalisation of transnational terror outfits. These could impact China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
At another level, it signals the Biden administration pivoting its strategic focus towards the Indo-Pacific. With Afghanistan dominating global headlines, US vice-president Kamala Harris’s trip to Southeast Asia received little coverage. While in Singapore, Harris outlined the administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy, highlighting the US’s “enduring interests” and “enduring commitments” in the region. Although the gains of the visit were limited, the direction of US foreign policy is becoming clearer.
Then, there is a second school of thought which argues that the nature of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the return of the Taliban have fundamentally eroded Washington’s credibility and legitimacy. This, the argument goes, will impinge on the thinking and decisions of partners in the Indo-Pacific too, which, in turn, benefits Beijing. Unsurprisingly, Chinese Party-state media has seized this opportunity to challenge the values-based foreign policy narrative of the Biden administration.
Such a perspective will indeed be useful at home and will have some purchase in willing states; it could indeed result in some reputation costs for the US in the short-term. However, in the long-term, US foreign policy driven primarily by a focus on strategic interests and pragmatism, as opposed to adherence to a values framework or transactionalism, will likely be far more welcome for partners and allies alike.
A third strand of thought doing the rounds is about China swooping into Afghanistan after the departure of the US forces to capture the mineral bounty that the country has to offer. Former senior PLA colonel Zhou Bo’s recent article in The New York Times made this case. Unfortunately, the reality is that big Chinese investments in Afghanistan’s natural resources over the past two decades have not yet yielded any significant gains. It is unlikely that amid potentially greater instability in the near future, the Chinese leadership will suddenly begin viewing the country from an opportunity prism. This, of course, does not mean that Beijing will not use its substantial financial capacity as a carrot to try and shape the Taliban’s behaviour.
However, even if Beijing does decide to throw caution to the wind and invest in major natural resource extraction projects in Afghanistan, this shouldn’t be entirely unwelcome. In fact, from an Indian interest perspective, all of the above provides opportunities for cooperation with China.
A stable Afghanistan that has a steady and productive source of revenue and livelihood for its people and that is not a gathering place for terrorism serves India’s interests too. In fact, just like Wang did with Blinken, India should impress upon China, given its financial and political clout and proximity to Pakistan, to take a more active role in ensuring stability in Afghanistan. Beijing has long argued that it is a major power; this is the moment for it to act as one.