Indian EVMs tamperproof, robust unlike West: Zaidi
Unlike The Netherlands, Ireland, machines here can’t be hacked or manipulated
Beginning June 3, the Election Commission has invited political parties to prove that electronic voting machines (EVMs) can be tampered with.
Several parties, led by Arvind Kejriwal’s Aam Aadmi Party, have claimed that the BJP’s victory in a string of state and civic elections was a result of the manipulation of EVMs and not a reflection of the voter sentiment.
The BJP and the EC have both denied the charge.
The poll panel while announcing the EVM challenge on Saturday again said the EVMs used by it were tamperproofW and comparing them with the ones discarded by several Western countries was unfair as the systems and technology were different.
“EVMs used in The Netherlands, Ireland and Germany were privately manufactured and had no independent certification system unlike a very robust verification and certification system… in case of ECI (Election Commission of India) EVMs,” chief election commissioner Nasim Zaidi said.
WHAT SETS INDIA APART
Data from the NEDAP machines used in the Netherlands is transferred through CDs but the Indian EVMs store data internally. Indian EVMs are standalone, direct-recording machines with no possibility of network connectivity with citizens casting their votes at an assigned polling station. It means that the machine can’t be accessed remotely or be hacked into. This feature, EC officials say, makes them impossible to manipulate. Chips were so designed that if tampered with, machines become inoperable, poll panels officials said.
THE NETHERLANDS
Information provided by the EC shows that the machines used in The Netherlands between 1990 and 2007 were manufactured by a private Dutch company, NEDAP (Nederlandse Apparaten Fabriek NV). In 2006, the government ordered an independent test of the machines. Two independent commissions were also asked to review the security and reliability features. The machines were discontinued after the commissions said the ministry responsible for holding polls didn’t have enough technical knowledge about the machines, forcing officials to depend on external actors for conducting elections. Technology vendors became part of the decision-making process and the ministry couldn’t exercise oversight.
GERMANY
In Germany, the NEDAP-manufactured e-voting machines were used between 2005 and 2009.
The Bundesverfassungsgericht, or the federal constitutional court of Germany, discontinued the machines in 2009, saying they violated the principle of the public nature of elections. The conthing stitution clearly laid out all steps in the elections process were subject to public scrutiny unless said otherwise, the court said.
IRELAND
Ireland used NEDAP machines from 2002 to 2004. Two independent commissions concluded that the machines could not be used because of inadequate safeguards, insecure transfer of data through CDs and inconsistencies in physical security of machines across constituencies.
THE USA
In 2000, the voting method was reviewed and direct recording electronic (DRE) systems introduced after a dispute in the presidential election. DRE systems use “one of three basic interfaces (pushbutton, touch screen or dial)” through which “voters record their votes directly into computer memory.
As many as 27 states use direct recording machines. Fifteen of these use paper audit trails. The other voting methods include: optical scan paper ballot systems, ballot-marking devices and the punch card ballot.
EVMS USED IN THE NETHERLANDS, IRELAND AND GERMANY HAD NO INDEPENDENT CERTIFICATION SYSTEM, SAID CHIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER ZAIDI