‘LAC HOLDS NO SANCTITY FOR CHINESE ARMY’
GENERAL VP MALIK (RETD), former chief of army staff
With the violent Ladakh face-off spiking the tensions between India and China, General VP Malik (retd), former army chief, in an interview with Executive Editor Ramesh Vinayak, analyses New Delhi’s options and the road ahead in fraught Sino-India ties.
The savage killing of 20 Indian soldiers by the Chinese military in the deadliest border clash in last four and a half decades has dramatically spiked tensions between the two nuclear-equipped neighbours.
As New Delhi weighs its response, a defining marker of the Ladakh face-off, according to General Ved Prakash Malik, former chief of the Indian army, is that the military-level engagement on the long-contested Line of Actual Control, premised on a series of bilateral agreements and protocols, has ceased to be a dispute resolution mechanism. In an interview on Wednesday with Executive Editor Ramesh Vinayak, Gen Malik, who led India’s decisive victory against Pakistani intrusion in the 1999 Kargil war, analysed India’s options, the geo-strategic portents in the escalation on the eastern frontiers and the road ahead in fraught Sino-India ties. Excerpts:
What is your reading of the deadly clash between Indian and Chinese soldiers in Ladakh? What makes it an extraordinary escalation?
Two facts stand out from the present face-off: (a) the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) encroachment across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Galwan Valley and in the disputed area of Fingers, North of Pangong Tso has been a well-planned military activity (b) military-level dialogue and understanding on the LAC has no sanctity for the People Liberation Army of China. This military action has eroded whatever ‘confidence’ that was created with China at the military level, and trust at diplomatic and political levels.
From the defence standpoint, what are the most crucial consequences of the “violent face-off” in the Galwan Valley?
Despite several agreements and protocols, special representative- level talks and political summits to maintain peace and tranquillity along the LAC, the number of PLA attempts to encroach upon undisputed/disputed territories have increased. The level of violence from scuffles to stone pelting and use of nailsembedded wooden clubs to kill opponent soldiers have increased. I foresee larger deployment of troops on both sides along the LAC to ensure security of our territory and assets. This will also require urgent improvement of military infrastructure to sustain troops deployed.
What do you see as the tactical and strategic objectives of China’s multiple and in-depth transgressions and holding the ground in what India has so far seen as its side of Line of Actual Control?
China under President Xi Jinping is committed to retake all territories which it perceives to have belonged to China in the past. Its attempts to execute salami slicing or creeping encroachments avoiding major escalation (‘lull the political adversary to comfort level before striking at military level’) will continue. We can expect more such military level activities, particularly in Ladakh, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh.
Reports suggest that intelligence agencies had red flagged the PLA troops’ unusual build-up at multiple points along LAC by April before their ingress and occupation of roughly sixty square km of what was so far an Indian-patrolled areas in Galwan Valley and Pangong Tso. Did our side lower the guard? Or, were we taken by surprise?
I have no knowledge of such an intelligence report from any source.
Do you think our military response on the ground was adequate and effective enough to countervail the Chinese intrusion?
As per past practices in Demchok, Depsang, Chumar areas in Ladakh and in Dokalam, the effort at military and diplomatic levels was to defuse and disengage. This has been the government’s policy and the usual response to maintain peace and tranquillity and avoid violent escalation. The army has gone as per those policy guidelines. These guidelines may change hereafter.
Now that China has aggressively attempted to redefine the LAC at strategic stretches and staked claim on the Galwan Valley that was so far seen to be on the Indian side, what options India has for restoration of status quo ante (before April) and counter China’s playbook of redrawing the LAC on ground while keeping its aggression below the threshold of actual conflict?
While the armed forces have to be prepared for any military escalation, it is for the cabinet committee of security to consider wider geo-political and strategic aspects and then give further directions. I think the government will now explore diplomatic and political level possibilities to get the encroachments vacated before going in for escalation.
Is a localised military response still one of options?
I believe any military-level dialogue at this stage is unlikely to produce desired results. It has to be tackled at diplomatic and political level now. However, with prevailing tension and anger among troops who are in eye ball to eye ball situation, a violent escalation cannot be ruled out. The armed forces have to remain extra alert for any military action.
In view of Indian army sustaining unprecedented fatalities on the Chinese front, what in your assessment are the chances of things flaring up militarily along LAC?
I do not expect the situation will develop into a full-fledged war or even major skirmishes along the length of our border. It is likely to remain localised. That, however, does not mean that we should become complacent militarily or politically.
Given that Monday’s clashes happened during “disengagement” agreed upon by senior military commanders of both sides, do the bilateral dispute resolution protocols/agreements still hold good for defusing the local stand-offs? Have these mechanisms failed? Is it time to relook at them?
Yes! My answer to Q 1 makes it clear. More importantly, we must not allow our troops to get into ‘unarmed’ or ‘scuffle’ situations. A new SOP will be required for patrolling on the ground and for any flag meetings.
Amid a heightened antagonism and mistrust between India and China, what will be the most important geo-strategic consequences of a tense LAC for India vis-àvis Pakistan?
Pakistan may attempt to intensify (a) its sponsored terrorist activities in J&K, and (b) ceasefire violations along the LoC and AGPL. India has the capability to handle any such escalations
Why it is crucial to resolve or freeze the border dispute with China?
The border dispute must be resolved peacefully or frozen till both nations can find a peaceful solution. That way both nations will be able to contribute towards peace, tranquillity and prosperity of Asia and also improve the quality of life of their people.
Is a two-front scenario now more real than ever before?
Unless the border dispute is resolved peacefully, such a possibility in the North West part of India cannot be ruled out in the middle distant horizon.
Do you see any parallel between Pakistan’s intrusion of Kargil in 1999 and China’s intrusion in Ladakh?
No. Pakistani military and political objectives in Kargil were much larger. It became a limited war situation. Present Chinese intrusion in Ladakh, unless it escalates further, cannot be compared to Kargil conflict. Given the complexity and high-level bilateral and multilateral interaction (including security) between India and China, the stakes in any IndiaChina conflict, whether large scale or limited, will be much higher.
What does the Ladakh 2020 tell us about the strategic lessons that India learnt or hasn’t learnt fully from the Kargil 1999?
As I said, there are no comparisons. The Chinese political and military strategies are of different style. We have to study them carefully. At the military tactical and operational level, the only thing common is high-altitude mountain warfare. In that respect, our troops are better skilled and have greater adaptation.