New Delhi’s tough choices in South Asia
There is a growing divergence between how India and its neighbours view evolving geopolitics, particularly the role of China and the US
China has swiftly but surely stepped into the vacuum created by the ignominious American withdrawal from Afghanistan. Utterly dependent on China for its survival, the Taliban regime has provided a ringing endorsement of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and wants to be a part of the Belt and Road (BRI) initiative; the first project expected to be taken up is the Peshawar-Kabul road. Added to this is the silence of the Taliban on the situation of the Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, while it has no similar hesitation when it comes to Jammu and Kashmir.
Though the China-Pakistan axis in Afghanistan has ominous overtones for India’s security and other vital interests as pointed out by several strategic experts, there is another regional dimension that also needs to be monitored.
Since July 2020, China has been hosting a meeting of a subgroup of South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) members — all supporters of the BRI — with varied participation, ostensibly to discuss the Covid-19 pandemic and its economic consequences. A set of four China-led meetings have been held so far with participation at the foreign minister/ vice-minister level from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The last such meeting endorsed the establishment of a China-South Asian Countries Poverty Alleviation and Cooperative Development Centre in Chongqing.
Clearly, this mechanism is not only here to stay but is expanding its remit. Neither India nor Bhutan or the Maldives are participants in this initiative. In his recently published book, All Roads Lead North, Nepal’s Turn to China, journalist and analyst Amish Raj Mulmi refers to this new group as a “Trans-Himalayan Quad”. He draws attention to its emphasis on “exploring ways to synergise the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the China Nepal Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network”.
In my own book, Kathmandu Dilemma, Resetting India-Nepal Ties ,I raise some issues relating to the synergy between these two distinct projects, and what it could imply for India. In particular, does China wish to model the Trans-Himalayan Network with Nepal on CPEC? Is China offering Nepal the use of CPEC as an alternative trade and transit route? Is China creating a Himalayan string of pearls to encircle India from the north, just as it is doing in the maritime domain? With Afghanistan securely ensconced in the PakistanChina camp, future meetings of this China-led group could effectively imply recognition of the Taliban regime, or at the very least, cooperation with it, by some of our South Asian neighbours, irrespective of the Indian position.
That China’s clout has grown in South Asia is self-evident; that the clout of the other superpower, the United States (US) is in decline, less so. Some of our neighbours, in deference to China’s wishes, are rejecting massive grant projects under the US-sponsored Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) at great cost to themselves, whereas they have little compunction in accepting BRI projects that are largely financed through loans and have given rise to fears of a debt trap as evident in the Sri Lankan case.
The Sri Lanka MCC project valued at $480 million for improving transport infrastructure and land management has been scrapped following the election of the Gotabaya Rajapaksa government. The Nepal MCC project valued at $630 million, of which $500 million is an MCC grant, for constructing transmission lines to facilitate evacuation of power to India and maintenance of roads has not been ratified by Nepal’s parliament. Though, as prime minister, KP Oli was a votary of the project, his rivals, Prachanda and Madhav Kumar Nepal, within the then unified Communist party, were opposed to it on the grounds that it was part of the US Indo-Pacific strategy, which they view as anti-China. Prachanda has since parted ways with Oli and is now in the ruling coalition under PM Sher Bahadur Deuba, who wishes to see the project ratified but Prachanda continues to oppose it. Oli, now leader of the opposition, has done a volte face and is no longer supporting the project.
A similar reluctance to annoy the Chinese was seen in Nepal’s refusal to allow the Nepalese army (NA) to participate in the Bimstec military exercise hosted by India in Pune in September 2018, even though the NA was fully involved in the preparations.
The awkwardly named AUKUS, the Australia, United Kingdom and the US security alliance announced on September 16, under which Australia will receive nuclear-powered submarines, will further confirm the perception in our neighbourhood that the Indo-Pacific strategy is primarily aimed at containing China. The smaller South Asian countries will be mindful of the Chinese response to AUKUS.
Given India’s support for the IndoPacific strategy, and participation in Quad (we have not yet formally commented on AUKUS), there is a growing divergence between how our neighbours and we view the evolving geopolitical situation in our region. This calls for stronger engagement and exchange of views with our neighbours and a stepping up of our connectivity projects both at bilateral and subregional levels.