Air surveillance can avert Sukma-like Maoist attacks
There is no other option but to implement the ‘security with development’ strategy in letter and spirit
On April 24, Maoists killed 25 CRPF personnel in Sukma. The ambush took place only a kilometre away from a CRPF post at Burkapal, which was established in 2013 by the Chhattisgarh Police and later taken over by the force to bridge the 12-km gap between Chintagufa and Chintalnar.
The availability of precise intelligence input is important for any successful operation. In a hostile environment, the forces face a herculean task of keeping themselves alert all the time. In the absence of roads for transport and mobile connectivity, the flow of information often gets delayed and so security forces are unable to take timely action.
Further, it is also difficult to verify such information and many a times the anti-Maoist operations are launched based on general inputs. The scenario, however, has been changing steadily. The tardy speed of road construction has improved. With more delegation of power, local contractors have undertaken construction works, though in patches. When all other agencies failed, the task of road construction, along the most challenging routes (including the under-construction Dornapal-Chintagufa-Jagargunda highway) was taken up by the Chhattisgarh Police Housing Corporation. Both central and state police provide security for this.
The mission of establishing 146 new mobile towers in the Maoist-hit areas has been accomplished. More are coming up. With more villages connected, intelligence will improve. Besides, three AIR stations are coming up in Bastar; regional programmes could help revive tribal culture and change the hostile atmosphere. We are also recruiting personnel for India Reserve battalions of Chhattisgarh from the Maoist-affected districts so that the problems related to local language and knowledge of terrain are minimised. The CRPF is also raising its Bastariya battalion . The next step is to use technology. For example, air surveillance of affected areas needs to be set-up at a battalion level. Plus we need more forces to reverse their mobile war. The central task of the Maoists still remaining the same i.e.; ‘to capture political power through protracted armed struggle with people’s support’, there is no other option than to implement the ‘security with development’ strategy in letter and spirit.
In an article in HT, former police officer Prakash Singh wrote ‘the state police forces lean heavily on the shoulders of the central armed police forces’ and ‘are in a shambles’. This is not true: The state police forces have increased their strength threefold since 2000 and have also occupied forward camps. The state’s ownership is total and complete.