Hindustan Times (Lucknow)

Pegasus vs Privacy: What the Centre can expect from the SC

- Kalaham NS Nappinai is an advocate, Supreme Court of India and founder – Cyber Saathi. The views expressed are personal

Intrigue and mystery continue to hound the Pegasus row. The central government started off strong by categorica­lly denying any violation of privacy, but appears to have fallen short of the requiremen­t expected by the Supreme Court (SC).

Two broad heads of inquiry were needed once the Pegasus spyware issue came to the fore — on its usage against citizens of India and its purchase. The latter does not, by itself, constitute material in the context of the hearing before the SC but the former, ie, usage of spyware to monitor individual­s, certainly raises serious concerns that needed to be addressed immediatel­y.

On usage, the focus was, till now, on the individual­s claiming violation of their privacy rights, whereas in law, the burden always lies with the person raising a claim. But with the ambivalent stand taken by the government before the SC, it appears that the norm may have been turned on its head and the government is now in the spotlight having to prove the negative (if negative it be).

That the government’s refusal to furnish more details would result in an adverse inference being drawn by the SC is almost a certainty. What the consequenc­es of such adverse inference are likely to be is the question. The law is explicit on the Centre’s rights to intercept, monitor (including traffic data), decrypt or block. Parliament has enacted provisions under Sections 69, 69A and 69B of the Informatio­n Technology (IT) Act, 2000 (as amended), and read with the rules framed thereunder, these clearly delineate the permissibl­e from the impermissi­ble.

The permissibl­e is restricted to access not only through compliance with the process set out under these provisions, including of reasonable cause and orders based thereon by a competent authority, but also for any act of intercepti­on, decryption or monitoring to be undertaken through the intermedia­ry or service provider. For instance, if law enforcemen­t needed to decrypt or monitor a Whatsapp group for circulatin­g child pornograph­y, the same would be feasible through a written order of the competent authority, based on the request in writing by a government agency, supported by reasonable cause. This order of the competent authority would be implemente­d thereafter through the service provider, which, in this hypothetic­al case, is WhatsApp. Nowhere in the IT Act or Rules is there permission for use of spyware.

Similarly, Section 5 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, provides for taking temporary possession or for intercepti­on. The Rules framed for implementi­ng Section 5 explicitly provide for the intercepti­on directions to be served on the designated officer of the licensees under the said Act. Hence, similar to the IT Act, the Telegraph Act also clearly vests the implementa­tion of an order for the intercepti­on in the licensee or service provider. Usage of a spyware, therefore, for intercepti­ons or monitoring does not have the imprimatur of law. The SC, in Puttaswamy v Union of India (2017), upheld and clarified privacy to be a sacrosanct fundamenta­l right. It cannot be trivialise­d or diluted, least of all through ambiguous claims.

The appointmen­t of an independen­t committee by the SC appears inevitable. There can only be speculatio­n on the scope of inquiry ie, of whether the same would expand to include purchase also or be limited to usage.

An adverse inference against the government would not, by itself, absolve the individual­s claiming violation of their privacy of their burden of proof. At best, an adverse inference only provides the basis for the interventi­on of the SC. Each person claiming infringeme­nt of his or her rights would still have to establish such violation. However, if the scope were to include the issue of purchase, then the ball lies squarely in the government’s court. The reason to assume that the scope of inquiry may be limited to only usage is that while purchase may be assumed to precede usage, mere preparatio­n in law is not a violation, unless such act of preparatio­n itself amounts to a violation.

Either way, for India and its citizens, the Pegasus row is a positive move, for as with Narada and his trouble-making, it is from

(conflict) that clarity results.

 ?? NS NAPPINAI ??
NS NAPPINAI

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